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Australian foreign policy should not be based on the Anglosphere concept

By Michael Fullilove - posted Friday, 14 May 2004


In this context, the Second World War example is, in my view, overplayed by advocates of Anglospherism. It is true, of course, that during the war British and American affairs were thoroughly entangled: high policy was relatively well coordinated, and joint committees and combined boards regulated many everyday activities. Nevertheless, significant differences existed on vital issues such as the timing and location of the cross-Channel invasion, the role of China, free trade versus imperial preferences, and the fate of the colonial empires. Moreover, the Anglo-American condominium declined markedly in the aftermath of the war. Owen Harries has reminded us, for example, of the Suez Crisis of 1956, in which the US publicly denounced Britain and France for trying to seize the Canal back from Gamal Abdel Nasser. This was only a decade after the end of the war – and the people who had run the Allied war effort still ran the world!

There are, of course, many other instances of interests trumping civilisational or ideological sentiment, for example the execrable 1939 pact between German fascism and Russian communism and Nixon’s 1972 recognition of Beijing at the expense of Taipei. Another example from within the Anglosphere was Britain’s decision – much to the consternation of Commonwealth politicians who had grown used to a special economic relationship with the mother country – to join the European Economic Community in 1973.

There is no reason to think that Anglospheric ties would have greater salience now – particularly given the changes to the makeup of the populations of countries within its borders. This is the second weakness in this rather dusty argument. The post-war waves of immigration to countries such as the United States, Britain and Australia have diluted their Anglocentric cultures even as they have enlivened cultural ties to other parts of the world. In other words, it may not seem intuitive for a Mexican-American in California or for a Vietnamese-Australian in Cabramatta to gaze towards Whitehall for political succour.

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And this foreshadows the final flaw in the Anglospherist thesis: it ignores the gravitational force-field of regionalism. Each of the US, Britain and Australia is located on the edge of a region which is occupying a greater share of the national mind. The US is being pulled southwards towards Mexico; the UK is being pulled eastwards towards Europe; and Australia is being pulled northwards towards Asia and the Pacific. It is entirely appropriate that these countries should put a priority on improving relations with the region in which they are located – and this regional push will properly affect the strength of extra-regional ties.

If not the Anglosphere, then what?

For these reasons, the Anglosphere is not a useful organising principle for the world – or for Australian foreign policy. That is not to say, of course, that the triangular relationship between the US, Britain and Australia is not valuable, and for all points of the triangle. It is hugely important. In the realms of defence, intelligence and foreign policy, these relationships are significant for all parties. ANZUS and the UKUSA intelligence-sharing agreement are two of the fruits of the trilateral vine and both constitute major national assets for this country.

Having said that, I would like to close with three suggestions. First, there are different roles that a small country such as Australia can play even within the context of a strong triangular relationship. A persuasive argument can be made that urging prudence and restraint on a hegemonic ally is sometimes in the interest of all parties – including the hegemon. As Owen Harries has written, even while seated on a bandwagon, one can "perform the valuable function of urging the need for careful steering and a judicious use of brakes".

Second, it is important that in focusing our foreign-policy binoculars on our long-distance Anglospheric partners, we don’t miss developments in the near distance. Engagement with our own Asia-Pacific region has been a great, decades-long, bipartisan national enterprise – and it is critical to maintain it. If the Anglosphere is ever seen as a strategic alternative to regional engagement, we are in trouble.

Finally, on a hopeful note: the triangular relationship is long-lasting and strong, and transcends personalities and political parties. Of course, it is true that the appeal of what Robert Menzies called "our great and powerful friends" is fixed more firmly in the DNA of the conservative side of politics. However the initial shift in emphasis from Britain to the United States in December 1941 was, of course, originally engineered by a Labor prime minister, John Curtin, and his successors have put a high premium on our traditional alliances. I am confident that - regardless of the outcome of elections this year in the US and Australia and in Britain in 2005 or 2006 – regardless of the various combinations of the Rubik’s cube of leadership that exists in the three countries, close relations will endure. The reason lies in their value. As Churchill is reputed to have said: "the only thing worse than having allies is not having them".

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This is an edited version of an address to the UK-Australia Future Leaders Dialogue at the Sydney Conservatorium of Music on 15 April 2004. The original can be downloaded here (pdf, 98K).



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About the Author

Michael Fullilove is Director of the Global Issues Program at the Lowy Institute for International Policy.

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