APEC-Manila and South China Sea Joint Development Areas

The problem with the 'One Belt, One Road' slogan is that it tends to include vague infrastructure pathways through the disputed South China Sea.

To date, there's been little or no explanation of how China's 'One Belt, One Road' pan-regional infrastructure concept fits into China's territorial claims to the entire South China Sea under its 'Nine-Dotted Line.'

It's all looks terribly sticky for China at APEC. since discussion of one naturally segues into discussion of the other. This, in turn, could explain China's dawdling in confirming Xi's attendance.

No other APEC member to date has publicly supported China's Nine Dotted Line claim. Worse, APEC host the Philippines has a pending appeal before a United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) tribunal over the matter.

But if Xi doesn't attend the Manila APEC meeting, it sends a terrible signal regarding China's commitment to multilateralism.

As a result, Xi will almost certainly attend. But confirmation will likely come only at the last minute in order to discourage grandstanding by others once the commitment is locked in.

Looking at the big picture, none of Asia's countries benefit from fighting over the South China Sea.

Therefore, a solution lies in exploiting synergies between the needs and capabilities of China and her stroppiest South China Sea neighbors: Vietnam and the Philippines. To see the solution, consider what each side has and what it needs:

China has the capital and the technology to develop new South China Sea energy resources, like deep water methane hydrates. What China needs is a neighborhood (and global) 'social license' to do so.

China has the military potential to control the South China Sea, but it needs to avoid conflict with the United States. China also needs access to the Straits of Malacca, which Singapore and Malaysia could deny if China gets too aggressive.

In a 'worst case' scenario, Singapore and Malaysia could stymie access to the Malacca Straits to Chinese commercial vessels. This could be done by imposing endless 'random' inspections and administrative procedures over Chinese merchant traffic.

Vietnam and the Philippines, meanwhile, have legitimate claims to portions of the South China Sea as strong (or stronger) than any China's put forward to date. However, both need foreign capital to develop the resources.