The guarantee of certain basic human rights to the individual is an important aspect of the observance of human dignity and integrity. There is, however, a broad range of approaches to human rights adopted by countries that share similar
origins.
The omission of a Bill of Rights from our Constitution is one of the elements that marked it as different from the United States Constitution, from which a number of other provisions were derived. The omission was not by accident. The proposed
inclusion of a Bill of Rights was defeated, somewhat ironically, on the basis that a 'due process' provision would undermine some of the discriminatory laws in place at that time, including laws enacted to the detriment of Aborigines and Asian
immigrants.
A number of attempts have since been made to amend the Constitution to include a Bill of Rights. Commonwealth Parliamentary enquiries in 1929 and 1959 rejected the proposal. A referendum in 1944 was also defeated. In 1985 the Australian
Government introduced legislative initiatives to enact an Australian Bill of Rights, but decided on 18 August 1986 not to proceed with the Bill. In 1988 the Constitutional Commission recommended an entrenched Bill of Rights, which was not taken
up by the Government. During the same year, constitutional referendums to extend the application of existing rights provisions attracted the lowest "Yes" vote in any Commonwealth referendum to date.
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The context in which the current debate over a Bill of Rights is occurring is the impending celebration of the centenary of Australia's existing Constitution in 1901. A more significant issue has been raised by the discussion of the need for
fundamental reforms to the Australian system of government. In this context, a Bill of Rights has begun to loom large as one of the component parts of an overall package of recommended reforms.
Prior to considering the merits and pitfalls of a Bill of Rights it is important to understand that certain individual rights are already recognised at common law. The "common law", in its broadest sense, means judge-made law and
judge-developed law. As such, I include the interpretation of statute law, that is, the law as enacted by Parliament, and the interpretation of constitutional provisions by the judiciary.
The common law has protected civil and political rights in four main ways. First, it has recognised and protected a number of rights and freedoms, which it has seen as fundamental. Second, responding to the avalanche of legislation that
regulates our conduct, it has developed rules of statutory interpretation that limit the degree of legislative encroachment into our rights and freedoms. Third, the Australian High Court has in recent years begun to give new life to express
guarantees in the Constitution. Fourth, some judges have suggested that limitations on legislative competence to contravene fundamental rights are to be found in the "peace, order and good government" formulae in our Constitutions, or
in implications to be drawn from the structure of the Australian Commonwealth Constitution and the free and democratic nature of Australian society.
In terms of international human rights norms, Australia's accession to the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has brought to bear on the common law the powerful influence of the Covenant and the
international standards it impacts. It may be expected that the results of individual petitions to the United Nations Committee could have a similar outcome in Australia to those that have occurred in England, given the accession of the United
Kingdom to the European Convention on Human Rights. It must be acknowledged, however, that many of the rights recognised by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are not currently protected by the common law.
In Australia, certain developments in the common law have been expressed to be made consistently with international norms. In Mabo v
Queensland [No 2] this was a significant part of the rationale for abandoning the fiction of terra nullius, which was the basis for the "discriminatory rule" of the common law departed from in Mabo. Australia is a party to
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, under which the best interests of the child are declared to be a "primary consideration" in all relevant actions concerning children.
In Minister for Immigration v Teoh it was held that the provisions of the Convention were relevant to a
decision to deport the father of young children. While such provisions were not incorporated into domestic law, accession to the Convention resulted in a reasonable expectation that those making administrative decisions in relation to a parent
which would affect the rights of children would take into account as a primary consideration the best interests of the children, who were themselves Australian citizens.
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While the common law has developed to protect some civil rights, the question of the ability of the common law to develop so as to deal with ongoing infringements of those rights was examined by the Chief Justice of South Australia, the Hon
John Doyle (then Solicitor General of South Australia) and Ms Belinda Wells in 1992. They strongly suggested that "no-one should underestimate the capacity of the common law to adapt to change in society."
It was conceded, however, that there are two "obvious limitations" on the ability of the common law to protect human rights. The first is the principle of parliamentary supremacy. The second is the basic approach of the common law to
the identification of what may be properly termed a 'residual right'.
To these limitations, two further limitations might be added. The first is that, while the courts are increasingly responding to society's attitude to human rights, the capacity of the common law is limited to the extent that it is
opportunistic. No general statement of relevant rights can be developed in response to the individual case. The Court is restricted to a declaration of rights as between the parties before it. The second is that the development of the common law
is dependent upon the doctrine of precedent. To the extent that the courts develop an approach based upon general rights, such as the right to a fair trial or the right to freedom of speech or expression, the approach must be reasoned and
principled, based on a balancing of the interests involved and with an eye to consistency with previous decisions.
