Continuity and change in Australian foreign and defence policy

Continuity

There have been four historical trends in Australian thinking since 1788.

One has been the fear of invasion. An example, which does not receive enough attention in the history books, was the risk of a German invasion in World War I. Imperial Germany held a colony just north of Queensland, in German New Guinea (now part of Papua New Guinea) and had imperial ambitions for Asia and the Pacific. Its East Asia Naval Squadron, based in China, was defeated in the naval Battle of the Falklands on December 8 1914, thereby ending the biggest German naval threat to this region.

A second trend is the fear that Australia cannot defend itself. Australia has a minute population and yet is responsible for about 5 per cent of the Earth's land x`surface. Flying from Sydney to London means spending about a quarter of the journey just flying out of Australia's airspace. Australia is not only responsible for the continent, but also all the surrounding islands, each of which has a 200 mile exclusive economic zone. It is also the largest single claimant in Antarctica (with a claim about the size of Queensland).

There is therefore a need for a great and powerful friend. Traditionally this was the UK, 1788-1941, with the US taking over that role after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. As a quid pro quo, the colony of NSW sent troops to assist the UK's late 19^th century military operations in Africa. Australia is the only country in the 20^th century to fight alongside the US in every war in which the US was involved.

Finally, there is a low level of public engagement in this subject. Like a homeowner with an insurance policy, Australians are confident that if something goes wrong, "they" will take care of it. Sport, for example, has a much higher priority than national security in the media and public discussions.

Another continuity for about the last century is the low level of success in offensive warfare. It pays to be the defender. Germany in two World Wars, Japan and Italy in World War II, Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War (one of last century's longest conflicts), and currently Russia's invasion of Ukraine are all examples of that failure.

Technological changes may swing the pendulum back to offense, but for the moment offensive war is both illegal (under the UN Charter) and ineffective.

Change

One change is the return of China to the global scene. About four centuries ago, China was responsible for about a quarter of global economic output. When the UK moved from being an agricultural society to a manufacturing one (in the 18^th century Industrial Revolution) China stayed with an agricultural economy, and so slipped down the economic league table.

In recent decades, it has changed dramatically, with one of the world's largest migrations caused by hundreds of the millions of Chinese people leaving their ancestral agricultural villages and moving to the cities to work in factories. The UK was the "factory of the world' in the 18^th century; now China holds that title.

China's "return" to global prominence (not "rise") has triggered fears of a war between China and the US. Harvard's Graham Allison has coined the expression "Thucydides Trap". Thucydides (c.460-c.400 BC) was one of the originators of the formal study of history and wrote about the clash between Athens and Sparta: an established power being challenged by a rising one.

Allison has looked at the last 500 years, and its 16 arms races, 12 of which resulted in war, such as the German challenge to the UK's global naval supremacy which led to two World Wars. He sees a similar situation today, with the US being challenged by an increasingly powerful China.

A second change is the comparative decline of the WEIRD World: Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic. This is the old "first" world of the US and its allies, such as Australia. The WEIRD world used to run the globe but that is now changing.

It is being rivalled by BRICS: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and now South Africa. The term was originally conceived by UK economist Jim O'Neill in 2001.

Traditionally the main WEIRD World economic group has been the elite G7, created in 1973. The Group's seven members are US, UK, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada. The G7 has about 10 per cent of the world's population and about 43 per cent of global economic output.

BRICS represent about 42 per cent of the world's population and about 33 per cent of world economic output. The BRICS lack the unified worldview that underpins the G7 (India and China, for example, are not the best of friends). But they certainly see themselves as the rival to the WEIRD World.

A third change is the decline of the "McDonald's Golden Arches Theory of World Peace". The slogan was never taken too seriously by International Relations scholars, but it did have a hint of truth: trade knits countries together. Therefore, no two countries which allowed the sale of fast food in their countries ever went back to war against each other.

There have been some exceptions to the theory, such as the conflicts in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, but overall the theory held until February last year with the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It remains to be seen if it will continue to apply in the case of China and Taiwan.

