Chinese grand strategy and American hegemony

And if too much appeasement has already occurred and the US has been prevailed upon to pull back too far, surely the danger is that any possible coalition will be fatally compromised by the fact that some key state, say Japan, will already have thrown in its lot with China, as the Soviet Union did with Hitler.

What is missing from White's argument is the key idea of an international order based on a set of constitutional premises and upheld by hegemonic power, the Deepak Lal paradigm.

For 300 years, with some cataclysmic disruptions, the world has developed under the auspices of economically and politically liberal hegemonic powers. China is neither economically nor politically liberal. It is a mercantilist state without a tradition of liberal political institutions.

It is not fit to preside over anything like the international order that has been, very imperfectly, put together by the British Empire and held together by the American Republic. That, and not merely some American arrogance or sense of exceptionalism, is actually the reason why pressure is still being put on China on what are, at the end of the day, matters of liberal principle.

It is therefore vital that we understand matters of principle and not see this situation merely as one of a competition for raw power. White concluded:

Because China's values are different from ours, we tend to see any compromise with Beijing as a sacrifice of our values on the altar of expediency. We will have to think our way through this because we cannot learn to live with a powerful China if we regard every accommodation as a betrayal of principle.

On the contrary, we have had a great dialogue with China now for 30 or 40 years about it abandoning communism and becoming part of the global international economic order. That accommodation has been based on a whole series of principled agreements.

Now we need more such agreement and we need China to adhere to them, otherwise there is bound to be trouble. Washington has been hinting at this for some time by suggesting a G2, which surely demonstrates an inclination to share power with China. The uncertainty in this equation is whether China will accommodate the necessary principles.

Towards the end of his monograph White states:

We can hardly imagine what it would be like to live in an Asia which is not led by the United States. All our history and instincts therefore incline us to push the US to contest China's challenge and maintain the status quo for as long as possible. Yet, our interests and our future should incline us to push the other way. We will need to sort this out among ourselves before we start talking to others about what to do.

That means the first step in Australia's strategic diplomacy is for our leaders to start explaining and debating the issues and options and solutions here at home. No one is doing that.

No single speech or paper can do more than make a modest contribution, given how vast the subject matter is and how great the stakes.