In relatively recent times, the judiciary, and in particular the High Court, has been the subject of a great deal of criticism by some members of the public, some politicians and some media for seeking to make new law. The process of judges
and courts developing, making and occasionally changing the common law has been going on for a very long time. The common law developed and modified by judges over the centuries is as much a part of our law as an Act of Parliament. However,
within the limits of its constitutional power, Parliament can change the law that has been declared by the courts. There is no reason to change this system.
A systematic and extensive survey of popular opinion conducted in 1993 found that 54 per cent of Australians did not think human rights were well protected under the existing system. Seventy-two per cent were in favour of the adoption of a
Bill of Rights and 61 percent believed that the final decision in relation to human rights matters should rest with the courts rather than the Parliament. The same survey also found that the views of most politicians were significantly different
from those of the people they represent. The question whether Australia should have a Bill of Rights and, if so, in what form and with what content is essentially a political question.
Opinions differ regarding whether it is proper for a judge to express an opinion one way or another on the question. In 1988 the then Chief Justice of the High Court, Sir Anthony Mason, announced that he had changed his mind on the answer to
the question and was now in favour of a Bill of Rights. He did so because Australia was going against the international trend and was falling out of step with comparable countries such as Canada.
When considering what we mean by a Bill of Rights, Lord Browne-Wilkinson has provided some useful terminology. He uses the term "the full Bill" to refer to the rights that are judicially enforceable and that cannot be overridden by
Act of Parliament. An example of this is the Bill of Rights of the United States of America. What His Lordship calls a "half-way Bill" would be enforceable against the executive and, in the absence of clear statutory enactment to the
contrary, it would be presumed that Parliament in passing legislation did not intend to infringe these rights. The half-way Bill is typified by New Zealand's Bill of Rights.
The arguments for and against a Bill of Rights have been well expounded in the 1987 Report of the Advisory Committee to the Constitutional Commission on Individual and Democratic Rights. The arguments in favour of a Bill of Rights include the
following:
i. The inadequacy of present constitutional provisions.
ii. The inadequacy of the common law.
iii. Statutory erosion of rights upheld by the common law.
iv. Enhancement of democratic government.
v. The educative role of constitutional rights.
vi. An additional guide for judicial interpretation.
vii A means of meeting Australia's treaty agreements.
The arguments against a Bill of Rights in Australia have principally relied upon the protection afforded by the common law. Some of the arguments are based on the contention that a Bill of Rights would confer too much power on the courts and,
in particular, the High Court. Others contend that existing constitutional protections are sufficient Another argument against a written Bill of Rights is that many rights may be left out and, over the course of time, those that are left out may
be perceived to be of lesser value and consequently more readily susceptible to extinction.
Another perceived problem with a Bill of Rights is that rights and freedoms tend to be stated in very general terms. The United States allows influences such as the political philosophy or values of the person called upon to interpret such
legislation to result in widely differing interpretations. This has often been used as an example of the danger inherent in broad statements of principle and seems to be the most fundamental argument against constitutional entrenchment of a Bill
of Rights.
Australia, without a Bill of Rights, is now outside the mainstream of legal development in English-speaking countries, particularly those most comparable in their political and legal systems, including the United Kingdom, New Zealand and
Canada. It is disappointing to note that to date in Australia there has been very little sustained thought or research devoted to the fundamental issues of the detailed nature and content of a Bill of Rights. In the various debates regarding the
Australian Constitution in the lead up to the Centenary of Federation in 2001 the main focus has been on whether Australia should become a republic and, and in that event how should the Head of State be selected, elected or appointed. The
question of a Bill of Rights does not seem high on the national agenda, despite the opinion polls, because of the level of controversy regarding the extent of the judicial power.
There are also critical views expressed in the states regarding the external affairs power of the Commonwealth. This criticism has been directed to accession to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and other treaties,
without adequate consultation with or participation by the states. Issues of human rights tend to be debated in a context where the real questions are sometimes obscured by economic, racial and other issues that lead to those promoting the cause
of fundamental rights being referred to as "bleeding hearts" and "do-gooders".
I hope that during the next few years, whilst contemplating the significance of this new millenium we will see a rational and detailed national debate on the desirability, scope and content of a Bill of Rights. While much has been achieved
through the development of the common law, the courts have had to pay a price for this in regard to criticisms that they have taken too much power to themselves.
The guidance provided by a Bill of Rights would be one way of assisting the courts as well as re-asserting the supremacy of Parliament. At the same time, it will need to be acknowledged by Parliament that the courts will become more involved
in the weighing of competing considerations, including those of a policy nature in the interpretation and application of a Bill of Rights, whether entrenched or unentrenched.
This is an edited version of a speech given to the Amnesty International Como Group on 16 July 1998 and published in the Murdoch University Electronic
Journal of Law, Vol 5, No 3 (September, 1998).