What would a Taiwan war look like?

Cooler heads might have still prevailed. Yet in any future crisis over Taiwan where the US military becomes involved, the risks of “wormhole escalation” cannot be underestimated. As soon as the shooting starts, significant “first mover” advantages will be available to both sides. The reason is simple. Modern militaries rely on a sophisticated network of radars, sonars and satellites to track an opponent’s movements. Such systems are vulnerable and difficult to defend. Taking them out is tremendously provocative, but confers decisive advantages by essentially blinding an opponent.

The temptation to pull off such a risky military manoeuvre may ultimately prove irresistible for Xi in the heat of conflict. Despite the considerable benefits conferred by geography – the island of Taiwan is 11,000 kilometres away from the continental United States – China remains well behind America in some key areas of militarily capability. A June 2021 report from the highly respected International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), for instance, estimates that China’s cyber capabilities – regarded by some analysts as the sine qua non of modern warfare – are at least a decade behind those of the US.

Likewise, China’s nuclear capabilities remain minuscule compared to America’s. China has 350 nuclear warheads; America has 3800. China also has only six submarines – the so-called Type 094 Jin-class nuclear-powered, ballistic missile-carrying submarine (SSBN) – that can deliver a nuclear strike. Such asymmetries mean that Beijing lacks what is called a secure “second strike” capability – the means to hit back at an opponent even after they have unleashed a devastating nuclear attack.

Xi is working assiduously to address this imbalance. In mid-2021, three freshly built fields of nuclear launch silos were discovered in north-central China by US-based analysts using commercial satellite imagery. The Pentagon estimates that China’s nuclear arsenal will swell to 1000 warheads by 2030. Construction of China’s next-generation SSBN (the Type 96 class) is also underway, along with a new kind of long-range, submarine-launched ballistic missile known as the JL-3. But such developments take time, as shown by Australia’s difficulties in deciding its next generation of submarine. Until these advancements come online, China’s nuclear vulnerabilities will encourage Beijing to embrace a “use them or lose them” mentality in a Taiwan conflict, reinforcing the risks of wormhole escalation.