Julia Gillard's u-turn on selling uranium to India exposes Labor's decay

But, in reality, within a society dominated by considerations of power and privilege bipartisan support is a reflection of elite consensus on policy. That is why both major political parties support procorporate neoliberal economic restructuring despite the depth of public opposition.

There are other more global matters also to consider.

Recently headlines around the world were devoted to the latest International Atomic Energy Agency report on Iran's past and present nuclear activities.

Iran is alleged to have engaged in a structured programme consistent with an objective to manufacture a nuclear weapon prior to 2003 and that some aspects of that effort continued beyond 2003. Never, either before or after, 2003 has it been established that Iran has conducted weaponisation activities with weapons grade nuclear material, which constitutes a crucial key step in any formal assessment in favour of manufacture.

Under the NPT ambiguity exists as to what constitutes "manufacture" of a nuclear weapon. The information publicly presented suggests that Iran has sought to develop a latent nuclear weapons capability or that it has in fact engaged in activities expressly devoted to the manufacture of a workable nuclear weapon.

Under Article II of the NPT nonnuclear weapon states pledge not to manufacture nuclear weapons nor to procure foreign assistance in the development of nuclear weapons. The prospect, in part, that Iran is violating Article II of the NPT has encouraged further speculation regarding military action against Iran given the importance we attach to nuclear nonproliferation.

The sale of uranium to India is unambiguously a violation of Article III of the NPT. Under this provision a country like Australia cannot provide "source material", which includes uranium, to a state not designated as a nuclear weapons state under the Treaty that does not accept full scope safeguards, defined as being over all nuclear facilities "anywhere."

India will not allow full scope safeguards. The Nuclear Suppliers Group of states have agreed to give India an "exemption" but that merely amounts to an agreement to violate the NPT.

Those who most blow the trumpet of war when discussing Iran's status with respect to Article II of the NPT are the most vocal in expressing support for violation of Article III.

India sits outside the NPT and has an active nuclear weapons programme which includes the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The export of uranium to India will, at a minimum (more could be said here but is left aside), free up India's domestic uranium stock to be used for the production of weapons grade fissile material and so serves to assist India's nuclear weapons programme.

In recent years whenever Australia has signed a controversial uranium export treaty a key selling point has been that the country concerned is not producing fissile material for weapons. That is not the case with India.

India is engaged in a strategic arms race with Pakistan. Supporters of uranium exports argue that India has enough nuclear weapons in order to deter Pakistan and so exporting uranium to India will not materially aid Delhi's weapons programme.