Defusing the Korean time bomb

Since the US conquest of Iraq in 2003, Iran has had powerful American forces in two of its neighbours. One would not need to be a particularly paranoid Iranian to conclude that this is an acutely uncomfortable strategic situation. With American armies flanking the country on two sides, many Iranians have concluded that, to preserve independence, Iran needs some further insurance.

The DPRK agreement will tend to isolate Iran; it now knows that, unless the pact unravels, the Americans will not be distracted by Pyongyang. Indeed, the DPRK’s decision will be held up as an example or precedent in order to increase the pressure on Teheran.

Nevertheless it will not be possible to bully Iran into compliance. I do not believe that Iran really needs nuclear weapons to guarantee its security, but that is easy to say living in Australia. However, Iran would be no military pushover like the Taliban or Saddam’s Iraq. It is a large country, hardened by years of (ultimately successful) defensive war against Saddam. Its people would certainly rally to any regime that sought to defend it against American attack. It would require forces far in excess of those deployed by the US against Saddam in 1991 (which were more substantial than those used in Afghanistan or in the last Iraq war) to attempt the military coercion of Iran.

Frankly, I doubt America’s capability to do this, especially as the counter-insurgency bloodbath in Iraq continues to drain off US resources with no end in sight. Nor do I really believe that Washington would be so foolish as to make the attempt. If it did, whatever else happened the resultant explosion among Iraq’s majority Shi’a Muslims would seriously destabilise Iraq at the same time as the US was engaging Iran (which is substantially Shi’a in faith). Even should it succeed in producing a deliverable weapon - something still a fair way off, and now probably more difficult with the DPRK unlikely to continue as a source of assistance - Iran’s missile programs are far from production of a system capable of reliably delivering a weapon as far away as US territory.

But if there is widespread political consensus in Iran, however misguided it may be, about the desirability of attaining a nuclear weapon capability, it is likely to prove at least as difficult, and take at least as long, to persuade the Iranians otherwise as it has taken to achieve this goal with the DPRK. And one thing is certain: overt pressure, sanctions, or attempts to back the Iranians into a corner will not succeed. For all its bellicose rhetoric, the DPRK is fundamentally a weak and failing state. Iran is not.