The limits of transparency: China releases 2010 Defense White Paper

Chinese military modernization is not simply a matter of improved weapons or even command and control systems, however. Much of this year's defense white paper is devoted to Chinese efforts at fostering joint operational capabilities, improving training and recruitment, and expanding Chinese logistical capabilities. These essential elements of modern warfare require not only advanced weapons but competent people proficient in their use and a logistical supply system capable of sustaining operations at the high expenditure rates typical of modern warfare. The future wars of the PLA will not be lost for want of rounds or lack of trained personnel or units.

In addition to broadcasting China's growing military capabilities, this year's defense white paper also serves as an instrument of strategic communications. An especially striking element is the proffering of confidence-building measures to Taiwan. Even as the paper condemns pro-independence elements on Taiwan as "the biggest obstacle and threat to the peaceful development of cross-Strait relations," it also makes the suggestion that "the two sides should take a positive attitude toward the future." The paper proposes not only political but military discussions and "a military security mechanism of mutual trust." It goes on to state that the two sides should "strive to create favorable conditions to gradually resolve, through consultation on an equal footing, both issues inherited from the past and new ones that emerge in the development of cross-Strait relations."

Lest one become too optimistic, however, the paper goes on to note that such consultations should be held "on the basis of upholding the one-China principle"-something to which Taiwan cannot agree. Indeed, perhaps recognizing this, the subsequent recital of military modernization capabilities is justified by the need to "oppose and contain the separatist forces," which are always listed as those supporting Taiwan, East Turkistan, and Tibetan independence.

The white paper remains studiously silent on other key issues, however. While reiterating claims to sovereignty over Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet, the paper makes no specific mention of the South China Sea. And there are only very brief mentions of cyberspace (which is distinguished from "electromagnetic space") or outer space-although the authors specifically note that China will not allow itself to become dependent on space-based systems.

Recommendations

For American policymakers, this edition of the Chinese defense white paper should reinforce certain longstanding lessons and recommendations:

• Recognize that the Chinese military will be increasingly capable.The Chinese white paper makes clear that the PLA will be continuing its modernization efforts. Indeed, the authors appear unaware that defense spending would again increase by double digits in 2011, focusing instead on the reduced rate of increase in 2010. The U.S. military, if it intends to remain a factor in the western Pacific, cannot afford to fall behind. This means that the Pentagon and Congress should hold the line on budget cuts and fully fund the U.S. Navy's shipbuilding needs.
• Do not waver on longstanding U.S. policies.The white paper reiterates Chinese policy positions on opposing Taiwan independence and asserting China's peaceful nature. American policymakers should be as steadfast in supporting American interests. As Taiwan's capabilities decline, providing Taiwan the wherewithal for self-defense by authorizing the F-16A/B upgrades and selling the F-16C/D replacement aircraft and other defensive equipment it has requested becomes ever more urgent. Policymakers should focus on what the PRC does as well as what it says.
• Recognize the very different view of transparency.Inevitably, some will hold up the white paper as an example of growing transparency on the part of the Chinese leadership. The comments of Chinese senior colonel Chen Zhou, a key contributor to the Chinese defense white paper, should disabuse this notion. He states, in a press conference regarding the 2011 edition, that it is an error to believe that transparency is a precursor to mutual military trust. Rather, "in order to achieve mutual trust, it is first necessary to constantly expand mutual interests and respect each other's strategic interests." The 2011 white paper would seem to make clear that there is no such convergence, in the Chinese view, between the U.S. and the PRC at this time.

Useful Nonetheless

The 2010 China's National Defense is not a glossy publication with Chinese photographs of new weapon systems or diagrams of how they function. Instead, it is a policy document that lays out China's national defense strategy and, as important, how Chinese leaders envision their military and security roles. And in this context, it is useful.