Russia, China, and the changing Eurasian balance - and what does it mean for Ukraine?

As 2026 draws to a close, the international system is deeply unsettled. The war in Ukraine is entering its fifth year, Russia remains committed to it, the United States is confronting Iran, and relations between Washington and Beijing alternate between rivalry and accommodation. Meanwhile, China continues to expand its economic, technological and military influence across Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific.

These developments can look like a set of separate crises. They are not. They are increasingly connected parts of a much larger shift in the distribution of global power.

The central question is no longer only whether Russia can defeat Ukraine, whether Ukraine can recover its occupied territory, or whether China might one day attack Taiwan. A broader question is emerging: what happens to the Eurasian balance of power if Russia emerges from the Ukraine war substantially weakened while China continues to grow in economic, technological and strategic importance? The question deserves attention because the usual Western focus on Taiwan may obscure a slower-moving development to China's north: the growing imbalance between China and Russia in their economic relationship, especially in Siberia, the Russian Far East and the Arctic.

The weakening of Russia

Russia should not be described as weak in absolute terms. It remains a nuclear superpower with immense territory and resources, a large military and considerable diplomatic influence. Yet it is becoming weaker relative to China and the United States, and the war has imposed heavy military, economic and demographic costs. Russia has devoted extraordinary resources to the fighting, while its relationship with Europe has shifted from economic interdependence to strategic hostility. With European energy markets closed to it, Moscow has increasingly turned toward Beijing.

China is now a major buyer of Russian energy. Its purchases of Russian oil and gas have grown since the invasion, while Chinese companies have assumed a larger role in Russian and Arctic projects. The United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission notes that Russia is China's largest source of imported natural gas and that Chinese companies have acquired significant interests in Arctic energy development.

The result is a remarkable reversal. For much of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union was the dominant political and military power across northern Eurasia. Today Russia remains geographically enormous, but its economic relationship with China is increasingly lopsided. Russia needs Chinese markets, technology, manufactured goods and diplomatic support. China, by contrast, can obtain resources elsewhere and cooperate with Russia while preserving relationships with the United States, Europe and the developing world. The longer the war continues, the more Russia's strategic independence may erode, turning China from a partner of convenience into the dominant power in the relationship.

China and the Russian Far East

This raises a broader question: why should China's present principal territorial concern necessarily be Taiwan? Taiwan is unquestionably important to Beijing. Chinese leaders regard it as a core sovereignty issue and insist that reunification must eventually occur, although they say peaceful reunification is preferable. Taiwan is a self-governing democracy that rejects Beijing's sovereignty claim. A military assault would be extraordinarily dangerous: an invasion across the Taiwan Strait would be one of the most demanding operations imaginable, exposing China to severe losses, economic disruption, sanctions and possible social instability.

China may therefore gain increasing influence over the Russian Far East without attempting to conquer it. The region possesses immense natural resources, Pacific ports and access to the Arctic, yet is sparsely populated compared with the Chinese provinces immediately to the south. China has capital, industrial capacity, infrastructure-building expertise and a vast population; Russia has immense territory but limited population and capital in its eastern regions. Beijing can exploit this imbalance without changing the border by building transport links, buying energy, investing in infrastructure, expanding trade and participating in Arctic development. It could become indispensable to the region economically without acquiring Russian territory.

A National Bureau of Asian Research analysis notes that Vladivostok has become a transit hub for Chinese domestic cargo and argues that China's objectives, resources, transport corridors, Arctic access and economic development, can largely be achieved without territorial revisionism. This frames the Russian Far East as "low-hanging fruit": the economic opportunities created by Russian weakness may matter more to China than the territory itself.

The historical question

The argument nevertheless has a historical dimension. In the nineteenth century, Imperial Russia acquired substantial territories from Qing China through agreements often regarded in Chinese historical memory as unequal. The Amur and Ussuri regions and the area around present-day Vladivostok therefore remain associated with a significant chapter of territorial loss.

History, however, should not be confused with current policy. China and Russia spent decades settling their border dispute. In 2004 they declared that the remaining disputed sections of their more than 4,300-kilometre border had been resolved, and Beijing presented the settlement as a model for peaceful dispute resolution. Later arrangements formalised it, and both governments have repeatedly affirmed the frontier's stability. A Chinese military attempt to recover nineteenth-century territories would reverse, rather than continue, this diplomacy. Russia's nuclear arsenal makes such an attack even more dangerous. The more plausible Chinese strategy is leverage, not conquest.

Why Taiwan remains different

Taiwan cannot be dismissed. For the Chinese Communist Party, it has ideological and historical significance that the Russian Far East lacks. It is tied to national rejuvenation and the unfinished legacy of the Chinese civil war, so Beijing's calculations are not purely economic.

This creates a strategic paradox. China could gain substantial benefits from Russia's weakening without firing a shot, whereas war over Taiwan would place its military, economy and international reputation under immediate pressure. Taiwan offers immense symbolic and strategic importance at enormous risk; the Russian Far East offers major economic opportunities with comparatively little need for military action. China is unlikely to abandon its ambitions regarding Taiwan, but assuming that its next major strategic move must target the island may be too narrow. The future may instead be marked by Chinese economic penetration of the Eurasian north.

