Australia's military intelligence should not become a political football

But bear in mind that such people would be powerless without political support. This was forthcoming from the Whitlam, Fraser, Hawke, Keating and early Howard governments. Not until Suharto's regime succumbed to the Asian economic crisis of the late nineties, did the Howard Government execute a sudden backflip on East Timor.

In any event we can no longer afford either continued intelligence self-censorship or a "pro-anybody" lobby. In our current strategic environment, intelligence collation and assessment are far more important in a day-to-day sense than in the deadly rituals of the Cold War. Good intelligence work in the field, or by capable analysts in Canberra like Lt-Col Collins, cannot now be compromised by the imposition of political priorities. This, it seems likely, has already happened. The cost has been Australia's involvement in an unsanctioned war of conquest and our (now apparently indefinite) embroilment in the post-war Iraqi morass.

Nor can we afford the quality of intelligence outcomes so tellingly listed by Lt-Col Collins. The "putrefaction" of our intelligence assessment and advice processes must end now or we could pay a heavy price. Our next failure might be televised direct from the Harbour Bridge, Parliament House or the Melbourne Cricket Ground.

In response to the Iraq fiasco, the Prime Minister set up an inquiry - not open, not a Royal Commission - under Mr Phillip Flood, former head of Foreign Affairs and a former Australian Ambassador to Jakarta. This inquiry is insufficient; not only might there be an appearance of a club member investigating the club, but it lacks the extensive powers and ability to protect witnesses held by Royal Commissions. Lt-Col Collins is right: only a Royal Commission and that soon, will serve.