It comes as no surprise to me that China the draft wide-ranging agreement has already been signed and proudly announced by the PRC Foreign Ministry.
I have been wondering how I would describe the impact of the agreement and especially its signing even before the high-powered United States delegation visits Honiara to argue against the SI Government signing-up.
Well, too late. The deal is not only done it is locked in.
Advertisement
I have sadly come to the conclusion the agreement simply proves what I have been arguing for some time, and that is Australia's influence in the South Pacific has never been weaker than it is today.
The Solomon Islands is the most obvious and recent example of that sad reality.
But when you look elsewhere among what the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister call our "Pacific Family" it is not hard to find examples of our diminished and diminishing influence in Vanuatu, Tonga and scattered islands further to our north.
I would add, as readers will appreciate, Papua New Guinea, but I have some hope China's growing influence in PNG might be slowed, if not reversed, depending on the PNG national elections in June-July.
Papua New Guinea is a large, complex, but very democratic nation, with a long and generally harmonious association with Australia. When you have 52 registered parties running in the PNG elections the outcome is very unpredictable - and it may well be that the generally pro-China Marape Government will not be re-elected.
But the Solomon Islands is a lost cause. What ought to be ringing alarm bells in Canberra, Wellington and Washington is just how quickly the Solomon Islands has gone from being aligned with Taiwan to China's most compliant partner in the region - barely three years.
Advertisement
Surely this outcome requires a massive re-assessment of Australia's strategic approach to our immediate region - and how we can reverse our apparent inability to slow China's influence?
One hopes the New Zealand and the United States administrations might do the same!
I am not sure China has any immediate interest in building a substantial military or naval base on the Solomon Islands. In the short term, it might be satisfied with the apparent authority it now has to place police officers in the Solomon Islands, to supply weapons and logistics, as well as visiting shop berthing rights.
But that is only holding for the short term in my view. Depending on how relations with Australia and the United States trend over the medium term, China might find it necessary to seeking to construct a naval, air force or military base in the Solomons.
While that might not happen - given the current state of relations you simple could not rule it out over the longer term.
My own view is that China sees Papua New Guinea as being more strategically important from a military sense. That is why the proposal for a major "fisheries facility" and large port on Daru, the closest reasonably inhabitated community to Northern Australia, is most definitely still on the agenda....and being promoted by the influential PRC Embassy in Port Moresby.
China clearly regards securing effective control over the Solomon Islands as its easiest and most immediate priority - but don’t be surprised if by the end of 2022 the multi-million dollar facility on Daru will be pushed up the agenda.
Worryingly, as I have written, there is also an alternative to Daru that is close by and arguably a greater risk to Australia’s national security and strategic interest.
The Kikori-Ihu special economic zone has already secured a K90 million "grant" from China - highly unusual given that China has shifted completely from grant aid to tied project support and loan funding.
But Kikori-Ihu depends substantially on the local MP, Foreign Minister Eoe, getting re-elected. That is not at all guaranteed.
While China will be enjoying watching Australia wring its diplomatic hands over the SI agreement, it knows that Australia's diplomatic and security agencies - not to mention the people of the Torres Strait are finally watching closely what China might be planning for the Southern PNG coast.
Australia must step up that interest and first and foremost fund urgent infrastructure and services on Daru, and in the adjoining Western Province.
We ought to be encouraging the United States to focus on China's agenda in island nations across the Central Pacific, notably the Federated States of Micronesia. The proposal to upgrade a disused wartime airport in World War Two should not be ignored,
In conclusion, we need to move on from the SI debacle. It is for now a lost cause, something only a change of government in Honiara could reverse.
Our focus needs to remain on PNG, Fiji, and Samoa; while keeping a close eye on Vanuatu and New Caledonia.
The PRC announcement represents a significant setback for Australia - sadly it has been looming on the horizon for some time. Our response when the growing PRC interest and influence became all too evident was sadly just wholly inadequate.