No time for celebrating victory over Iran

While killing the chances of a diplomatic solution to Iran’s nuclear issue, the covert Israeli and Western operations against Iran’s nuclear program are also not likely to achieve their intended goal of disrupting Iran’s nuclear program.

The main reason for this observation is that nuclear experts closely monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities do not share the exaggerated view of the Israeli and Western politicians and media of the extent of damage caused to Iran’s enrichment facilities by the Stuxnet computer worm. A technical report issued on December 22, 2010 by a team of nuclear experts at the Institute for Science and International Security on the impact of Stuxnet computer worm on Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities concludes that Stuxnet may have succeeded in disrupting a limited number of Iranian centrifuges temporarily, but if the goal of Stuxnet was to quickly destroy all the centrifuges at Natanz enrichment centre it failed. IAEA reports also indicate that the monthly low-enriched uranium output at Natanz flattened but never came to a halt from mid 2008 to late 2009 and that it has substantially increased since then.

To say the least, these acts of covert sabotage against Iran’s nuclear program are detrimental to the very spirit of diplomatic negotiations aimed at resolving Iran’s nuclear issue. They are likely to further strengthen Iranian resolve in pursuing its uranium enrichment program and create more domestic public support for it. Not to mention various retaliation options available to Iran, these acts of hostility are also likely to force Iran to limit its co-operation with the IAEA in order to minimise harm to its nuclear program.

Taking these consequences and realities into account, there is no reason for celebration by all concerned.