Hugo Chávez, Venezuela and the corporate media

It is perhaps not surprising that corporate media analyses tend to ignore or trivialise these achievements, and look for weak spots. The Economist (5/3/13), representing private financial groups, launched a broadside against Chávez on the day of his death. He had been 'as reckless with his health as with his country's economy and its democracy', said the finance magazine. Accusing him 'narcissistic' rule, the magazine did admit that a quick election would favour Maduro over what it called the 'moderate centrist', Capriles.

The Economist claimed Chávez had 'squandered' his country's oil wealth, but had been lucky with high oil prices, clever advice from Fidel Castro on social programs and an unpopular nemesis in the form of George W. Bush. However the Bolivarian Revolution was 'a corrupt, mismanaged affair' which failed to invest and relied on handouts.

Venezuela under Chávez, it continued, came 'towards the bottom of just about every league table for good governance or economic competitiveness'. It is hardly a coincidence that the relentless demonization of the man comes from those investment groups most affronted by his re-nationalisation of Venezuela's huge oil industry.

One important source to counter such assertions has been the Washington-based Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). A recent article by Mark Weisbrot and Jake Johnston (CEPR, September 2012) observes that IMF forecasts 'repeatedly underestimated GDP growth' in Venezuela. Recovery from its two recessions (from the coup and oil conflict of 2002-2003, then the US financial crisis of 2008-09) had been much stronger than expected. Despite the dependence on oil income, there had been substantial investment across a range of sectors. Yet the Chávez 'bias' towards public and social sectors was not received well by predatory investor groups.

Precisely because of this corporate media onslaught, it can be difficult to read Venezuela. But, with a little patience, we can find independent sources and identify the distortions. For example, Roy Carroll of the British Guardian claimed 'a third of the country' revered Chávez, while 'millions detested him as a thug and a charlatan'. None of this explains the successive election victories, nor the fact that polls, two weeks after his death, showed that 79% of Venezuelans retained a positive image of their late president (USA Today 2013).

In another example, The Economist, seizing on a partial truth, claimed Venezuela had become 'even more dependent' on imported food, as 'State takeovers of farms cut agricultural output'. In fact, while Venezuela's spending on food imports rose from 2.0 to 2.2 of GDP, between 2000 and 2009, local food production also increased. The FAO (2012: Table 19) shows that the country's caloric self-sufficiency rose from 58% to 62% in that same period. More importantly, the FAO also shows that the proportion of under-nourished Venezuelans more than halved in just a few years under Chávez (FAO 2011, 2012). The country's nutritional problems have changed. By 2009 the rate of underweight children was down to 4% but that of overweight and obese adults was up to 30% (FAO 2012: Table 18). By way of comparison, the rate of food insecurity in the USA had worsened, from 10% of families in 2000 to 15% in 2011 (ERS 2012).

'Mismanaged' Venezuela was overcoming hunger while the much wealthier USA was going backwards.

The Economist also suggested that mass education in Venezuela had been a mistake, as the 'millions who enrolled in 'universities' that mainly impart propaganda [a reference to the promotion of Bolivarian values of solidarity and egalitarianism, as opposed to neoliberal individualism and commodification] have raised expectations that are almost bound to be dashed'. Chávez , according to the finance magazine, had failed 'to provide the best education and health services money can buy'.

Nevertheless, the UNDP recognised the massive rise in Venezuela's educational enrolments, a major factor in its above-average performance in the Human Development Index (PNUD 2013).

Beyond the attacks over 'autocracy' and 'populism' have come some more specific criticisms over inflation, violent crime and an independent judiciary. Venezuela does have 20% inflation, but it has been controlled and is much lower than pre-Chávez levels. Nevertheless, further depreciation of the currency seems likely, to counter a growing black market.

Violent crime in Venezuela remains very high, but highest in the state of Miranda, where drug gangs persist and Opposition Presidential candidate Capriles has been Governor for some years. In part due to his shared responsibility for security and crime, Governor Capriles has often focussed on similar themes to those of the national government:

education, improved infrastructure and reformed policing. However he refuses to cooperate with the newly formed Bolivarian National Police.