America and Iran recklessly ride the escalation ladder

Advocates of military action argue that the United States would be able to strike Iranian nuclear facilities whilst at the same time deterring Iranian escalation during the conflict. This is redolent of the theories of "intra-war deterrence" drawn up by nuclear strategists during the Cold War and the "rolling thunder" bombing campaigns of the Vietnam War.

The US could threaten to launch widespread attacks both against regime assets throughout Iran and Iran's oil and energy infrastructure whilst bombing the nuclear installations. That the US may be able to do this with the forces it has currently deployed in the Persian Gulf serves as a timely reminder of raw US strategic power when many are speaking of US decline.

The problem with intra-war deterrence is that it requires the other side to play ball. The Soviets during the Cold War had always indicated that any limited US strike during a superpower standoff would be seen as an all-out attack requiring an all-out response. Iranian strategic planners have stated that any preventive strike would be seen as an existential threat to the Iranian state requiring a series of responses throughout the region. Should the Iranians be true to their word a limited military engagement would rapidly escalate to a broader war designed to degrade Iranian strategic capabilities across the board. It does not help matters that a preventive strike would not be aimed at a discrete geographic location. My own view is that a broader air campaign would be the real purpose from the get-go.

The problem with the regime change through bombing option is that it relies upon air power to achieve its central objective. It is just as probable, if not more so, that the end result of such an extended air campaign would be increasing support for the regime, or a bloody civil war, rather than its ouster through a popular uprising. Hitherto air power has had a poor record in achieving fundamentally political goals such as change of regime.

War is about the use of military firepower to achieve political objectives. Risking heightened anti-American fervour in the Middle East at a time of political flux, even renewed uprisings against the Gulf monarchies, and cementing the Islamist hardliners in Tehran is surely bad politics.

The system of power within Iran lacks legitimacy, now more so than ever, and is more susceptible to transformation if the people of Iran understand that there exists a credible partner. Hostile actions and rhetoric only serves to demonstrate that sacrifices made on the street won't lead to fundamental change in the pattern of US-Iran relations. The offer of concessions made by the hardliners is meant to serve an important internal political function; to demonstrate that diplomatic offers do not lead to a diminution in external pressure.

How many rational actors would take on the Iranian regime if at the end of the day one believes that not much will change? Too few, I would hazard to guess. Revolutionary regime change has a chance to succeed if the liberal opposition in Iran can meaningfully show that there exists a credible alternative policy approach in Washington.