New START: beyond the rhetoric

Rail-mobile ICBMs and launchers

Beyond missile defence, there are also concerns about the exclusion of mobile Russian rail-based ICBMs and launchers from New START language, worries that have regrettably been categorically dismissed in some circles. This is especially troubling since there appears to be a growing Russian interest in these rail-based systems, according to official Russian sources. It is clear that these systems would not be covered under New START’s definitions. In the absence of New START limitations on rail-mobile ICBMs and launchers, the Russians could deploy an unlimited number of these systems.

Critics are also bothered by the fact that New START allows the Russians to increase the number of delivery systems (e.g., missiles and bombers) while the Americans must decrease their holdings. The treaty also limits the development of the Prompt Global Strike, a strategic missile armed with a conventional warhead that could be launched in as little as 60 minutes for use against targets such as a terrorist stronghold when other US forces are not immediately available. The treaty also fails to account for Russia’s enormous tactical nuclear arsenal, which might be up to 10 times larger than America’s.

Arms control agreements should be adequately verifiable as well. Paula DeSutter, former Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance and Implementation at the US State Department, points out that New START has glaring holes in its verification regime. According to DeSutter, New START is “much less verifiable than the original START”. Moreover, “the Russians can do so much under this treaty to advance and expand their strategic forces over the length of the New START treaty and our ability to determine whether or not they are doing that and whether it violates the treaty is very, very low.” An assessment that says it is “effectively verifiable would be incorrect,” said DeSutter.

Another move by the Obama Administration not inspiring confidence is that despite questions about the treaty, the White House refuses to release the New START negotiating record to the Senate for review. Important questions have been raised about how provisions of the treaty were included and how the treaty fails to include subjects that are germane. Some have insisted that such a disclosure would be unprecedented, but the Reagan Administration released both the negotiating record for the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty and the Nixon-era 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty to the Senate at the request of Democratic Senators.

Sacrificing American security

There is no doubt that the concerns noted above need to be addressed. But, in the end, the Obama Administration views New START as the crown jewel of its effort to “reset” US-Russian relations, making them anxious for the Senate to ratify the treaty. Yet America’s national security should not be a sacrificial lamb to better ties between Moscow and Washington. Accordingly, the US Senate should give New START a careful and thorough vetting and be careful not to rush its constitutional duty to review treaties.