Russia's dilemma

Moscow intended confrontation with the West to restore Russia's status as an independent great power. Yet prolonged confrontation with Europe and the United States has increased dependence on China. The two countries describe their relationship as a comprehensive strategic partnership, and in May 2026 Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin agreed to extend the China-Russia Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation. But partnership does not mean equality. Chatham House describes the relationship as durable and pragmatic, not a formal alliance. China gains energy, geopolitical cooperation and a secure northern frontier; Russia gains markets, resilience and diplomatic relevance. The relationship nevertheless contains substantial asymmetry and Chinese caution.

The proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline illustrates the imbalance. Russia has promoted it strongly, while China has remained cautious and sought favourable terms - the negotiating position of the stronger economic partner. Russia's deeper problem is not an impending Chinese invasion but the possibility that it will be unable to develop Siberia and the Far East without Chinese capital, markets, technology and infrastructure. This is a form of imperial pressure that requires no tanks: contracts, investment, pipelines, railways, ports, energy purchases, and infrastructure can turn economic dependence into strategic influence.

The Trump factor

This is unfolding amid turbulent American foreign policy. President Donald Trump has pursued personal diplomacy with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin while confronting Iran. The White House presented his September 2026 meeting with Xi in Washington as a step towards a "constructive relationship of strategic stability," but the summit produced dialogue rather than resolution, with disagreements continuing over Taiwan, technology, Iran and the broader relationship.

American power remains central to the balance. Washington is managing China, Russia, Iran and other challenges simultaneously; the more crises it faces, the greater the strain on its diplomatic and military resources. Europe, and especially Ukraine, risks receiving less attention.

Ukraine in the international system

The international argument over the legitimacy of Russia's invasion has not disappeared. At the United Nations in September 2026, Secretary-General António Guterres again described the full-scale invasion as a violation of the UN Charter, while the General Assembly continued to emphasise Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity and the need for a just peace. General Assembly President Annalena Baerbock stressed that territorial integrity cannot be applied selectively and reported that Ukrainian civilian casualties in the first half of 2026 were 114 per cent higher than in the corresponding period of 2024. The United Kingdom also said Russian military action cannot alter Ukraine's sovereignty or internationally recognised borders.

Ukraine's position is therefore part of a larger question: whether the post-1945 international system still means what it says about sovereignty and territorial integrity.

What does the changing China–Russia relationship mean for Ukraine?

The changing relationship presents Ukraine with dangers and opportunities. If Russia becomes more dependent on China, Beijing may gain leverage while continuing to supply markets, industrial goods, technology and diplomatic support that help Russia withstand Western pressure and sustain the war. China has little incentive to see Russia collapse, since a functioning but dependent Russia remains a useful partner and source of energy and resources. The longer this relationship endures, the harder it may become to weaken Russia's war-making capacity. If Washington is preoccupied with China, Iran and other crises, Ukraine may also slip down the American agenda.

Yet a significantly weakened Russia may no longer dominate Eastern Europe, intimidate its neighbours, or project power across its former sphere of influence. Its dependence on China could diminish the strategic autonomy that Moscow sought to restore.

Ukraine's importance extends far beyond its borders. If Russia establishes that conquest can permanently alter the borders of a sovereign European state, the consequences will weaken a fundamental principle of the post-1945 order. If Ukraine survives as a sovereign, independent European state, Russia's attempt to reverse the post-Cold War order will have achieved far less than intended. Ukraine's survival would test whether territorial conquest can again become an accepted instrument of great-power politics.

The larger Eurasian paradox

Russia launched the war to restore geopolitical power and its status as a dominant Eurasian force, yet it risks emerging militarily depleted, economically constrained and increasingly dependent on China. China, meanwhile, can extend its influence across Eurasia without conquest. Taiwan remains profoundly important to Beijing, but an assault carries enormous risks; the Russian Far East offers expansion through investment, infrastructure, energy, trade and long-term dependency.

The future may therefore be shaped less by invasions than by shifts in dependence: who supplies energy, provides investment, builds infrastructure, controls markets, possesses technology and offers diplomatic alternatives. The key question may not be where armies stand, but who needs whom.

And Ukraine?

Ukraine's immediate reality remains difficult. Russian pressure continues, civilian casualties are high, and no durable peace has emerged. Russia's weakening could improve Ukraine's position, but weakness is not imminent collapse: Russia retains military resources, nuclear weapons, energy and diplomatic relationships. Ukraine cannot base its future on Russian disintegration.

At the same time, Ukrainian resistance has prevented Russia from achieving its original political objective. Moscow has not eliminated Ukraine as an independent state or persuaded the United Nations that conquest is legitimate. Continued recognition of Ukrainian sovereignty is strategically important.

The links form a chain: the longer the war continues, the more dependent Russia may become on China; the weaker Russia becomes, the greater China's relative power in northern Eurasia; but the more Ukraine survives as an independent European state, the less successful Russia's attempt to rebuild its sphere of domination will be. This may be one of the war's great unintended consequences.

The central geopolitical question is whether the world moves towards a system in which great powers determine smaller states' futures, or one in which sovereignty, territorial integrity and international law retain genuine force. Ukraine stands at that crossroads. Beyond it lies a larger Eurasian chessboard: Russia defending its great-power status, China increasing its weight, the United States managing simultaneous crises and Europe reconsidering its strategic responsibilities. The outcome is uncertain, but the Ukraine war will reshape the balance of power across Eurasia.