We cannot win the Afghanistan war

To believe that the Australian commitment to Afghanistan has not changed as a result of the killing of three, and the wounding of 10, Australian soldiers over the past few days by Afghan soldiers said to be loyal to the Australian military contingent, is to ignore some basic human emotions and to ignorantly or wilfully misunderstand the average Australian soldier.

If Prime Minister Julia Gillard and Defence Minister Stephen Smith believe that trust and confidence can be re-established by Australian soldiers toward Afghan troops they are meant to live alongside and train they are sadly deluded.

That's the problem in having politicians of limited life experience and senior defence force officers who gain preferment and promotion through playing the political game.

The Australian commitment is in a mess and will not be sorted in the short, medium or long term.

The bipartisan approach of the major parties is not serving the wishes of the Australian people. Australians are not just questioning our commitment to Afghanistan – 72 per cent of Australians (or 16.4 million people) say they want the troops withdrawn. It is the politicians who have dug in, contrary to the wish of their constituents. How much longer can they be ignored?

Each time an Australian soldier is killed or wounded the Prime Minister, Minister for Defence and the Leader of the Opposition stand with studied solemnity before the media gallery and deliver rehearsed lines like "Despite setbacks like today, we believe we are making progress". We've heard it all before from equally disengaged politicians in another era.

It is said by the disengaged that if we left now we would run the risk of creating a vacuum into which the Taliban, the Haqqani network and the remnants of Al Qaeda would again fall, creating precisely the same danger that we are there to eliminate. But where's the evidence that the Taliban or the Haqqani network or the remnants of Al Qaeda have, or will have, popular support within Afghanistan? The lifeblood of the Haqqani network flows from Pakistan, not Afghanistan, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last month testified to a U.S. Congress committee that Al Qaeda's senior leadership has been devastated and its ability to operate greatly diminished.

The Australian Government has stubbornly chosen to ignore the futility of our involvement in Afghanistan. Just like the Russians before us, we're trying to hold the main cities, keep open the roads between them, and make forays into the countryside to convince ourselves that we control it. Just by being there, by engaging in search and destroy, new resistance is created. More Afghan soldiers become angry at the death of family members. Resistance coalesces around the presence and activities of foreign troops.

Mikhail Gorbachev eventually recognised this stupidity, but neither the U.S., NATO nor Australia has learned a thing from Russia's failure.

Prime Minister Gillard says we shouldn't judge the progress of the mission from single incidents. However General McChrystal has noted that:

We didn't know enough, and we still don't know enough. Most of us, me included, had a very superficial understanding of the situation and history, and we had a frighteningly simplistic view of recent history, the last 50 years, the personalities, the actions that occurred. Many people thought, well, they fought the Soviets, they defeated the Soviets, and then there was this Taliban period, and then we came in 2001. But there were so many forces at play and so many personalities in the seven different Mujahideen groups, so many different actions that complicated, that when we arrived, I think we were woefully underinformed.

Last year three U.K. servicemen were killed by an Afghan soldier in a gun and rocket-propelled grenade attack. In mid-February this year an Afghan soldier working at a NATO outpost opened fire on German soldiers, killing three and wounding eight. In July several attacks involving bombers wearing military uniforms targeted foreign troops as well as official Afghan institutions. Nowadays, according to a 'secret' NATO report, British troops in Afghanistan are to be armed with a pistol at all times - even when sleeping - because of the high risk of being attacked by their Afghan allies.

Despite these occurrences we are cautioned not to jump to conclusions about systemic problems, but what about reports of Afghan forces uncovering a counterfeit military uniform factory in Kabul? As British academic, author and Conservative politician Rory Stewart so eloquently put it:

...Beginning in 2004, every general came in saying, "I've inherited a dismal situation, but finally I have the right resources and the correct strategy, which will deliver," in General Barno's word in 2004, the "decisive year." Well guess what? It didn't. But it wasn't sufficient to prevent General Abuzaid saying that he had the strategy and the resources to deliver, in 2005, the "decisive year." Or General David Richards to come in 2006 and say he had the strategy and the resources to deliver the "crunch year." Or in 2007, the Norwegian deputy foreign minister, Espen Eide, to say that that would deliver the "decisive year." Or in 2008, Major General Champoux to come in and say he would deliver the "decisive year." Or in 2009, my great friend, General Stanley McChrystal, who said that he was "knee-deep in the decisive year." Or in 2010, the U.K. foreign secretary, David Miliband, who said that at last we would deliver the "decisive year." And you'll be delighted to hear in 2011, today, that Guido Westerwelle, the German foreign minister, assures us that we are in the "decisive year....

In 1996 General (Ret) Mohammad Yahya Nawroz and Lester Grau wrote:

That the Soviet concept for military occupation of Afghanistan was based on stabilising the country by garrisoning the main routes, major cities, airbases and logistics sites; relieving the Afghan government forces of garrison duties and pushing them into the countryside to battle the resistance; providing logistic, air, artillery and intelligence support to the Afghan forces; providing minimum interface between the Soviet occupation forces and the local populace; accepting minimal Soviet casualties; and strengthening the Afghan forces, so once defeated, the Soviet Army could be withdrawn.

Like us, the Russians tried to impose military and social reforms; like us, they implemented economic measures that worsened the conditions for the impoverished, and they detained, tortured and executed enemies of the 'state' and bombed large numbers of Afghans into fleeing their homes and their country, all of which is happening today.

In a country where millions of Afghans still live in poverty an Afghan National Army officer gets about $US170 as a starting monthly wage. On top of that they can receive specialty pays and enhancements, longevity pay and promotions. The Afghan National Army pay is bankrolled entirely by the United States. The Soviets tried that too, and failed: they attempted during the first year of their occupation to rebuild the depleted Afghan army, first by inducements like pay rises and reenlistment bonuses and then by more stringent measures like more stringent conscription laws and impressment. They failed not only because their regime was unpopular but also because the warfare in which potential recruits would be engaged was repugnant to most Afghans. There were widespread desertions, as there are today.

The war in Afghanistan can't be won, and Afghanistan isn't ours - or anyone else's - to lose. Australia will not form part of the peace process or be required to broker a peace deal. Many lives have been lost, many others ruined and money squandered in Afghanistan, but it's not a sign of weakness to admit that we've made a mistake. Rhetoric about 'progress being made' will not re-cast the war in a more favourable light. It is what it is. Futile.