Sympathising with monsters: the David Hicks case

How else are we to explain someone as prominent, and with so much to lose, as Opposition leader Bill Shorten, describing terrorism in this manner, and not suffering a public backlash: “David Hicks was probably foolish to get caught up in that Afghanistan conflict”.

Foolish! David Hicks directly contributed to the harm caused by three separate terrorist organisations - and for this, he is unrepentant. By this standard, the ISIS fighters currently decapitating prisoners in the Iraqi desert, Boko Haram’s decision to kidnap Nigerian school girls, and the gunmen who executed Charlie Hebdo employees, are just foolish?

This type of broken moral judgement is indicative of how public opinion seems to form in response to David Hicks. It is as if, otherwise-rational people are suddenly comfortable in accepting one of two depraved ideas: either David Hicks is a terrorist, and therefore no manner of ill-treatment is unjustified or, despite once being a terrorist, the ill-treatment Hicks received absolves him of all previous guilt and responsibility.

In either circumstance, our moral concern is reduced to a zero-sum exercise. For many people, it is hard to show compassion for Hicks without also ceding to him the moral high ground. It is just simpler to think of him in absolutes, that is, as either a terrorist or as a victim. David Hicks, however, is both: a moral monster who, nevertheless, deserves our sympathy.