It's time to trade in, and trade up, the outdated ANZUS treaty

The foundation of Australia's security relationship with the United States is the ANZUS Treaty. Signed in 1951, this concise pact of 800-odd words, made up of just 11 articles, remains "fundamental to our national security" - if you believe the current government. Most Australians do, according to the polls at least.

In a detailed public survey taken during the 2001 election, nearly 90 per cent of respondents rated the treaty "important" to Australia's security (many considered it "very important"). An overwhelming number of those people surveyed also believed that Australia could rely on US military support should the need ever arise.

An interesting question that the pollsters didn't ask is who has actually read the ANZUS Treaty. Show of hands? There might be more arms raised in Canberra than anywhere else but it still won't be many.

Assuming then that Australians are largely unaware of the treaty's contents, how is this positive regard for the alliance explained? One reason is that ANZUS is consistently and uncritically revered in public. For instance, in the lead-up to the agreement's 50th anniversary (observed just before the 2001 terrorist attacks in the US), media commentators formed together in a choir of acclaim, lauding "a crucial security partnership", "Australia's ultimate security blanket", "our priceless military alliance", "so valuable, even after half a century".

Most of these observers avoided mention of New Zealand, the lapsed alliance partner, because that might expose the absurdity of the celebration - though in one impressive display of mental agility, a visiting US naval commander had no problem resolving this cognitive dissonance.

He declared the "fact that it's a three-country treaty that's still in effect after 50 years speaks highly of the close ties that the United States has to Australia".

But sir, there are only two left ... oh, never mind.

Anyone who dares to question the benefits of ANZUS is instantly maligned. The Labor Party is routinely warned by venerable analysts that an open debate on the alliance amounts to "electoral poison". Consequently, in the absence of thoughtful and ongoing evaluation, it's little wonder that the treaty is so overwhelmingly approved.

The public hears only the sound of one needle knitting. Another reason for the popular affection toward the treaty is best explained by the Prime Minister. According to John Howard, "We should remember that in the end there is only one country that can help with us to guarantee our security and that is the United States". So, presumably, forget any opportunity Australia has to secure itself.

Again, this view is supported by opinion polls. Most Australians, almost two-thirds according to the survey at the last election, think we would be unable to successfully protect ourselves if ever attacked (and the country considered the most likely threat is Indonesia).

But if Australians en masse picked up and read over a copy of the ANZUS Treaty at their local library, would they be satisfied with the content? Probably not, especially if they accept the view of the Prime Minister.

Howard repeatedly argues that traditional concepts of security and defence, built to counter "war with armies rolling across borders", are outdated because of the threat of indiscriminate terrorism. The message? Forget Indonesia and focus on Jemaah Islamiyah. Australia must face up to this new reality in international politics.

But ANZUS makes no mention of terrorism. It speaks only of the dangers presented by an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties to the treaty (too bad New York or Perth!).

The demands on the signatory partners are nominal, calling for an "act" in response. What this might involve precisely has been the subject of perennial debate, though it is generally accepted that this does not impose any military obligation. And the treaty calls for action through the United Nations, hardly a favoured forum these days.

So why not renegotiate the alliance, to bring the text up to date to account for contemporary challenges - and while we're at it, stop pretending that the NZ part still plays a role?

A new treaty could institutionalise the relationship between Australia and the US, making it less susceptible to the kind of political prevarication that Howard says is the risk of electing a Labor government.

Howard's favourite line in foreign policy is that, under his stewardship, Australia's relationship with the US has "never been stronger or closer". If that's true (and why should we ever doubt his word?), surely now is the perfect opportunity to trade-up ANZUS, this antiquated security relic of a bygone era, for the latest model available in modern security agreements.

Our government won't adopt this progressive stance, most obviously because of the fear that its special relationship with the Bush Administration will be exposed as an empty pantomime. Australia's interlocutors in Washington regard the modern era as a time when the very idea of alliance is itself outmoded.

Instead, the prevailing view is that the "war on terror" demands shifting coalitions of convenience, assembled for specific purposes. Statements attributed to US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld make the disdain for allies clear: "The mission must determine the coalition. The coalition must not determine the mission."

Still, if the number of times that Winston Churchill's hackneyed wisdom is cited around Washington today is any indication - "There is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies. And that is to fight without them" - reality may be finally catching up to the Bush Administration.

Alliances will very quickly return to favour, especially as the limits of American power become evident in Iraq.

Australia should take the opportunity to make its formal security commitments relevant for today. If the current government has courage and a genuine interest in the future defence of Australia, it should exercise its much-touted political capital in Washington to bring the alliance into the modern era.

And if it remains too timid, Mark Latham has promised that a future Labor government will approach the US as "genuine partners at the negotiating table". Could a modern Australia-US alliance be a Latham legacy?