Like what you've read?

On Line Opinion is the only Australian site where you get all sides of the story. We don't
charge, but we need your support. Here�s how you can help.

  • Advertise

    We have a monthly audience of 70,000 and advertising packages from $200 a month.

  • Volunteer

    We always need commissioning editors and sub-editors.

  • Contribute

    Got something to say? Submit an essay.


 The National Forum   Donate   Your Account   On Line Opinion   Forum   Blogs   Polling   About   
On Line Opinion logo ON LINE OPINION - Australia's e-journal of social and political debate

Subscribe!
Subscribe





On Line Opinion is a not-for-profit publication and relies on the generosity of its sponsors, editors and contributors. If you would like to help, contact us.
___________

Syndicate
RSS/XML


RSS 2.0

America and the world into a new era - Part III

By Klaus Naumann - posted Tuesday, 16 September 2008


It is obvious that, for mutual strategic interest, Europe needs the US to be a global player beyond Europe and the US needs Europe to sustain its global commitments.

But this indispensable partnership is in troubled waters. The future appears bleak, whether observing European sentiments at the mere mention of President George W. Bush or comparing the foreign-policy statements from US presidential hopefuls that include scant mention of Europe.

The real reason why the partnership is in trouble is because too many different perceptions and gaps in capabilities lead to different approaches on global problems. Moreover, the so-called West has lost credibility in the world and many Europeans hold the US government responsible for that.

Advertisement

Europe’s risk awareness is very different from that in the US. While most in the US believe in the global war on terror, Europe does not see itself as being at war.

The US begins to understand the new dimension of trans-national threats - terrorism, organised crime and cyber war in conjunction with proliferation and failing states. In Europe the experts agree with their American colleagues, but not the general public.

The European governments are reluctant to speak about threats as are the media. The general public in Europe is therefore not really aware of the truly dangerous situation in which we live on both sides of the Atlantic although many in Europe feel a degree of uneasiness.

Following a period of unilateralism, the US will probably return to a new form of multilateralism as of January 20, 2009. Whatever the label, the net result for Europeans will be the same: they’ll be called upon to take more responsibilities and show solidarity by risk-sharing without reservations. To avoid new transatlantic disputes, both sides must consider the prevailing perceptions they have of each other.

Europeans see the US as prepared to use its overwhelming military power early in crisis, unleashed from customary international law. Indeed, the US often takes a robust approach, heavily shaped by military options - although a growing number of Americans is aware that few future problems can be solved with military means alone. On the other side, Americans overlook the diversity of Europe and tend to see Europeans’ use of soft power, dialogue and international law as a fig leaf to hide a lack of resolve. Europe is more reluctant than the US to use military power, and the degree of being prone to the use of force varies from country to country.

Germany, not at all reluctant in using offensive military power throughout the 20th century, is now probably most reluctant to use military power for other than homeland defence operations. Germany arrived at the conclusion that any war of aggression must be banned and that it’s extremely difficult to justify war as an instrument of politics. Germany’s interpretation of the customary international law and its views on the ethics of power are not shared by all European countries and never will be, yet German views do delay decision-making in both NATO and the EU.

Advertisement

In addition, most European governments must win parliamentary approval for any deployment in operations outside the country. This constitutes a major obstacle in any transatlantic consensus since the US president can take advantage of the War Powers Act, whereas the allies must base their requests for approval on an international consensus.

Moreover, looking at the peaceful end of the Cold War conflict, many Europeans believe that most conflicts can be solved through dialogue, negotiation and compromise thus reinforcing a European school of thought aiming at a total ban of war.

But war is alive and well. Any claim otherwise was bombed into pieces when non-state actors using deadly instruments attacked the US on 9-11.

Nevertheless, too many in Europe believe that one can cope with the dangerous world of the 21st century by applying the traditional legal instruments to protect a state’s citizens. The US understands that new solutions are needed. But its initial steps suggested to the outside world that protection of American citizens took priority over customary international law. Consequently, two approaches have emerged from the transatlantic community: the legalistic approach and the protection-at-all-cost approach.

The first approach has two ways of legalising the use of force by a state against external threats - self-defence and a UN Security Council resolution. While the proponents of the legalistic approach are right in principle, the question remains what to do if the UN Security Council cannot fulfil its duty, even though an overwhelming majority regards the use of force as legitimate. We saw these cases in the past, for example, Kosovo in 1999, and we’ll see them again in the future.

A strictly legalistic approach is therefore no longer appropriate. But to act with little or no respect for international law is no answer either since it ruins the credibility of the West’s most powerful instrument: we stand for the rule of law and respect for human rights.

But the challenges faced collectively are too big, the reality too compelling, that we can afford being split by perceptions. There’s but one way to respond, namely by standing together. Anything else signals that the West lacks the resolve to protect its way of life, values and convictions.

But there is also a substantial gap in military capabilities between the Europeans and the Americans. Information dominance matters today, but the Europeans spend far too much money on legacy forces and personnel: Europe’s defence spending amounts to 60 per cent of US defence spending, but Europe produces little more than 10 per cent of US power projection capabilities. The prospects of redressing such imbalances is bleak since adverse demographic development will impact defence spending. Europe confronts a shrinking and aging population.

Moreover, the US will remain the leader in high-tech systems integration and exploring new domains such as nano-technology and bionics. However, whether the US will enjoy advantages in the emerging domain of cyber operations remains to be seen. The Chinese seem to have taken the lead in this domain and work on acquiring a capability to paralyse a country without using any destructive power. Such areas deserve more attention. The potential exists to simply switch off the most powerful military capabilities, in addition to paralysing any society.

Another capability that matters, possibly more than any other, is the political will to take unpopular decisions. Obviously, this is easier for a US or French president than it is for a German chancellor or other European heads of government who must form coalition governments, inadequate for responding to the security challenges of today.

Turning public opinion around on controversial issues such as deploying forces in combat operations or on using all instruments of politics and tools in fighting terrorism is a demanding battle for politicians. Moreover, the historically well-founded desire of never again giving too much power to a centralized government produces additional impediments in quite a few countries.

In conclusion, the West is in serious crisis, and Europeans lack what’s needed most at the dawn of a new administration in Washington: European unity and the resolve to find with its US allies common approaches that coordinate all instruments of politics.

There’s urgent necessity to begin any process of shaping a new transatlantic relationship by sincerely discussing what divides Europe and the US and what keeps us together - a step not taken since the uniting pressure during the Cold War withered away.

Such a crisis of transatlantic relations is nothing new for NATO nations. Political leaders should take advantage of it and lay new foundations by moving to the bold vision of an alliance comprised of more than military precautions, prepared to use all instruments of politics in a comprehensive way, one that convinces citizens that preserving peace and protecting values and convictions are well worth the sacrifices.

  1. Pages:
  2. 1
  3. 2
  4. All

Reprinted with permission from YaleGlobal Online - www.yaleglobal.yale.edu-(c) 2008 Yale Center for the Study of Globalization.



Discuss in our Forums

See what other readers are saying about this article!

Click here to read & post comments.

5 posts so far.

Share this:
reddit this reddit thisbookmark with del.icio.us Del.icio.usdigg thisseed newsvineSeed NewsvineStumbleUpon StumbleUponsubmit to propellerkwoff it

About the Author

Klaus Naumann is a German Army four-star general who served as NATO’s highest ranking military officer during the Kosovo Air Campaign. He retired as chairman of the NATO Military Committee in May 1999.

Creative Commons LicenseThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons License.

Article Tools
Comment 5 comments
Print Printable version
Subscribe Subscribe
Email Email a friend
Advertisement

About Us Search Discuss Feedback Legals Privacy