Last week the Deputy Russian Foreign Minister indicated that Russia was "considering" a permanent military presence in Cuba and Venezuela.
His frank statement again brought to my mind a question I posed here and elsewhere over the last eighteen months – is China seriously looking at a permanent military presence (army, naval or air bases) in our region?
Since I first raised the question there have been several developments which in my view that at the very least indicate that bases in our region are an "option" China has under active consideration.
Advertisement
When I initially raised the possibility my views were based on the steps a China-owned entity was taking to grab effective control of the township of Daru the PNG community closest to Australia.
The multi-million dollar proposal for a seafood processing industry and large port and industrial estate on Daru may seem farfetched but it enjoys the support of the Western Provincial Government, local MPs and community leaders. It has not advanced far, but it has not gone away.
For now I do not see this project being on China's "military base" agenda but if it proceeds it will provide China with a significant "listening post" and be a strategic irritant on Australia's northern border.
But since that project was announced one that is potentially of far more concern for Australia has emerged just a few hundred km to the east of Daru. And this one has the direct involvement of the PRC Government.
When I wrote about it after China gifted around $35 cash to the Ihu-Kikori Special Economic Zone I missed one important feature of the project. In the plans released by the project proponents, supported by the PRC Embassy in Port Moresby, included both a "naval base" and a "military camp".
Just how a naval base and a military camp would qualify for all the taxation and other concessions that go with the PNG "special economic zone" concept eludes me, but they were clearly included as part of the total concept.
Advertisement
This project is being principally driven by the local MP, Soroi Eoe, who just happens to be the PNG Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. He happens to be up for re-election when PNG goes to the polls midyear.
It is clearly in his political interest to ensure it gets high priority, and in recent days he briefed the PRC Ambassador on the works "agenda" for 2022. Notwithstanding the fact the project is strategically very close to Australia, I doubt if he has also briefed the Australian High Commissioner!
China establishing a military-naval base in Papua New Guinea would be very a controversial step in the ever-changing world of PNG politics!
But even if the involvement with the Ihu-Kikori project does not initially extend to a military presence, it gives China a potentially very significant "presence" right on our northern border.
But looking beyond Papua New Guinea, I see three potential areas of concern for Australia, and for New Zealand, Japan and the United States.
The first is Vanuatu, one of our closest and most strategically significant neighbours. China has already built a large wharf in Vanuatu, more than capable of berthing large naval vessels. But Vanuatu is also heavily indebted to China under the "Belt and Road" program and other bi lateral loan arrangements.
Vanuatu is very vulnerable to China's influences and pressures. Clearly if China sought a military base presence, Vanuatu would struggle to say "no".
The second is potentially even more serious for Australia, and our allies. I have written about it recently.
China now has a small, but strategically important, disciplined forces presence in the Solomon Islands. No one whose views I respect believes that the initial six person PRC police contingent won't soon grow rapidly. And as the Solomon Islands does not have an army, influencing the police force gives China just what it needs on our northern border.
When one examine sthe Solomon Islands economy today, the dominance of China after just three years diplomatic recognition is frankly alarming. The Solomon Islands depends on fisheries, timber and gold mining exports. Today more than 80 per cent goes to China, and direct Chinese involvement in the local fisheries, timber and gold sectors is growing.
It also now controls just about 100 per cent of the construction sector, doing virtually all government construction work in particular.
Our influence in the Solomon Islands under the current regime is just about zero. If China sought to establish a permanent "base: in the SI any objections by Australia would be ignored.
The other country of immediate concern when it comes to a potential PRC "Base" in our region is Kiribati. This small Central Pacific nation is one of China's closest allies in our region.
Last year, China expressed an interest is redeveloping a long abandoned World War Two US airstrip in a remote part of Kiribati. Clearly its development as a China controlled airport and base would be easy to achieve.
Kiribati is rapidly finding itself in debt to China, and again it would simply not be in a position to say "no" to any China proposal with some "benefits" attached.
This list is far from exhaustive – but I wanted to get it on the record so we might keep a close watch on it throughout 2022
China is playing "the long game" in our region. It has shifted from "aid to trade" and to locking in our regional neighbours to Belt and Road and other loan deals that in many cases, if not most cases, are unaffordable.
This year may well tell whether that extends to at least one military presence in our immediate region and beyond!