Proportional representation in Iraq is a recipe for instability

Divisions in Iraq have little to do with communal identity. Communal violence has been slight, despite the dire pre-war predictions of politicians and pundits, many of whom had never talked to an Iraqi, let alone stepped foot in the country.

For example, the Najaf governorate is almost entirely Shia but a chasm exists between the old families of Najaf city and the tribal families in the countryside.

Likewise, in areas south of Kirkuk, where Turkmen, Kurds and Arabs live in equal number, residents favour political parties like the Iraqi National Congress that do not base themselves on ethnicity or sectarian preference.

In Iraq, local interests run supreme. As in Australia and the US, politics in Iraq is about patronage. Support for the now-disbanded Governing Council varied. Residents of Basra and Mosul accepted the Governing Council; they had representatives. Residents of the Shia town al-Kut or the predominantly Sunni town of Fallujah did not; they had no representatives.

The best way to ensure civil war in Iraq is to create a system in which some regions feel completely disenfranchised.

Most Iraqis favour constituency-based elections. The Transitional Administrative Law calls for a 275-member National Assembly, which equates to about 30,000 voters per district. Contests would occur not between parties but rather between individuals.

Living among and being accountable to constituents breeds moderation; uncharismatic, corrupt, or abusive party hacks who hope to win power on the coat-tails of party bosses would be the main losers.

Older Iraqis also favour constituencies. Distrust of political parties runs deep in Iraq. Even Perelli acknowledges Iraqis' ill-feeling towards political parties. "The anti-political party feeling of the population is extremely high," she told journalists in May, citing a poll that found only 3 per cent support for political parties.

Distrust of parties extends to Iraqi Kurdistan, where I taught in 2000-2001. With few exceptions, my former students associated local Kurdish parties with corruption, abuse of power, and nepotism.

In July 2001, the Jordanian government switched from a party-slate to constituency-based system to augment representation and undercut the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which dominated the former. And one of the few issues on which Israelis reach consensus is on the failings of party-slate elections.

It is disappointing to many in Washington and Baghdad that Australia, which has internationally renowned experience in election systems, remains relatively silent on such a key issue. The future of Iraq may just depend on Australia finding its voice.