Developments in Timor Leste’s 2012 presidential elections

What differences there are in policy between Ruak and Lu Olo on the broad questions of development, oil and gas, food, health, education, infrastructure etc are difficult to discern.  Timor Leste’s political elites show considerable solidarity and long-term unity on these development questions for a Timor Leste way. But on a daily basis politics is fierce with contests on the details, how to tackle poverty and unemployment and illiteracy and poor health and the roads.

Fretilin attacks the government on the issue of waste and badly spending millions from the Petroleum Fund revenues, on corruption and not investing enough on health and education. Ruak plays it tough against Fretilin with accusations that they are divisive and that in Falantil Lu Olo was under his command.

One major election debate is instructive. Ruak - with Xanana on election banners both in military uniform (and fair enough) – promises compulsory military service for the youth. This has considerable popular support given 60 per cent youth unemployment and the U.N. leaving and security issues geo-politically such as US relations with China, the numbers of U.S. troops relocating at Darwin.

Those in favour of conscription argue that it would provide structure, discipline, life skills and future educational and job opportunities to the youth, that most 18 year olds and their parents want these. National service binds Timorese together in a nationalist experience, would reduce sukuism and regionalism and minimize the influence of gangs and crime.

Those against argue with around 40,000 18 year olds leaving school each year it is very expensive (food, fuel, uniforms, buildings, vehicles etc) and would create a massive national military infrastructure that is unhealthy and not in current Government army planning. Many prefer if there is to be compulsion, civilian jobs and training for building, labouring, civil service, health, education, and services and rural jobs.

Solidarity activists from overseas do not want to have struggled against the Indonesian military to end up with Timor Leste another militarised army-dominated nation.

Tim Anderson argues: “The 2012 elections…is a confrontation between two important themes: ‘mauberism’ and ‘big man’ culture…Fretilin’s better known ‘mauberism’ is an assertion of indigenous identity which stresses cultural pride and collective action…‘big man’ culture, a Melanesian concept which seems to also have roots in East Timorese culture, not least through the Liurai (kingly) tradition. The role of Xanana Gusmao in the post-independence scene is certainly the best example of this.

‘Big man’ culture means that local and political conflict are seen as resolvable by the intervention of a great personality, a hero or mediator. The ‘big man’ politician, like the clan leader or the Liurai, can be seen as a unifying force, expected to impose himself on the situation and then distribute benefits.

Political weaknesses of this approach might be immediately apparent. The language is populist (promising more than is delivered, or hiding other agendas), accountability is ignored and corrupt private networks tend to displace the public sphere and to restrict participation.

Mauberism, on the other hand, maintained the legitimacy of wider popular participation. The extreme ‘big man’ dependence of the CNRT, and of its wider government coalition the AMP (Parliamentary Majority Alliance), subsequently crippled any real collegial policy formation. For example, the 2010 ‘Strategic Development Plan’ was pretty much an edict from the office of the Prime Minister.

Fretilin puts the weakness of the CNRT/AMP more or less this way: if Xanana Gusmao falls under a bus, that’s the end of CNRT/AMP; if Fretilin leader Mari Alkatiri falls under a bus, Fretilin goes on.

Can ‘Big Man’ culture really help develop a nation? I think not. Surely there is more to be said for pooling talents and building some distinct Timorese solutions?”

Timor Leste’s President stands in strong contrast to Australia’s Constitutional parliamentary democracy and appointed Governor-General and Queen of England. The President is not ‘largely ceremonial’ as argued by Damian Kingsbury in the Dili Weekly article ‘The Role of the President’. Australian journalists often describe The Prime Ministerial position as ‘largely ceremonial and largely symbolic ’.

But arguably Ramos-Horta was not ‘largely a ceremonial President’. His political practice is powerful on many domestic and international issues that define the role of the President – no doubt he admires the French model. What political power he has exercised and continues to on a daily basis at home and in international relations, how he daily publicly comments, how he assists people with representations to the government and Parliament – all these actions marks the political boundaries for the President. Similarly in no way was Timor Lester’s first President Xanana Gusmao ‘largely ceremonial’. The politics of Presidential ceremonial practices international national and local for nation building, peace, healing and national unity are most significant

The democratic will of the people voting in two rounds for the President is important with the President having a democratic political legitimacy, not only a unifier, but seen as a countervailing power to the Parliament and the PM. The boundary is not just the literal words in the Constitution, but how the players exercise political determinations.