Why consult the electorate on gay marriage?

When the issue is one of grave moral concern, like war, it is their duty to pay full regard to the moral principles that have been adopted in our own community and under international law. Both clearly prohibit the killing of people in all but the most exceptional circumstances. These are restricted to proportional self-defence from imminent attack and the keeping of the peace in ways specifically authorized by a recognized legal authority.

Likewise, on the issue of gay marriage, their duty is to determine the morally relevant principles and arrive at the most morally defensible position. Consulting the electorate can only be justified in so far as it assists the member to discharge that duty.

The proponents of gay marriage argue on the basis of a moral principle that it is unfair and disrespectful to discriminate to deny someone the enjoyment of a legal status solely on the basis of their sexual orientation. The principle of equality before the law is relied on to justify removing this final barrier.

Their opponents argue that the institution of marriage as traditionally understood is still central to the fabric of our society, that its rich moral and symbolic significance is inseparable from the relationship between a man and a woman, and to undermine it would be to the detriment of child rearing.

Rather than rigorously examining the merits of these arguments, some of our political leaders have concluded that what we have here a conflict between two conflicting moralities, representing two competing world views – one arising out of an older view based on religious conviction and the other arising out of a newer conception based on secular humanism. The direction of change is inevitable. The challenge, they say, is to handle the transition by waiting for public opinion to arrive at some magic tipping point.

This is a cynical view, implying that our representatives should not act to right a wrong unless and until it is politically expedient to do so. This is morally indefensible and a clear abdication of their responsibility.

It is also far too simplistic because it confuses public opinion with "public morality." While we must respect the right of people to hold their own opinions, we are not bound to respect the opinions themselves. Opinions about moral issues are not necessarily moral. And a consensus of public opinion does not constitute a public morality. Nobody believes slavery was moral when it was supported by majority opinion.

Failure to appreciate this leads to the extraordinary double bind some of our politicians have got themselves into in the debate on gay marriage. They accept that opinions denying equal access to gays cannot be morally justified. However, they feel constrained to act by their false belief that these opinions reflect moral positions which must still be respected.

This does not mean that these opinions are of no importance. Clearly they matter in terms of how to argue the case politically. However, they can have very limited relevance to the determination of issues of morality. Rather, our focus should be on those moral principles we commit to that best reflect our moral concern. These can only be resolved by each individual deciding for themselves what is right, not seeking the views of others.

When our elected representatives consult us, we should remind them of the job we are paying them to do: to make reasoned and principled decisions on our behalf. In deciding how they should vote, we should ask them to exercise their own best judgment and conscience, without fear or favour. This will relieve them of the impossible task of determining "the moral will of the people" and refocus their responsibility where it properly resides.

We might then engage in a mutually respectful conversation about those moral principles we hold dear and wish to advance in the best interests of our society. This is the real value of consultation with others. It reminds us of our core values, as distinct from our opinions, and it forces us to reflect critically on our own moral blindness as well as that of others.

Only through such a process can we hope to arrive at wise decisions that do justice to the seriousness and complexity of the issues involved.