America and Iran recklessly ride the escalation ladder

There can be little doubt that there has been an escalation in tension between Iran and the United States. This escalation has been accompanied by an intensified debate within America about the wisdom of launching a military campaign against Iran, which seems to be mirroring an internal debate on the matter within the Obama administration given that two former government planners, on opposing sides, have been leading the renewed debate.

The escalation, it must be stressed, is accompanied by measures that appear to be directed toward diffusing tension. These diffusing elements would tend to indicate that currently those expressing caution have, tenuously, the upper hand in both Washington and Tehran.

It is often stated by bombing enthusiasts that the escalating tension follows Iran's nuclear activities and the security concerns that others have about them. Two recent developments in particular are cited in this regard, those being the November 2011 IAEA nuclear safeguards implementation report and Iran's announcement that it is now enriching uranium to 20% U-235 at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP) near the city of Qom.

The first, it is argued, shows that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. The second, that Iran shall very soon reach a "break out" capability to produce fissile material for a nuclear weapon. Putting the two together demonstrates that now is the time to attack Iran before it is too late, advocates of military strikes implore.

Both claims need to be carefully assessed.

The November 2011 safeguards report is often misrepresented, especially by policy hardliners and journalists not prepared to engage in some old fashioned home work. It is taken to demonstrate that the IAEA has concluded that Iran has reconstituted a nuclear weapons programme after having halted one in 2003 according to US intelligence estimates. Those estimates have not changed.

Yet the wording in the report is not so unequivocal. A key passage states that, "the information indicates that prior to the end of 2003 the above activities took place under a structured programme. There are also indications that some activities relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device continued after 2003, and that some may be still ongoing."

This distinction between these two sentences is critical.

Prior to 2003 there appears to have been a structurally connected dual track approach to weapons development, one involving weaponisation activities and the other a militarised parallel nuclear fuel cycle devoted to the development of weapons grade fissile material. In the detailed annex to the November report there appears no evidence suggesting that Iran has reconstituted a parallel nuclear fuel cycle. Furthermore, Iran would need to secure alternative uranium mining sites to those currently known to the international community for a clandestine parallel fuel cycle. Lastly, that "some" weaponisation activities "may" be ongoing does not mean "all" are with "certainty."

This suggests to us that the post 2003 activities are consistent with the notion that Iran is attempting to develop a latent nuclear weapons capability, in accord with its deterrence oriented, rather than expansionist, strategic doctrine. That is not a bomb programme per se. The difference is indeed subtle though important for all that, for it undermines the key assumption made by supporters of escalation. Namely, that Iran is unambiguously pursuing a nuclear weapons programme for an aggressive foreign policy.

The IAEA has confirmed that Iran has started to enrich uranium to 20% U-235 at Fordow, which is under IAEA safeguards. Uranium enriched to 20% and above is classed as Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Weapons grade uranium is enriched to greater than or equal to 90% U-235. It is much easier to enrich from 20% to 90% than it is to enrich from 0.7 to 3-5%, with the latter being required to fuel a light water moderated reactor.

At current production rates it is estimated that Iran will be able to produce 250kg of HEU by the end of 2012. This assumption is based on 20% enrichment being conducted at both Fordow, using four cascades, and Natanz, using two cascades. From there it is further estimated that 250kg of HEU could be used as feed to produce enough weapons grade uranium for one bomb in a month. Such a bomb would need to be tested and further work beyond enrichment would realistically need to be conducted to manufacture it. That is not an imminent break out capacity.

The highly enriched uranium is partly being produced for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), which is used to develop medical isotopes. If operating at capacity the TRR reactor requires 9 to 18kg of HEU annually or if at historic capacity some 5 to 11 kg of HEU fuel annually. Iran has just announced that it is able to fabricate the fuel rods for the TRR without foreign assistance. The TRR previously was fuelled by uranium supplied by Argentina, but the TRR now needs to be refuelled.

The break out calculations, for one bomb, are based on the assumption that both Fordow and Natanz are devoted to HEU production and no HEU is being diverted to the TRR. Those are tight assumptions.

We have known for a while that Fordow would come online about now. This is not a revelation that has come out of the blue as often breathlessly reported. In June 2011 Iran announced that it shall be enriching to 20% at Fordow when the FFEP comes online, widely anticipated to be January 2012.

It will be very interesting to see what happens at Natanz from here on. The Iranian announcement in June 2011 stated that HEU production would be shifted from Natanz, above ground, to Fordow, below ground, not that it would be done in addition to HEU production at Natanz.

