Why Australia should have a military space policy

The Senate Economics Committee has just released a report recommending that Australia adopt a space policy, which is defined as a co-ordinated whole of government program to support space science and industry. It quite categorically states, "The Australian government should have a space policy and, like most other comparable countries, an agency to implement it".

One of the interesting aspects of the report was its comments on Australia and the militarisation of space.

The Committee firmly "opposes any moves toward militarising space".

Even though the author supports what some derisively call "the peacenik Left" nonetheless one may well argue that Australia should have a space policy that looks favourably upon the militarisation of space.

A case could be made for a two-pronged approach, namely developing indigenous military intelligence and communication capabilities and supporting a global arms control regime covering space. This would equate to support for the militarisation of space while opposing the weaponisation of space.

The problem with the Senate Committee conclusion is the rather muddled conceptual analysis upon which it is based. This lack of clarity further adds to a rather poorly developed military space debate in Australia, which is unfortunate because the further militarisation of space will be an important strategic development in the first half of the 21st century.

There is a big difference between the "militarisation" of space and the "weaponisation" of space. The weaponisation of space refers to the deployment of weapons in space, the use of ground launched weapons in space or attacking terrestrial targets from space platforms.

The militarisation of space refers to the use of space capabilities for military related purposes, which could include space weapons but by no means is synonymous with space weapons.

Space has been militarised from the onset of the space age. For example, satellites that provided imagery of, say, strategic missile silos or large scale troop movements would be instances of the use of space for military purposes, yet these satellites would not be classed as weapons.

GPS satellites are used to provide targeting information for some precision guided munitions, such as Air Force delivered bombs, but these too are not weapons. This could have dangerous implications for stability if strategic nuclear missiles become GPS guided, as they will be.

The militarisation of space is not necessarily a bad thing. For instance, Russia and the United States are currently engaging in talks on what may prove to be a verifiable strategic nuclear arms control agreement.

Should such an agreement come into being it would be verified by what is referred to as "national technical means of verification", which would include the use of satellites. This would be an example of military based space assets that enhance strategic stability; nobody should be against that.

Having our own defence oriented space satellites, launched from the infrastructure provided by a civil space policy, geared towards intelligence gathering and communications would lower our strategic dependence upon the United States. The Department of Defence, in its submission to the Senate Committee, noted that access to the US system "has largely met Defence's needs, in particular for intelligence and more recently for satellite communications".

However, the Defence submission also stated that "assured access to allied systems may not necessarily be guaranteed in all circumstances and is subject to host nation priorities". It is quite clear that although access to the US system has largely met the needs of the Defence Department, it nonetheless obscures an Australian dependency in what will increasingly be an important factor in both global and regional strategic affairs.

An indigenous space based intelligence capability directed towards covering the sea-air gap to the north would decrease, but not eliminate, Australia's military dependence upon Washington. Greater situational awareness and communications provided by our own space assets would increase the Australian Defence Force's own network-centric warfare capability.

This would be an example of the militarisation of space, but one that militates against the case for the alliance and the need to engage in joint military operations with Washington globally. If the "peacenik Left" is indeed serious about Australia pursuing a "non-aligned and independent" foreign policy then surely it would not want to leave Australia strategically blind, especially as other regional powers are further developing indigenous satellite and space launch capabilities.

If the states of the Asia-Pacific develop their own space capabilities would it be wise for Australia to remain dependent upon the United States? Would the benefits of greater independence offset the cost of developing an indigenous space policy?

US space weapons hawks like to refer to what they call a "space Pearl Harbour". Australian strategic planners should be mindful of a "space fall of Singapore".

The Committee is right on target in its opposition to the weaponisation of space. Australia would be a loser if it adopts a civil space policy in the context of space weapons proliferation and the most rational outcome, from an objective national interest perspective, would be an indigenous intelligence and communication capability in the presence of a global ban on space based weapons.

In fact, it might well be the case that Canberra will support Washington's drive to weaponise space.

One possible link is with Ballistic Missile Defense. The Labor Party has generally opposed Australian support for, and participation in, US Ballistic Missile Defense since Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative; we might even call this "Labor tradition".

Labor continued to oppose BMD in opposition, but there are signs that the Rudd Government may be backtracking. Rudd led Labor sought to develop a distinction between theatre missile defence and strategic missile defence when in opposition, but now things are more blurry.

The previous government was all but set to acquire a Navy based ballistic missile defence capability, built around the US Aegis class cruiser, the AN/SPY-1 phased array radar and the SM-3 interceptor, which it claimed did not have a strategic capability.

The Rudd Government has inherited a Howard government study on the topic, which likely has become a part of the wider Defence White Paper process. The main focus appears to be on Aegis BMD.

Earlier this year the US conducted a space weapons test using an SM-3 interceptor launched from the Pacific Ocean, which also employed the wider Ballistic Missile Defense System. The Bush Administration rationale for the test, to knock out a wayward satellite with a tank full of hydrazine fuel, lacked credibility at the time and the official rationale has been severely dented by astrophysicist Yousaf Butt, who has gained access to the NASA analysis used by the White House: Butt shows that a philosopher of science would have a field day with this study, given its methodological approach.

To be sure this followed China's test of a direct ascent space weapon, however the US has been committed to the weaponisation of space since at least the Clinton Administration (PDF 1.04MB) and has often conducted space war games with a thinly veiled reference to China. Also, the US throughout this period has opposed Russian and Chinese calls at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament for a space arms control regime, the opposition to which has become a feature of formal US space policy under Bush.

Should Australia participate in an Asia-Pacific SM-3 based BMD system alongside the US and Japan this may complicate relations with China, at a time when the US National Intelligence Council believes world order will be increasingly shaped by relative US decline, and would likely suck Australia into the "strategic vortex" of Northeast Asia, which Kevin Rudd stated he opposed when in opposition.

Australia is not threatened by medium range missiles and Aegis/SM-3 BMD would be a waste of money, which would be better directed toward an indigenous space policy.

In any discussion directed toward opposing "any moves" on the weaponisation and militarisation of space we need to take note of the Joint Facilities and Canberra's support for space assets that assist the US to project offensive global firepower.

Australia could adopt the following policy on space militarisation as part of a national space policy, namely:

• development of an indigenous military space intelligence and communications capability;
• oppose supporting US space programmes geared toward projecting US military firepower globally; and
• support a global arms control regime directed toward banning weapons in space.

Wholesale opposition to the militarisation of space in the context of wholesale opposition to the alliance with the US is not a viable policy option.

More broadly, we note that even though the government is drawing up a Defence White Paper the Left is basically absent from the debate, with hardly any record of a contemporary study devoted toward developing alternative security visions.