Ethics don't require God

KZ: G. E. Moore once said that goodness is a simple, indefinable, non-natural property. It's said that the indefinableness of goodness is the central claim of non-naturalism. Can we accept such an explanation of goodness? Does it mean that goodness is intuitive and can not be taught to others? If goodness is indefinable, then how is it possible to convince people to accept it?

RC: Goodness isn't indefinable, and Moore himself didn't think it was, though of course you're right that he "said" this. His real point is that it can be defined only in other evaluative terms such as "valuable". But this is just to say that evaluative properties are not the same kind of properties as those discussed by natural scientists. Natural science, then, cannot tell us what is good. But return to my previous example. Is it not easy to see that this kind of action is bad?

KZ: Have you personally arrived at a categorical definition for moral goodness? Is it plausible to identify what is morally good? Some say that whatever gives pleasure is morally good, but it's not always the case and pleasure does not always underpin morality. What's your explanation?

RC: Actually I do think that pleasure and pain are fundamental to ethics - see my book "Reasons and the Good".

KZ: One of your fields of study is applied ethics in which different subjects such as bioethics, environmental ethics and business ethics are studied and discussed. Some ethicists, however, hold viewpoints which seem to be structurally contrary to the principles of applied ethics. The renowned bio-ethicist Peter Singer, for example, is an ardent proponent of abortion and euthanasia and doesn't consider these actions immoral. What's your viewpoint about Singer and his views? Does he, in your view, violate the rules of applied ethics through his statements and viewpoints?

RC: Certainly not. Singer is the most influential analytic philosopher alive today, and he is not only an excellent philosopher but has also done a great deal of good in the world e.g. for non-human animals, and the global poor. Some people don't agree with his conclusions, and indeed I disagree with some of them. But that is common throughout philosophy.

KZ: And finally, in one of your interviews, you had stated that the relationship between morality and well-being is central to ancient ethics. Does the contemporary philosophy still adhere to such a standpoint? Can we say that morality is a shortcut to well-being? What is the definition of well-being in this context? Does it refer to peace of mind, material prosperity or other similar concepts?

RC: As I see it, the holy grail of ancient moral philosophy - by which I mean ancient western philosophy, but it may well be true of eastern too - was to show that living the virtuous life would be best for the individual. I think analytic philosophy has pretty much given up on that project now, which is a pity (though myself I think it wouldn't succeed). What can be shown, I think, is that those who live lives in which they are genuinely concerned for the well-being of others - strangers as well as friends and family - are more contented with their lives (on the whole). The results of 'positive psychology' in this area are very hard to deny. So one important task is for us to educate people that if they want happiness it will not come through acquiring many possessions, though of course some material possessions are required for happiness, but through human relationships.