Chance for uranium diplomacy

The world was understandably shocked by the events of Fukushima that continue to drag on.

A month before, I wrote in this newspaper urging the Gillard Government to overturn its uranium export ban to India which has become a bad symbol of our diplomatic relationship.

At the time, I held out hope that when the Indian Manmohan Singh visits Perth in October for a Commonwealth Meeting that he would extend the trip to a bilateral visit during which a reversal in Australia's policy could be announced.

But this now looks increasingly unlikely.

The zero-sum mentality of the ban is based on the fact that despite India already being a nuclear power they have not signed the archaic and exclusive nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The reality is that the world's appetite for Australia's uranium will not slow in the wake of the Japanese disaster.

This was highlighted last week in Perth by the Resources Minister Martin Ferguson – himself a closet supporter of nuclear power in Australia – when he said "What Fukushima will not do is change the fundamental drivers, the increasing population and increasing demand for energy that are behind the desire by some nations for more nuclear power".

And he is right.

While several of the four hundred nuclear reactors around the world were shut down in the wake of Fukushima, the vast bulk continue to operate. These, coupled with increasing global demand from countries such as India – which plans a tenfold increase in nuclear power to 2050 – will keep the world's eyes firmly focused on Australia.

Australia is home to forty percent of the world's uranium reserves with approximately $9 billion of that in Western Australia. This provides Australia with unique leverage to use these reserves as currency to do good in the world.

On nuclear non-proliferation, this could take the form of embedding various bilateral agreements on use into our uranium trade deals with countries like India rather than relying on them to simply sign the NPT.

For instance some have argued that by selling India uranium we could make it conditional on a cessation of the production of fissile material for weapons. This would be a markedly different approach to the NPT all or nothing agenda which achieves zero with India as a non-signatory.

Such actions would not be without basis.

In 2006, Australia and China signed a bilateral agreement on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and current negotiations with the United Arab Emirates are heavily focused on a similar outcome.

Similar arrangements can also promote safety and standards on nuclear power.

This is something the Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd understands writing recently that "We should use what we have learned from promoting (proliferation) safeguards to also promote safety in viable ways."

Present arrangements between a country and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are not sufficient lacking any means of enforcement. But a bilateral agreement on the supply of uranium to a reactor, contingent on IAEA safety standards being upheld, would add a measurable safeguard beyond current practise.

But the immaturity with which our domestic political discourse views nuclear power – unable to grow out of a nappy like approach that considers even the debate of the topic politically toxic – has infected our wider foreign policy and risks overshadowing these possibilities.

For far too long, Australia's foreign policy elite have either overlooked or completely misunderstood the diplomacy of uranium.

It would be completely ridiculous to think that nuclear power or arms proliferation will not continue in the wake of the Japanese crisis.

It will, and as it does, we have a real opportunity to leverage our uranium reserves to not only usher greater safety standards in the nuclear power industry but to redouble our efforts on non-proliferation.