Pippa’s dilemma: the moral demands of affluence

So the question arises: what possible argument could someone in Pippa’s situation advance to justify spending the money on this trip abroad? Can it be argued that art or the benefits of travel or, indeed, the enjoyment of any other similarly pleasurable activity, could ever have a comparable moral significance to the suffering of others? What moral significance could her own enjoyment of life or personal flourishing have?

It is clear from Pippa’s comments online that she believes that great art, literature and music, have a very high moral significance for her. In a sense, they constitute her being, along with her personal attachments to others and to nature. They ground her moral concerns. They seem integral to her leading ‘a good life’ which, according to ancient wisdom, involves a search for ‘the Good, the Beautiful and the True’.

Pippa’s journey could well be characterized as a kind of modern secular pilgrimage, no less sacred than a religious one. By engaging in such an

activity we honour our ancestors and their great creative achievements, which can only be kept alive by people like Pippa embracing them and living out their life in the community in response to them. A personal investment in such an activity is a profound moral good that should not be sacrificed lightly.

If this is so, how could the value of such a life-enhancing experience be weighed against the value of alleviating another person’s suffering?

The answer to this is: it cannot. There is no way to calculate it. This was the rub for Pippa. And this is where I think the well-intentioned advice of the panel and listeners may have let her down by pretending that you can calculate it and thereby arrive at some balance or compromise. Such an approach serves only to exacerbate the dilemma.

There is an assumption here that these are essentially distinct realms of value. On the one hand, there are moral values that must be observed but, it is suggested, there are also aesthetic values that can be disconnected from ethical considerations. And sometimes we are entitled to prefer these at the expense of our moral values.

This reminds me of the claims some moral philosophers make for other distinct realms of value, such as morality on the one hand and political duty to the community on the other.  Politicians frequently claim that they are entitled and sometimes duty bound to engage in discretionary wars without moral justification if it serves the community’s interests.

Apart from setting up false dichotomies, the problem remains: by what standards are we to judge the choices we make except by reference to our most deeply held values?

In Pippa’s circumstances, what can we do?

I am reminded of the exhortation, so contrary to ‘left-brain’ problem solving: Don’t just do something. Stand there!

It is here that Pippa’s own advice to herself is so instructive. She speaks for a life of integrity that transcends such dichotomies. She invokes the ancient concept of sitting with your conscience.