Battle for the Gulf tomorrow: between a Hobbesian and a Kantian world

For smaller and middle-sized states in particular, participation in shaping the regional order is itself a matter of security. Those who are absent from the process through which the regional order is shaped risk becoming objects rather than authors of that order. A permanent regional process would therefore give smaller states not merely a voice in moments of crisis, but a continuing capacity to shape the rules, norms and arrangements by which their security is affected.

The major powers will continue to pursue their interests through strategic competition, deterrence and periods of selective détente. Smaller and middle-sized states, however, have a different instrument of statecraft – if timely, available to them: institution-building.

Their influence is well beyond the military weight alone. It can derive from convening, mediation, rule-making, connectivity and the creation of institutions in which larger powers also have an interest in maintaining stability. This is a form of statecraft particularly suited to a region in which no single power can impose a durable security order.

The Muscat Process would provide several strategic advantages:

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• establish a permanent regional platform for dialogue among the principal Gulf actors;
• create structured mechanisms for crisis prevention and conflict de-escalation;
• strengthen regional ownership of security while complementing existing international partnerships;
• reduce the risks of military miscalculation through transparency and confidence-building measures; and
• contribute to a stable environment for economic development, energy security and international trade.

  By maintaining continuous dialogue during both periods of stability and crisis, the Process would help transform episodic diplomacy into a permanent mechanism for regional cooperation.

  Why Oman?

  Oman is uniquely positioned to facilitate such an initiative.

  Its long-standing policy of neutrality, balanced regional relations and proven mediation record has earned the confidence of major regional actors. Muscat has consistently served as a trusted venue for discreet diplomacy and dialogue during periods of heightened tension.

  The credibility of the Process therefore derives not only from its institutional design but also from the reputation of Oman as an impartial and respected facilitator.

   

  III. Proposed Structure

  The Muscat Process should evolve gradually through three successive phases.

   

  Phase I – Confidence Building

  The first phase would focus on establishing regular consultations among GCC member states, Iraq and Iran.

  Meetings would be chaired by Oman and conducted on the basis of consensus, ensuring equal participation and political ownership by all members.

  Initial discussions should concentrate on practical areas where cooperation is both feasible and mutually beneficial, including:

  • maritime security;
  • protection of critical infrastructure;
  • humanitarian cooperation;
  • disaster response;
  • cyber security;
  • environmental challenges; and
  • economic connectivity.

  At this stage, the emphasis should remain on confidence-building rather than formal negotiations on politically sensitive disputes.

   

  Phase II – Institutional Development

  Once regular dialogue has become established, participants could agree to create a modest permanent secretariat in Muscat.

  Working groups composed of governmental officials and technical experts would support cooperation in specific policy areas, while annual ministerial meetings would provide strategic guidance.

  A small administrative structure would ensure continuity without creating excessive institutional costs.

   

  Phase III – Comprehensive Regional Security Framework

  Over the longer term, the Process could gradually evolve into an institutionalised regional organisation comparable in function-though not necessarily in structure-to the OSCE.

  Possible future instruments may include:

  • confidence- and security-building measures;
  • crisis communication mechanisms;
  • military transparency arrangements;
  • maritime incident prevention procedures;
  • early warning and conflict prevention mechanisms;
  • regular political consultations; and
  • joint initiatives on economic and environmental security.

  Such evolution would depend entirely on consensus among participating states.

   

  IV. International Support while Preserving Regional Ownership

  The Muscat Process should remain an indigenous regional initiative.

  External actors would not participate in decision-making but could provide technical expertise and share institutional experience through a "Friends of the Process" mechanism (already diplomatically active).

  An advisory panel composed of distinguished former senior officials from organisations such as the OSCE, the United Nations and other international institutions could support the initial establishment of the Process by providing expertise in mediation, institutional design and confidence-building.

  This approach combines international experience with regional ownership, ensuring that solutions are developed by Gulf states while benefiting from lessons learned elsewhere.

  Expected Strategic Benefits

  If successfully implemented, the Muscat Process could generate substantial long-term benefits for regional stability. Politically, it would institutionalise dialogue among states with divergent strategic interests, reducing the likelihood of escalation through regular communication.

  From a security perspective, it would promote transparency, confidence-building and practical cooperation on shared challenges, including maritime security, cyber threats and protection of critical infrastructure.

  Economically, greater regional stability would strengthen investor confidence, safeguard international energy markets and protect strategic trade routes such as the Strait of Hormuz.

  Institutionally, the Process would establish a comprehensive Gulf security framework owned and led by regional states themselves, complementing rather than replacing existing bilateral and international security arrangements.

   

  Policy Recommendations

  To maximise the prospects for success, participating states should:

  • endorse the establishment of the Muscat Process as a permanent consultative mechanism;
  • reaffirm consensus-based decision-making and equal participation of all members;
  • begin with practical, non-contentious areas of cooperation before addressing more sensitive political and security issues;
  • establish a small, cost-effective secretariat in Muscat to ensure continuity and institutional memory;
  • create technical working groups on maritime security, cyber resilience, critical infrastructure protection and humanitarian cooperation;
  • invite international experts to provide technical support while preserving full regional ownership; and
  • maintain flexibility, allowing the Process to evolve gradually according to the confidence and political will of participating states.

  Conclusion

  The Muscat Process represents a realistic and forward-looking response to the changing strategic environment in the Gulf. Drawing on the successful experience of the CSCE while adapting it to regional realities, it offers an inclusive framework capable of transforming dialogue into sustained cooperation.

  Rather than seeking immediate solutions to deeply rooted geopolitical disputes, the initiative aims to establish the habits, institutions and confidence necessary for durable peace. In doing so, it could lay the foundations for a new Gulf security architecture-one that is regionally owned, internationally supported and designed to promote stability, prosperity and peaceful coexistence for decades to come.

  Well aware that statecraft will ultimately be judged by history, and building on their personal experiences, the 'Friends of the Process' have a simple message: statecraft achieves better results the sooner it recognizes the challenge-especially for smaller states in geopolitically overcrowded neighborhoods. After all, the Bretton Woods institutions and the foundations of the United Nations architecture began to take shape well before the Second World War was over.

  As President Roosevelt understood in the early 1940s, the Gulf does not need to wait for the perfect moment to begin. It needs a process capable of helping create one.