What direction will the Chinese government take after 2012?

The first thing to note, is that most of the human rights abuses in China are perpetrated by stability-preserving security outfits that have been hired by local governments or corporations. Operating in a quasi-legal environment where the law is only occasionally enforced and rights are little more than lines on paper, citizens who stand in the way of local governments seeking to meet GDP targets by seizing land for development almost always find themselves on the losing end of the battle, with no outlet for their frustrations. The petition system that once allowed residents with complaints to voice their grievances has become a mockery of its former self, with local government s often dispatching the aforementioned security outfits to pick up and detain petitioners before they can reach Beijing.

An excellent example of local government ignoring central government directives can be seen in the rapid expansion of golf courses throughout the country. Despite the central government being concerned about the loss of agricultural land, high water requirements (for a country with dire water problems) and ostentatious displays of wealth, all of which are on display when golf courses are constructed in poorer areas, local governments have blazed ahead with hundreds of these developments, despite central government restrictions. By calling them sports fields or country clubs during the development stage, local authorities have found ways to circumvent requirements.

Similar tales of circumventing rules have allowed local governments to amass huge debts via subsidiary companies, which also prove to be honeypots for corruption. Earlier this year, the government was forced to spend trillions of yuan balancing the books, and it seems like this saga of debt isn't over.

These illustrate the point that China's central government is not all powerful and it's not just the local governments which don't always take their cue from the central leadership. The CCP is undoubtedly hoping that Xi Jinping, who has strong links with the People's Liberation Army (PLA), will be able to help coordinate policy with the PLA, who have also been independent of late. The best example of this was Hu Jintao's January visit to the US. This was supposed to be a smooth visit and a time to soothe tensions, so the fact that this was when China's first Stealth Fighter Jet made a public appearance would appear to indicate either a major miscommunication or a deliberate gesture by the PLA. Either way, it was a concerning development for the CCP.

Lastly, the CCP's control over the media is not absolute. The recent Wenzhou train crash has provided the clearest example of this yet. Despite reporting restrictions issued by the Ministry of Culture, Chinese paper The Economic Observer published a graphic front page image and a scathing editorial that pushed for continued vigilance by the public and indicated that if the Chinese people stopped pressing for their rights to information, they would be lied to.

These may not represent a 'separation of powers' in a conventional sense, but they do curb the CCP's ability to reform or even exercise power effectively at a domestic level, perhaps even more so than limits on power in the US, despite the recent high profile wrangling over debt-ceilings. Where democratic systems run the risk of ejecting political parties from government or destroying careers, Chinese leaders fear far more debilitating outbursts of violence.

Something which will undoubtedly be on the minds of the politburo standing committee when they take the mantle of leadership next year. Their solutions however, are unlikely to be similar to those Western leaders would propose.