Reconstituting the United Nations for collective security – we need a popular campaign!

When United Nations failure costs lives

The consequences of these weaknesses are measured in human lives. Armed actors, not the United Nations, commit atrocities, so not every death can be attributed to institutional failure. Yet inaction can leave perpetrators free. Three failures recur: vetoes prevent decisions; peacekeepers receive weak mandates and resources; and troops arrive only after governments negotiate contributions while civilians are killed. Rwanda, Srebrenica, Syria and Sudan illustrate failures.

Sudanis the contemporary example. War between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces began in April 2023 and produced mass killing, violence, displacement and hunger. In June 2024, Security Council resolution 2736 demanded that the Rapid Support Forces halt its siege of El Fasher and called for humanitarian access. The demand was not enforced. In November 2024, Russia vetoed a draft calling for a nationwide ceasefire and unhindered aid, although every other Council member supported it.

By 2026, the World Food Programme reported that nine million people had been forced from their homes, nearly 19.5 million faced acute hunger and 825,000 children under five were expected to suffer severe acute malnutrition. The UN remained essential for relief and diplomacy but lacked an independent force able to secure humanitarian corridors, protect threatened communities or compel compliance. Sudan exposes the gap between recognising catastrophe and possessing the means to stop it.

Rwandademonstrated the cost of retreat in the face of mass murder. During the 1994 genocide, approximately 800,000 people were killed in one hundred days. The UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda had a limited mandate and strength. After ten Belgian peacekeepers were murdered, most of the mission was withdrawn when reinforcement was required. A standing force could not have guaranteed prevention, but units authorised to protect civilians, secure refuge sites and confront organised killing would have offered possibilities that delayed national contributions could not.

Srebrenicarevealed the danger of promising protection without the power to deliver it. The Security Council declared the Bosnian enclave a safe area, but the UN force lacked troops, deterrent capacity and support. Bosnian Serb forces overran the enclave in July 1995 and murdered more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys. The UN should never offer civilians a guarantee that its authorities have not equipped personnel to uphold. A credible mandate requires forces, reinforcement and willingness to act when a protected area is attacked. This means superior military enforcement.

Syriaillustrates paralysis through great power conflict. Security Council divisions and vetoes prevented a collective response as the war expanded and atrocities multiplied. The UN Human Rights Office estimated that 306,887 civilians were killed through direct conflict related causes between March 2011 and March 2021 alone. Similar weaknesses have appeared in Myanmar, Yemen, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo: warnings, investigations and humanitarian assistance document suffering, but the international community cannot compel armed actors to stop. These cases do not prove that military intervention is always wise. They prove that an organisation claiming responsibility for international peace requires options between verbal condemnation and improvised war by individual states.

The veto and constitutional change

Russia can obstruct action concerning Ukraine, while the United States can block measures opposed by Israel concerning Palestine.General Assembly procedures such as Uniting for Peace and the automatic debate following a veto increase political accountability, but the Assembly recommends rather than compels.

1. Complete veto abolition is the clearest democratic solution.

2. If immediate abolition is unattainable, binding restrictions should prohibit vetoes in cases of genocide, mass atrocities and clear aggression; prevent parties to a conflict from voting on enforcement concerning themselves; and permit a General Assembly majority of two-thirds to override it.

Under Article 108, however, Charter amendments require ratification by every permanent member. Reformers must therefore pursue achievable interim changes while building support for reconstitution.

A permanent force capable of rapid deployment

A reformed organisation needs a standing armed force, not promises of troops that governments may withhold when a crisis occurs. It should combine a permanent international headquarters, logistics system and directly recruited core with larger national units committed under binding readiness agreements. It should possess strategic transport, field hospitals, secure communications and prepositioned supplies. An advance formation should deploy within days, with heavier reinforcements arriving within thirty to sixty days. Personnel should swear loyalty to the Charter while serving, train together and operate through an integrated command. Geographically balanced recruitment, instruction in humanitarian law, and strict protection against sexual exploitation and other abuse would be essential. An independent inspector general, prosecutor and claims mechanism must ensure that immunity never becomes impunity.

Palestine and the Gaza force

Security Council resolution 2803 of November 2025 authorised an International Stabilization Force for Gaza within a United States backed plan involving a transitional Board of Peace. The ISF is intended to support security, Palestinian policing, humanitarian work, reconstruction, demilitarisation and Israeli withdrawal. It is temporary, confined to Gaza, assembled from national contributions and dependent on political negotiations among participating governments and the parties. A genuine UN force would be directly commanded by the international organisation and, once lawfully deployed with meaningful Palestinian consent, would not be controlled by Israel, Hamas or an outside patron. It would enforce reciprocal obligations: preventing attacks and hostage taking by Palestinian armed organisations, protecting Israeli civilians, stopping unlawful attacks on Palestinians and armed settler violence, supervising Israeli withdrawal and acting against every party attempting to destroy the settlement.