The sources of Russian conduct

Firstly, there is no real trust between the Russians and the West. The expansion of NATO to Russia’s borders occurred in contradiction of the guarantees made to the former Soviet Union that a united Germany would be the only addition to NATO’s membership. By 1999, under the Clinton Administration, former Warsaw Pact members such as Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic became NATO members, which has since grown to include all manner of smaller European states that few if any US politician could find on a map. Also in 1999, NATO bombed Russia’s ally Serbia in support of the Kosovars. All this NATO expansion occurred when Russia was at its weakest, most dysfunctional, and, in the Russian mind, while they were being exploited by the new oligarchs and Western vagabonds who plundered their wealth. These grievances are all ‘baked in’ the Russian relationship - and Vladimir Putin is but one of the inevitable reactions by a Russian people with grievances towards the West. The (disastrous) Western interventions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, continuing or leaving chaos in their wake, have also raised Russian anxieties as to Western enthusiasm for ‘regime change’.

(I leave aside the West’s own grievances against Russia, most recently its proxies’ shooting down of the MH17 aircraft, killing 298 innocent people, and Russia’s support for Iranian moves. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea is, in truth, a less serious issue, as it has no real likelihood of being reversed, given the local Crimean support for Russian unity and the fact that no Russian leader will ever surrender Sebastopol. Those criticising President Obama for weakness towards Russia over Crimea and Donetsk ignore that Obama had no good options. Simple fact is that there is simply no trust between either side and Russia is entrenching its newly acquired position.)

Secondly, Russia’s geography and the value of its ‘near abroad’ to its security mean that Russia cannot overlook Western militaries operating in or near its borders, bases and interests, be it in Afghanistan, Syria, the Black Sea or Baltic Sea. One can have idealistic dreams of a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific” but the reality is that, each day, the Russian military operates and patrols to deter what the Russians see as deterrence of Western probes, intelligence collection and reconnaissance against ‘the motherland’. Even with a relationship in a better state than the current dismal one, it is inevitable that ‘blue and red’ military activities risk future clashes between Russian and Western militaries, which will, when they occur, have to be de-escalated quickly. This is in addition to Western provision of lethal military aid to the Ukranians, which risks Western weaponry being used to kill Russia’s “little green men”. One does not need to be AJP Taylor to see the obvious dangers of escalation here. Moreover, the Russian military staff system is mature and dates back centuries, improved by the Soviets, and staff training prepares Russian officers in understanding the history, languages, cultures and military thinking of their adversaries. The Russian military mind is brutal where necessary but is just as supple and sophisticated as any Western military at its higher echelons. Westerners underestimate the sophistication of Russian military thinking at their peril.

Thirdly, the sanctions against Russia have done grave damage to the Russian economy. There is no prospect of the West relaxing sanctions. There is no prospect of Russia engaging in any sort of behaviours that would lead to a relaxing of sanctions.

Fourthly, Russia (through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and bilateral relations) has sought closer relations with China and Iran. This is in addition to Russia’s role as a backer of North Korea and Syria. In the case of Russian support of Syria, this is not a policy choice suggesting a desire to relieve Americans and Israelis of anxieties as to Russian policy in the Middle East. Russia is promoting its reliability as an ally by backing its long term Syrian ally and by ensuring Russia’s bases in Tartus and Lakatia. Russia also sees these relations as a means of breaking out of its perennial fear of encirclement.

These are just some of the problems that plague the Russian relationship.

The conundrum of Western statecraft is that, at present, the Russians, Chinese, and Iranians, form a geopolitical bloc that dominates the Eurasian heartland and rimland. The more Western policy punishes Russia (rightly or wrongly), the more Russia is pushed to sees its future as one of these three overlords, rather than, say, as a humiliated counterparty of an ever more mercurial West. Moreover, from a Muscovy perspective, it is far better to be in penury and have good relations with the other land powers adjacent to Russia than to risk disappointment again by engaging with the West. A Russian people that lost tens of millions of people during the Second World War, a war that still helps define even a modern, non-Sovietised Russia, has little fear of Western sanctions that do not bind China and other states.

To some degree, the future will be determined by this geopolitical question: does the West see curtailing Chinese and Iranian ambitions as worth overlooking some previously unacceptable Russian belligerence? Can Moscow win concessions if Chinese and Iranian aspirations become the most pressing concern? If so, does Russia do what it can via arms sales, training, intelligence sharing, and subversion, to assist the Iranians, especially, and the Chinese to make as much of a nuisance of themselves as to force the West to come to terms with Russia - on Russia's terms? There is no feasible way that the West can posture military forces to engage in a “Triple Containment” of Russia, China, and Iran, especially as they are all land powers. The future of Russian statecraft may seem to be adventurist but that is to assume that the Kremlin sees the world as the West does. Where the liberal West eschews the means of military power in favour of absurd ideas of 'soft power', the Russians look at the required ends to be achieved, including intervening with overwhelming military force, as Russia's Syrian campaign has shown.

On any view, relations with Russia will remain fraught for the foreseeable future. If one is to understand Russian statecraft, one must understand the Russian people, history, and culture, on their own terms and as Russians see them. To understand your adversary is not to betray your own nation but to be able to pursue its interests all the more effectively and with a needed grounding in reality.

The current hysteria over Russia helps no one. We need a broader debate over Russian policy rather than allegations of treason or puppet when anyone tries to correct error. Conformity helps no one, especially when it is imposed on pain of dissenters being defamed. The real question must be asked, also, of the utility and realism of Western security pledges made to states on the historic Russian periphery by alliances in which Americans shoulder an immensely disproportionate share of the military burden, at a time when most Americans are tired of alliances that are, in effect, dependencies. Europeans that have effectively disarmed take grave risks when poking the Russian bear or threatening the approaches to its historic domain. The question, "Who will die for Donbass?" may not be wholly rhetorical for NATO in the years to come.

I will leave the final words to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, himself a very astute judge of Russian military history and statecraft, as to why we do not learn from history:

“Regrettable as it may seem to the idealist, the experience of history provides little warrant for the belief that real progress, and the freedom that makes progress possible, lies in unification. For where unification has been able to establish unity of ideas it has usually ended in uniformity, paralysing the growth of new ideas. And where the unification has merely brought about an artificial or imposed unity, its irksomeness has led through discord to disruption.”

Spasiba.