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India’s fast breeder nuclear reactors and Australian uranium: an absence of safeguards?

By Marko Beljac - posted Friday, 17 August 2007


Much has been said in recent times about the US-India nuclear transfer agreement and the export of Australian uranium to India, even by yours truly. It is to be expected that we shall hear plenty more about this in future now that the government has formally agreed to the sale of uranium. My purpose here, however, is to focus very narrowly on one aspect of the issue that may have interesting implications and that is on India’s three-stage nuclear fuel cycle strategy and the role of the fast breeder reactor within it.

The fast breeder reactor is a special reactor type. Most reactors are called thermal reactors because they utilise slow neutrons to trigger nuclear fission. As the name would suggest fast breeders utilise fast neutrons. They also act as efficient breeders of fissionable material, especially plutonium. The idea behind the fast breeder is to produce more fissionable material than is consumed. For instance by bombarding a nucleus of uranium-238, that is natural uranium, one can breed plutonium-239 after two successive beta decays. