The Gulf of Mexico oil spill: an accident waiting to happen

Energy companies have aggressively lobbied to avoid formally analysing worst-case scenarios since the Carter administration first required them in instances where there was uncertainty about the risk of disaster.

“They thought it would lead to irrational public resistance to projects,” Doremus said. “But to me this Deepwater Horizon thing is an example where a worst-case analysis would have been useful. If they had done a worst case analysis they’d have to consider, well, ‘What if our blowout preventer didn’t work? And what if it happened during a bout of bad weather when the spill might reach the shore?’” Instead, BP officials admitted they were stunned by the disaster, and they and the government have largely improvised their response.

The evidence shows MMS has not taken an aggressive stance policing offshore drilling. Based on experience with malfunctioning blowout preventers, for instance, the MMS did suggest that energy companies install backup devices for triggering them. But it was only a suggestion, not a requirement, and US drilling operators have declined to do so.

MMS has also been plagued by scandals in recent years, including one in which eight employees were disciplined for partying, having sex with, and receiving expensive gifts from their energy industry counterparts. Critics question whether the agency possesses the independence or the power to effectively tackle these issues post-spill. One sign of trouble: The MMS is a major player in investigating the spill and in the Outer Continental Shelf Oversight Board set up by Interior Secretary Ken Salazar to examine the broader safety issues the accident raises.

“MMS is the regulator, and regulatory failure is a part of this,” Hopkins said. “It’s going to be investigating itself. It’s totally inappropriate.”