Are we ready for the next pandemic?

So far, Australia has only reported one human case of H5N1, in 2024, from a person infected overseas. The person made a full recovery.

Is Australia doing enough?

Australia has taken a first step with a $95 million federal anti-bird flu package announced in October 2024. The plan includes funding for early detection efforts, antiviral stockpiles, pandemic flu vaccines, and biosecurity measures to prevent bird-to-human transmission.

By contrast, California has taken a far more aggressive approach. In December 2024, after detecting cases in farm workers and livestock, the state declared a state of emergency. Authorities distributed protective gear, expanded testing, and ramped up monitoring programs. Some experts viewed this as a necessary precaution, while others saw it as an overreaction to a virus that has not yet proven capable of human-to-human spread.

Regardless of the approach, one critical gap remains: tracking human infections. Most surveillance focuses on birds and animals, but no one knows how many humans have been exposed. This is where antibody testing comes in. Antibodies are proteins your immune system produces after an infection. By testing for H5N1 antibodies in blood samples, scientists can estimate how many people have already been infected-even if they never showed symptoms.

Large-scale antibody testing is tricky. It requires broad population sampling, and cooperation from farm workers and agricultural industries may be difficult to secure.

Wastewater testing, widely used during COVID-19, can detect viral presence in communities, but it doesn't tell us who has been infected, how sick they were, or which strain of flu is responsible. Antibody testing is essential for knowing the real human infection rate.

What should we not do? COVID-19 changed how governments respond to pandemics, and not always for the better. The last thing Australia should do is repeat the same mistakes. Lockdowns, mass business closures, and blanket restrictions may have been our only choice in early COVID-19, but they caused huge social and economic damage.

If H5N1 remains poorly transmissible between humans, shutting down society makes no sense. If it does evolve to spread more easily but becomes less deadly, it should be treated more like a severe seasonal flu than a civilisation-ending catastrophe.

The key lesson from COVID-19 is that public health responses should match the actual threat, not the worst-case scenario in a headline.

Right now, the risk of an H5N1 pandemic in the next five years is low-but not zero.

H5N1 doesn't spread well between humans, it hasn't mutated significantly or reassorted with human flu strains, and there is no clear evidence that it is evolving toward human-to-human transmission. However, H5N1 is infecting more mammals, increasing its chance to evolve. If it eventually spreads more easily between people, the severity of a pandemic would depend on how much, or how little, the virus weakens in the process. Historically, flu viruses that become more transmissible tend to become less deadly-but there's no guarantee. Even a flu with a one or two percent fatality rate could cause global disruption.

Let's sum up the present situation. H5N1 has not yet reached Australia, and being an island helps. That buys time. Plans are being made, but Australia needs to do more now, not later. Expanding human surveillance, investing in large-scale antibody testing, and ensuring a proportionate response will determine whether the country stays ahead of the curve or finds itself playing catch-up once again. The lesson from COVID-19 is clear. It's better to prepare for a crisis that never arrives than to scramble after one that does. This time, Australia has a chance to get it right