For Siddiqa, the US avoidance of Musharraf's "command economics" raises questions about the real price of American foreign policy in the region. She believes Pakistan's response to insurgencies and to religious fundamentalism is often manipulated to suit Musharraf's political agenda. "The menace of extremism was caused by state policies ... We must comprehend the imperative for this kind of negative state interference," she writes.
In scrutinising the military's influence across Pakistani society, Military Inc presents convincing evidence that its unregulated financial activities render hollow the official boasts about Pakistan's buoyant economic growth. In reality, stagnating social development, acute unemployment, disproportionately low spending on health and education and widespread corruption has become a recipe for dissatisfaction and the growing influence of religious hardliners, particularly among Pakistan's young.
Pakistan has the highest birth rate in South Asia but more than 28 million people live below the poverty line and two-thirds of the adult population is illiterate, while maternal mortality is high (340 per 100,000) and one-quarter of newborns are underweight and malnourished.
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Military Inc also highlights the $US1.5 billion in US aid Pakistan receives each year to assist the armed forces fight insurgencies in the North West Frontier provinces and Waziristan. But Siddiqa writes that the US does not make Pakistan account for how it uses this money. Further, the US's tacit acceptance of the Pakistani military's lack of financial transparency has consolidated Musharraf's power base.
In May, the US State Department released its 2007 Country Terrorism Report, which downgraded Musharraf's effectiveness in the war against terror by highlighting the anti-money-laundering bill stalled for two years in the Pakistani National Assembly. "Adoption of anti-money-laundering legislation consistent with international standards would significantly broaden Pakistan's ability to co-operate internationally on counter-terrorism finance issues," the report noted.
After the surrender of more than 150 Pakistani soldiers who were fighting militants in the Swat Valley in October, fresh questions emerged about the Pakistani military's state of preparedness and tactical competence for the fight against jihadists, al-Qaida and Taliban insurgents. A US Senate armed forces committee report released at the same time argued that the Pakistani military was ill-prepared to fight terrorism. But Siddiqa's opinion is more nuanced: "No military, especially South Asian militaries, which are essentially World War II armies, will find it easy to fight insurgencies. It's a difficult kind of warfare which militaries, trained to primarily to fight other militaries, are bound to find tougher. For the Pakistan military it's even more complex because its top leadership is so integrally engaged in politics, leaving little time to think about professional issues."
Have any of the billions of US aid been used to upgrade the military's insurgency-fighting capabilities? Or does this targeted, internationally sanctioned aid package go the unaccountable way of much else of Pakistan's defence spending? "There is no accountability of this money," Siddiqa said. "There is a lot of wastage in Pakistan's defence budget so I am sure this money is not being spent efficiently."
Members of the Pakistani armed services are uncomfortable with Musharraf's state of emergency, Siddiqa believes, but this doesn't mean there'll be a coup. "There is no possibility of a colonels' coup either, but if Musharraf orders the army to fight innocent civilians, we may have some defections," she told me.
As the ALR went to print, the 53-nation Commonwealth made good on its threat to suspend Pakistan after Musharraf failed to meet a deadline to lift emergency rule and resign as army chief. The biggest impact of emergency rule on Pakistani life, other than inducing fear in the populace, is "the stagnation of political and intellectual discourse", Siddiqa said. "Unlike the US and other Western societies, Pakistanis won't denounce the military because they've been trained to think in terms of the military's protective role in our society."
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Siddiqa sees Musharraf engaged in a particularly dangerous political game with military aid. Using the "threat or fear of extremism to get support for the military regime from abroad", she says, there is always an underlying agenda of "saving militants for future use" while conversely using "external pressure as a ploy to get rid of groups problematic for the establishment".
Musharraf's regime has backtracked on its commitment to fighting militants within Pakistan's borders. When 800 militants captured in Pakistan were freed some months ago, 40 top radical leaders were among them. Securing political support from hardline Islamic parties and their leaders is one of Musharraf's most familiar political survival techniques.
Military Inc asks how, beyond the haphazard scope of its role in fighting terrorism and securing Musharraf's power base, Pakistan rationalises such a large military budget when social development is almost at a standstill. The answer, Siddiqa writes, lies partly in the cultural manipulation of Pakistanis since its formation after the 1947 partition from India.