That TRR fuel is being produced and fabricated in Iran follows the failure of a Turkish and Brazilian initiative to have the TRR fuel rods fabricated in Russia. A key reason why that deal fell through was a UN sanctions resolution. Furthermore, in September 2011 Iran offered to halt the production of highly enriched uranium if the TRR was to be supplied by fuel from outside Iran. An opportunity existed to pursue a diplomatic initiative to halt the production of HEU and to cap its production for an extended period thereafter. That opportunity was not pursued.

It is thereby odd that something that might well have been prevented diplomatically is now being put front and centre in the case for war.

Surely this invites speculation as to whether nuclear proliferation is the real issue here.

The financial sanctions bill recently passed by Congress, an important factor in the escalation of tension, stipulates that sanctions can only be lifted after Iran has released political prisoners, established an independent court system and tried those responsible for killing Green Movement protestors. Iran would need to cease support for international terrorism, halt all weapons of mass destruction related activities and, to boot, stop working on ballistic missile technology.

These, naturally, are all laudable goals but clearly they go well beyond nuclear proliferation and are politically unrealistic. This is because they have been the key set of demands that successive administrations have made of Iran. Absent a pledge in return to normalise relations with Iran and demilitarise the Persian Gulf such demands are fantasy and known to be so.

There is surely an element of domestic politics involved. Other than Ron Paul, a genuine libertarian of the type rarely seen in Australia, the leading GOP candidates for the presidency have accused Obama of being soft on Iran. Yet it also demonstrates that there exists a strong constituency within the American political elite for using concerns about nuclear proliferation as cover for a policy of regime change by way of graduated economic and strategic pressure. This is the simplest and most rational hypothesis that one can draw. That doesn't make it right, but if one were a scientist from Mars surely this hypothesis would be taken seriously.

I believe that the most likely route to an Iranian nuclear bomb would be if Iran, much like North Korea, uses its nuclear activities asymptotically in tit-for-tat fashion to gain leverage as it rides the escalation ladder with Washington. If so, graduated pressure using nuclear weapons as a cover could well lead to a nuclear armed Iran.

We might call this type of nuclear proliferation as "asymptotic proliferation." A non-nuclear weapon state might seek to approach closer and closer to overt weaponisation as relations with another state grow more distant, eventually breaking through to proliferation if escalation reaches a hot spot even though proliferation was not strictly intended.

Advocates of military action argue that the United States would be able to strike Iranian nuclear facilities whilst at the same time deterring Iranian escalation during the conflict. This is redolent of the theories of "intra-war deterrence" drawn up by nuclear strategists during the Cold War and the "rolling thunder" bombing campaigns of the Vietnam War.

The US could threaten to launch widespread attacks both against regime assets throughout Iran and Iran's oil and energy infrastructure whilst bombing the nuclear installations. That the US may be able to do this with the forces it has currently deployed in the Persian Gulf serves as a timely reminder of raw US strategic power when many are speaking of US decline.

The problem with intra-war deterrence is that it requires the other side to play ball. The Soviets during the Cold War had always indicated that any limited US strike during a superpower standoff would be seen as an all-out attack requiring an all-out response. Iranian strategic planners have stated that any preventive strike would be seen as an existential threat to the Iranian state requiring a series of responses throughout the region. Should the Iranians be true to their word a limited military engagement would rapidly escalate to a broader war designed to degrade Iranian strategic capabilities across the board. It does not help matters that a preventive strike would not be aimed at a discrete geographic location. My own view is that a broader air campaign would be the real purpose from the get-go.

The problem with the regime change through bombing option is that it relies upon air power to achieve its central objective. It is just as probable, if not more so, that the end result of such an extended air campaign would be increasing support for the regime, or a bloody civil war, rather than its ouster through a popular uprising. Hitherto air power has had a poor record in achieving fundamentally political goals such as change of regime.

War is about the use of military firepower to achieve political objectives. Risking heightened anti-American fervour in the Middle East at a time of political flux, even renewed uprisings against the Gulf monarchies, and cementing the Islamist hardliners in Tehran is surely bad politics.

The system of power within Iran lacks legitimacy, now more so than ever, and is more susceptible to transformation if the people of Iran understand that there exists a credible partner. Hostile actions and rhetoric only serves to demonstrate that sacrifices made on the street won't lead to fundamental change in the pattern of US-Iran relations. The offer of concessions made by the hardliners is meant to serve an important internal political function; to demonstrate that diplomatic offers do not lead to a diminution in external pressure.

How many rational actors would take on the Iranian regime if at the end of the day one believes that not much will change? Too few, I would hazard to guess. Revolutionary regime change has a chance to succeed if the liberal opposition in Iran can meaningfully show that there exists a credible alternative policy approach in Washington.