How politics contributed to the January 2011 Brisbane floods

Reports today by Dr Patel take-down journo Hedley Thomas indicate that mismanagement of the dam levels at Wivenhoe and the decision to belatedly release water may have contributed to the flooding in Brisbane.

But there is more behind this story than simply an over-worked engineer at SEQ Water. The real problem lies much deeper and has its roots in the Cabinet Room in George Street.

To understand the underlying issues, we must first look back to 2006.

In 2006, South-East Queensland faced a daunting prospect of total water loss (see section on Historical Dam storage data). Rainfall was at an all-time low and it was clear to then Premier Peter Beattie that action was required.

Beattie’s response to the lack of rain was the $9 billion water grid. The water grid is a spider-web of pipelines that would connect water supplies and sources to spread stocks around. Attached to that was a recycled water plant and a desalination plant.

The key focus of these measures was the assumption being fed from people in the Department of Environment that climate change was visibly at work and that it might never rain in South-East Queensland again. One of the Premier’s key advisors with this message was now-Premier Bligh’s husband: Greg Withers.

So acting on this assumption of climate change-affected rainfall the Government announced these new measures with typical Beattie-gusto!

Fast forward a couple of years and the water grid was under construction.

Step two in Beattie’s plan to “drought-proof” South-East Queensland was for the State Government to compulsorily acquire local council water infrastructure. Until then, while the State Government owned some of the larger infrastructure like Wivenhoe Dam, local councils owned and operated the distribution and retail water assets.

Part of the compulsory acquisition was a nominal payment from the State Government to councils to compensate them for the loss of water infrastructure. That payment was in the order of $2 billion after significant haggling by the local councils – Brisbane City Council received $1.01 billion.

Premier Bligh and Labor then announced a raft of new bureaucracies to oversee water distribution in South-East Queensland, and the model announced would bring a tear of joy to Sir Humphrey. Even former Labor Lord Mayor of Brisbane Jim Soorley called the water bureaucracy a “complex mongrel beast.”

From a public responsibility perspective it was a nightmare concept – but from a public service perspective it was perfect. With so many advisory bodies, the actual responsibility for decision making was lost thereby protecting the people giving the advice on which decisions were made. But the cost of these bodies began to add up – and that’s the theme of this story.

Fast forward to 2009/ 2010: the new pricing regime for water in South-East Queensland begins and the cost of water begins to rise. Bulk water prices, now set by the State Government authority but levied by council-owned retailers begins to bite and George Street starts to feel the political pain as “costs of living pressures” start showing up on their polling.

So Treasurer Andrew Fraser makes the call that whatever can be done to “ease the burden” (read: save our skin) of cost pressures must be done.

The announcements which followed indicated the Government's preference for the use of more rain-fed supplies over desalinated or manufactured water.

The Tugan desalination plant is placed into “standby mode” to save costs. The recycled water plant is switched off and the Government starts announcing that it has done everything it can to stop increasing costs. Never mind that the reason costs where rising in the first place was because of the poorly planned infrastructure spending they started in 2006.

So with manufactured water being on the nose due to its price, a decision is taken in George Street to give Wivenhoe Dam a de facto re-tasking.

Instead of predominately being a flood mitigation dam, its normal storage levels would be allowed to increase to hold more water for drinking. This was at the cost of the space for flood mitigation. However, the Government to its credit, did not entirely discount the need for Wivenhoe to act as a flood-mitigation measure. But a review was undertaken with a view to increasing the drinking supplies.

It is highly doubtful that the report's findings will ever see the light of day.

In effect, the Government indicated their preference for operations of Wivenhoe Dam toward storage for drinking supplies. In doing so, their political desire to avoid heat from tax-payers for increasing water costs has jeopardised the safety of Brisbane residents.

It’s a classic case of short-term management plus political convenience culminating with an extraordinary series of events that has led Brisbane to the 1/11 flooding.

The best thing for Queensland is a commission of inquiry to delve into these issues and examine the evidence. The recommendations of the commissioners should include new operating procedures for Wivenhoe Dam, but should also examine the broader issues of water-supply in South-East Queensland discussed here that led to this situation.

To be clear, I'm not blaming the Government or the water authorities entirely for the flooding. Obviously there was extraordinary rainfall. But it is clear that the actions of the Government were complicit in allowing the destruction of Brisbane. It's a sin of omission, rather than commission.