A fourth change is the impact of Moore's Law. Information technology pioneer Gordon Moore, who died a few weeks ago at age 94, wrote an article on April 19 1965 speculating on the increasing power of IT and reducing cost of IT. That rate of change has held up. We are now heading for a third revolution in warfare: gunpowder, nuclear weapons, and now artificial intelligence (AI).

We have no way of knowing where AI will take us. It is assumed that by about the year 2045 we will have AI as smart as humans (or at least until it doubles again and so leaves us well behind!). Will AI keep us on as pets – or tell us we are now redundant?

Implications

I never thought I would be talking about a war in Europe in the 21^st century. I thought we had left that habit behind in the 20^th century.

February 24 2022 was a turning point in world affairs. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has created a new level of uncertainty in world affairs.

1989-91 saw the end of the Cold War, which had been the central defining event of the period 1945 to 1989. President George HW Bush spoke about a "new world order": the Soviet Union had collapsed, China was opening up peacefully for international trade, and the US was the sole undisputed super-power. It was then fashionable to be optimistic about world politics. This new world order represented the "triumph of the Western idea" of liberal democracy and free-market capitalism.

But the Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed that. Ukraine represents the best-situated, most productive piece of Russia's former Soviet empire, and so it was the logical place for Putin to start rebuilding the Russian empire.

Optimism has now been replaced by pessimism. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has shown how hopes of trade knitting the world together via trade (such as Germany's heavy reliance on importing Russian gas) have proven illusory.

Another uncertainty is the extent to which the US will remain engaged in Asian Pacific matters. With the return of China to the global scene, the US is no longer the sole undisputed superpower. It had a very short period of that status: from 1991 (with the end of the Cold War) to 2001 (the onset of the disastrous War on Terror).

Many Americans now feel they have spent too much blood and treasure in trying to solve the world's problems and getting little thanks for all their efforts. The longest continuous theme in US foreign policy is isolationism (going back to President George Washington) and many Americans now want to end what they see as excessive overseas military engagements.

A second issue are matters not previously regarded as "national security" ones, but which will have national security implications. Climate change now occupies much attention. It will also have national security implications, with armed forces being deployed to cope with it. For example, China has a large army but much of it will be deployed in dealing with such crises as floods and fires.

Another national security challenge comes from the declining populations in most countries outside Africa. By the end of this century, there will be more people in Africa than in China and India combined.

Many other countries will follow the Japanese example, namely a lot of older people but not many young ones. China may grow old before it grows rich (which may help explain President Xi's impatience over Taiwan: he is striking while he thinks he still has the opportunity to do so). WEIRD World countries have their own labour shortages, which may also affect recruitment to the armed services.

Finally, we need a more engaged Australian public discussing defence matters. We need to be more imaginative in how we communicate human rights issues.

There is the lesson here from the longest running radio series in world history: BBC's The Archers. During World War II the UK became self-sufficient in food and the post-war government decided that UK farmers should maintain that progress. It was necessary to educate them on the emerging ideas in agriculture. A formal radio programme (TV was not then in general use) would not be effective: few farmers would bother to tune in. The Archers, as a daily episode, provided a daily drama interspersed with conversations about agriculture. (The government is no longer influencing programme content). Could we get some attention to Australian foreign and defence policy via light entertainment?

Another example: Malcolm Gladwell, in examining how ideas can be spread, provides the illustration of Georgia Sadler (The Tipping Point: how little things can make a big difference). Sadler (now a professor at the University of California San Diego) was a nurse employed to educate women on health issues. Over two decades ago she realized that the women who came to her seminars were already aware of the issues. The challenge was to connect with the women who did not or could not attend.

Sadler realized that women have a more intimate relationship with their hairdresser than with most other people. She decided to educate the hairdressers to educate their clients. She worked with trainers on how the hairdresser could educate their clients in a compelling manner.

To conclude, Australia – and the world – is moving into a more complicated and unsettled era. We need innovative ways of communicating a sense of urgency to the general public about the challenges of the new era.