China’s fait accompli in the South China Sea

The South China Sea has become Beijing's lake. While the Philippines, Vietnam, the United States, the international courts, and others continue to vigorously contest it, China has won. It claims de facto dominion well inside the 370-km exclusive economic zones of the seven other littoral nations which is prescribed by the Law of the Sea and there seems little they or the United States can do about it.

Beijing solidified its claim earlier this year with access to Ream Naval Base in Cambodia, as Asia Sentinel reported on September 26, giving China the ability to project power further into the sea and beyond, which is critical for its ambitions to be a global naval power. By controlling these waters China makes it more difficult for US forces to operate freely and challenges the current US-led security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.

Beijing has introduced laws, rules, and regulations governing conduct in the 3.5 million sq. km. sea, through which passes an estimated $3-5 trillion in trade annually, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes. China seized the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in 1974. Since 2021, China has introduced new maritime patrol regulations authorizing its coast guard, for example, to detain foreign ships and individuals for up to 60 days if it suspects them of illegally entering what it considers to be its indisputable territory, as defined by its 9 dash-boundary line.

According to one authority in the Philippines, there were 251 Chinese vessels in the West Philippine Sea from September 17 to 23, up from 157 the previous week. That comprises 28 People's Liberation Army Coast Guard ships, 16 PLA Navy warships, 204 maritime militia vessels, and three research and survey vessels. Beijing also established a new administrative governance system in the sea, known to its ancestors as Nanyang (South Sea) in the 14th century. In 2020, China declared two new administrative districts for the region they claim. Before this. the entire area was placed under the administration of Hainan Island, which still appears on older maps.

The two municipalities are Nansha and Xisha. Located on Fiery Cross, an artificial island, the Nansha Municipality oversees all the Spratly islands and the surrounding waters. Based on Woody Island, the Xisha municipality takes care of the areas around the Paracels. Based on the 1947 nine-dash line, China released a new map in 2020, last updated in 1983, giving a name to each feature it claims. An earlier copy of this map made the rounds in May 2009 at the United Nations following the joint submission by Malaysia and Vietnam for an extended continental shelf which China protested. The 2020 map reinforces what China calls its indisputable claim to the territories it calls "the Nansha Islands, the Xisha Islands, Zhongshan Islands (Macclesfield Banks) and Dongsha Islands (Pratas Reefs) and the adjacent waters" as theirs.

In 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague ruled that China's claims based on the Nine-Dash Line had no legal basis under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, China rejected this ruling and continues its military activities in its lake despite being a 1996 signatory to UNCLOS. Paradoxically, despite its defense of navigation in the waters, the US is not a party to UNCLOS. To China's credit, its activities in the SCS have not significantly infringed on the freedom of navigation in the SCS, although the US Navy has complained of occasional unsafe maneuvers, which the PLA Navy has denied.

Despite pushback from several countries including the US, China has since 2010 further strengthened its claim by building artificial islands and military installations on the Spratly and Paracel Islands. These seven artificial islands are equipped with airstrips, missile systems, and radars that have allowed China to project military power far from its mainland. The continuing militarization of these islands has raised concerns among regional powers and the US. Early last week the US conducted military exercises in the SCS involving the Philippines, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand, as China carried out its own military drills. Through regular military patrols and exercises the US seeks to prevent China from asserting de facto control over the region.

To many Chinese, apart from a legacy, the name South China Sea evokes a sense of entitlement that history on their side. An entitlement that is accompanied by a sense of historical legacy and political destiny. The British gave a name to the sea for political convenience during the late 18^th century. It has given China an identity and a sense of ownership. Students in primary school are taught to believe that the territory at sea – that their ancestors called Nanyang Sea in the 14^th century – is part of their motherland, a manifestation of political destiny designed to appeal to its domestic audience.

Recent spats with the Philippines in the West Philippines Sea (Second Thomas Shoal, Scarborough Reef, Sabina Shoal, et al) seem to suggest that China would have no qualms in using force to reclaim territories occupied by unfriendly powers especially those who align with the US to oppose China's dominance in the South China Sea.

Beijing's primary mission to secure the sea is not motivated by trade, oil, gas, or fish but rather by its strategic position, coupled with the desire to promote and defend its historical entitlement. Even if the South China Sea is bereft of resources, Beijing will still want to control it, much as the US, through the Monroe Doctrine enunciated in 1823, controls the Caribbean. As a core territory, the South China Sea is non-negotiable.

Washington maintains that Beijing's strategic objective of dominating the South China Sea ties into its broader goal of breaking through the so-called First Island Chain, which includes Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. China has overcome this dilemma by acquiring the right of access to Ream Naval Base. Control over the South China Sea would provide a foothold to expand beyond the first chain barrier and directly challenge U.S. naval supremacy in the wider Pacific, where US presence is quite thin. The US commitment to Israel and Ukraine has diluted critical forces from the Indo-Pacific theater. Prolonged commitment in the Middle East and Europe can undermine US ability to come to the defense of Taiwan.

Amidst the shifting global balance of power, the U.S. remains the world's preeminent military power. However, its capacity to confront multiple global challenges simultaneously is diminishing, most evident in the SCS, 8,000 km. from Hawaii. Washington is concerned with how to manage a China that has risen very fast in the past two decades and deter Russian aggression in Europe as well as maintain stability in the Middle East. Washington also faces the rise of the global south moving closer to Beijing due partly to China's aggressive economic diplomacy via trade and investment in the Belt and Road Initiatives.

Despite their contentious rivalry, the world would be a better place if China and the US could reach a modus vivendi on their respective spheres of influence in a multipolar geopolitical environment and reduce military confrontations. The two could bury their hatchets and call for disengagement in military affairs including de-escalating conflicts in the South China Sea as a way forward to mitigate global warming and manage the health of the oceans which provide the critical life-support system for humanity.