Public governance, parliament and politics – the last frontier for innovation and reform?

Innovation and reform in the institutions and practices of public governance is just one part of this broader imperative of dispersal of power. It is, nevertheless, an important part, for it can either support and complement the dispersal of power, or it can buttress its concentration.

An agenda for reform of the institutions and practices in Australian public governance will have to address particular manifestations of the current malaise in public governance: the phenomenon of the 'career politician'; corporate funding of political parties; compulsory voting; and the absence of citizen adjudication in key areas of decision-making.

But it is worth stating some guiding principles that should govern the design of this innovation and reform agenda in an era of dispersal of power to civil society and restriction of the power of states and markets:
 

1. The role of Parliament and public institutions is to serve, protect and strengthen civil society and the common good (the century-long shift in functions, resources and authority from civil society to the state should be checked and steadily reversed).
2. Members of Parliament in representative institutions should be drawn from the full body of citizens in the Commonwealth (and should reflect the diversity of the general citizenry, not narrow unrepresentative sections of society)
3. The role of a Member of Parliament is to represent and serve their electors (it is not a career or profession)
4. Political parties have an important role in supporting and facilitating civic participation and parliamentary representation, but their role should be confined to this. It is parliament and parliamentary representatives that determine governments, not political parties.
5. The jury system of citizen adjudication can and should be applied to a range of public decisions to ensure de-politicised non-partisan decision-making (such as adjudications on political advertising, political appointments, and parliamentary remuneration).
6. The Australian head of state should be an Australian citizen appointed by a jury of citizens selected by lot (to avoid a partisan politicised head of state that would result from either parliamentary appointment or popular election.

The following specific measures seem to flow from these principles:
 

The Australian Electoral Commission would oversee a public nomination process, and present nominations to the citizens' jury.
 

1. To establish the role of a member of parliament as one of service to the community, and not a career, the existing salary, pension, superannuation, allowances and retirement benefits should be replaced with a Living Allowance of, say, $100,000 per year, plus an accommodation and travel allowance. The Living Allowance of $100,000 would be a fixed amount, without additional remuneration for leadership or ministerial roles.
   
   The purpose of this Living Allowance is to discourage career politicians and encourage limited terms of service from citizens who want to contribute to civil society and the common good.
   
   Superannuation benefits should be set at the standard citizen rate (currently 9%) not the current special politician rate of 15%. Parliamentary pensions for life for retiring members of parliament should be abolished, along with retirement benefits such as travel passes. Special allowances and benefits for retired ministers and prime ministers should be abolished.
2. Retiring ministers of the crown should be prohibited from trading on public information by appointment to a company board or to an advisory or consulting role with governments for a period of 5 years after their retirement.
    
3. Members of parliament should be prohibited from retiring in mid-term except for reasons of ill-health. Where a member of parliament retires in mid-term and forces a by-election, the costs of holding the by-election should be met by the retiring member.
    
4. Donations from corporate entities to political parties should be prohibited. This should include companies, trade unions, and foundations. Only donations from individuals should be permitted.
   
   The purpose of this proscription is to remove the corruption of the democratic process where corporate entities with vested interests seek to influence the stance of parties and governments through political donations.
    
5. The jury system of citizen adjudication should be applied to a range of public decisions to ensure non-partisan non-party political decision-making in matters including:

 
6. 1. Approval of government advertising;
   2. Scrutiny and right to veto political appointments to diplomatic posts;
   3. Scrutiny and right to veto political appointments to public boards such as the ABC;
   4. Approval of allowances to members of parliament.

In these cases, the Australian Electoral Commission would select by lot a jury from the Australian Electoral Roll, subject to the same qualifications as currently apply in the use of juries in the legal system.
 

7. An Australian head of state should be appointed by a jury of 25 citizens selected by lot by the Australian Electoral Commission. The head of state would serve for a period of five years, and must be an Australian citizen.
8. The fine levied by the Australian Electoral Commission on citizens who are not sufficiently inspired or motivated by candidates and parties for public office to attend a voting place in elections should be removed.