Why Ukraine matters

American-based social media featured a piece this week entitled "Five Things to Know About Ukraine". If knowledge levels about this 40 million strong country have a feint heart beat in the US, it's fair to say they are close to comatose in Australia.

No wonder when (at one point) CNN International was running the Ukrainian pro-EU integration protests story as it's lead item, and there wasn't even a mention on our national broadcaster's website.

This low level of engagement is perhaps reflected in the Australian Government's response to recent events in Ukraine, which was low-key compared to that of our strategic allies, such as the United States, Canada and the European Community.

While the US Secretary of State, Canadian Foreign Minister, and European Community President all made strong and repeated public statements supporting Euro-integration and condemning violence by the regime of President Viktor Yanukovich against young peaceful protestors, Australia has made no public statements to date.

While international Ambassadors were grilling Ukraine's Interior Minister on his Government's behaviour in using security forces against its own kids, Australia was not present. Australia has no Embassy in Kyiv (even though a Parliamentary inquiry has recommended its consideration). In fact, Australia is the only member of the G20 that doesn't have an Embassy in Ukraine (even as it's about to take on the G20's chairmanship).

(In one positive development yesterday, Australia put its first diplomats on the ground in Kyiv since the crisis began - for the purposes of a previously scheduled OSCE meeting.)

So, why should Australia bother?

Obviously, there are arguments based on Australia's long-term and international commitment to universal human rights and it's leadership obligations in our new UN role.

Considering the West as a whole, the New York Times editorialised along such lines this week:

The West's duty… is to give full support to the Ukrainians who are fighting for everything that an association with Europe represents to them: the commitment to democracy, the rule of law, honest government, human rights and a better future.

These are praiseworthy and important considerations, and one's I obviously support as someone with family and friends in Ukraine. But, without in anyway diminishing concern about kids getting beaten up and arrested for basic freedoms, let's temporarily put them aside and look at the real politik. Let's just talk turkey and about Australia's interests.

First, a liberalised and more transparent Ukraine, which is effectively a requirement of Euro-integration, means greater opportunities for businesses that Australians do particularly well.

There's especially a good fit between some of Australia's specialist industries and Ukraine's growing demands in the areas of:

• mining services - as Ukraine's abundant but extraordinarily archaic resources sector moves out of the 19^th no less than the 20^th century;
• international education – as the children of Ukraine's growing middle class look to study abroad, and;
• financial services – as Ukraine's economic oligarchs seek to legitimise themselves (not to mention increasingly disaffiliate themselves from the current regime).

All up, Australia / Ukraine trade has grown by 50% (from $117 million to $176 million) between 2009 to 2012 despite tough global conditions and a Ukrainian regime that's been accused of focussing on enriching itself rather than the managing the nation's economy. This suggests that opportunities would grow with better governance and better economic management on the Ukrainian end.

In pursuing more opportunities in Ukraine, would there be some downside risk from, say, decreased trade opportunities for Australia with Russia? From a risk management perspective, the answer is: low probability and low consequence. In the same way that Russia can't turn the economic tap off with others who have been critical of its extreme political pressure on Ukraine (such as the US), it can't turn off the (comparatively small) economic tap when it comes to Australia.

Second, Ukraine should matter to Australia because it matters to our allies in Europe who very publicly say they need Ukraine. In addition to global terrorism, if there is a key regional security issue for contemporary Europe, it is the rise of President Vladimir Putin's authoritarian vision for Russia.

Bringing Ukraine further into the European sphere of influence, and further away from Putin's aspirations, is a strong hedge for the Europe Union. Indeed, Ukraine's opportunity and misery over many centuries has been effectively similar to today's: being the fulcrum in the balance between western Europe and Russia.

Australia's interests clearly lie in backing the EU's. The EU (at some $80 billion per annum) remains Australia's second-largest trading partner after China, and Australia's most significant trading partner in services. The EU is also the largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Australia, and the largest destination for Australian FDI overseas.

So, if Australia cares about the interest that is 13% of its total current trade, not to mention specific Ukrainian opportunities, it should care about a democratized and Euro-integrated Ukraine.

And, yes, Australia and other Western democracies should also care when kids stand in the cold, stand up to physical violence, and stand up for values that we Australians can almost take for granted.