North Korean materiel and troops in Ukraine – both a threat and opportunity for Seoul

Despite a supermajority of the world's states condemning Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the vast majority of the free world supporting Ukraine, the Kim regime has chosen to back Russia in this deplorable war.

Concrete military aid from the DPRK for Russia

In June 2024, President Putin of Russia visited Pyongyang where he signed a Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the DPRK's Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un. Basically, parts of the treaty serves the functions of a Mutual Defence Treaty (MDT) in particular Article 4, which states that both Pyongyang and Moscow "shall immediately provide military and other assistance" to the other party if it "falls into a state of war due to armed invasion from an individual or multiple states." Setting aside the semantics of the latter statement since it is clear that it was Russia that invaded Ukraine in February 2022, North Korea is very committed to fulfilling this particular clause of this de facto MDT.

Indeed, whilst it is common knowledge since the latter half of 2023, that the North has been supplying Russia with artillery ammunition for the latter's offensives in Ukraine, it has now come to light that the former has ramped up this supply, with some sources reporting that the DPRK might be providing up to 50% of the 3 million rounds of artillery that Moscow has been annually expending.

In addition, Pyongyang has signalled its adherence to Article 4 by shipping KN-23 or Hwasong-11 short ranged ballistic missiles to the Russian military. Even as the accuracy of such missiles is questionable, they have ranges of a few hundred kilometres, vastly exceeding the reach of conventional howitzer or tube launched artillery. Such missiles allow Moscow's forces to target Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, safe from retaliation by Kyiv's conventional artillery.

Moreover, the Kim regime's assistance is not only confined to heavy munitions like artillery shells and missiles but also combat vehicles. There exists photographic evidence that North Korean missile launching tank destroyers in the form of the Bulsae-4 have been provided for service in Putin's disastrous "special military operation". Even as such vehicles are not gamechangers, they present the worrying potential for Pyongyang to supply Moscow with tanks and other armoured vehicles, replacing the thousands that have been destroyed, thereby allowing Putin's war machine to prolong this conflict to Ukraine's detriment.

The Korean People's Army (KPA) fighting in Ukraine?

Even as the North's substantial supply of war materiel to fuel Russian expansionism is deplorable, Kim appears eager to bolster Putin's territorial ambitions by reinforcing Russian troop strength with soldiers from the Korean People's Army (KPA). If done in sufficient numbers, this will help offset grievous Russian casualties exceeding 0.6 million, possibly facilitate tactical victories against the Ukrainian Army, and prolong the war with many more Ukrainians, both military and civilians being maimed or killed.

Based on intelligence analysis and media reporting, thousands of KPA troops are already training in Russia and occupied Ukraine for deployment to the frontlines in Ukraine or to be used as border garrison forces, freeing up border guards for frontline duty, while small KPA units may already be active in eastern Ukraine as evinced by KPA fatalities from a Ukrainian missile strike.

As for what Kim hopes to achieve by pledging his soldiers to Moscow, only educated guesses can be made since dealings between Moscow and Pyongyang are largely opaque. Based on the order of tangible benefit to the Kim regime, the returns that Pyongyang could hope to reap from least to most could be, i) giving KPA personnel the chance to acquire combat experience, ii) monitoring the effectiveness of North Korean weapons supplied to Russia and improving the procedures for their use, and iii) trading the service of KPA soldiers for technology transfer concerning missiles and even spy satellites.

Regarding combat experience, this could be the least relevant since there is arguably little to learn from Russia's unsophisticated "cannon fodder" tactics. On the other hand, this war offers North Korea the best opportunity to take their weapons through a "baptism of fire" in Russian hands, learning how best to employ them against South Korea and/or the U.S.. Thirdly, Kim most desires the reward of advanced Russian missile and satellite technology which his scientists are arguably unable to independently develop. Taken together, these benefits make the DPRK a more dangerous adversary to the ROK and the U.S. in war, while giving the North more effective options for destabilization during peacetime.

Should Seoul authorize the transfer of military aid to Ukraine?

Now that North Korea is directly involved in Putin's war and will likely be strengthened as an antagonist on the Korean peninsula, this should be a strong impetus for Soeul to lift its prohibition on supplying arms to active war zones, so that Kyiv can be bolstered with military aid, a pro-Ukrainian end to this war can be facilitated, and the Kim regime's profiteering off this despicable conflict can be curtailed. Other salient reasons for the Yoon administration to supply lethal aid to Ukraine are as elaborated below.

Firstly, such a move would help uphold UN norms of legitimate self-defence and contribute to the preservation of the rules based international order, by promoting Ukrainian efforts to expel Russian occupiers from internationally recognized Ukrainian territory, thereby cementing South Korea's reputation as a responsible middle power.

Next, this would communicate to Russia that there are concrete costs (revitalized Ukrainian defence) to assisting North Korea with its military development and missile program, in contravention of UN sanctions which the former had originally agreed to as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, and is obligated to enforce.

For the ROK defence industry, defence aid provision is an excellent opportunity to showcase the efficacy of South Korean arms under real world operational conditions without placing ROK troops at risk. If such weapons perform well, this will serve as excellent promotional testimonials for future arms sales.

Lastly, active facilitation of Ukrainian defence efforts places South Korea amongst the club of nations which will be favourably considered when Kyiv eventually awards both civil rebuilding and military development contracts for the restoration of Ukraine once the war ends.

As for exactly what kinds of munitions and armaments the Yoon administration should send, that is an expansive topic that deserves its own elaborative article. Suffice it to say, the ROK government should make up its mind on military aid to Kyiv sooner rather than latter, with a substantial rather than tokenistic quantum of aid if delivery approval is given, along with an expedited shipment timeframe and minimal caveats regarding armament use. This will strengthen Seoul's moral authority amongst Ukraine's coalition of supporters, since some nations in the collective west dither in their military backing for Kyiv.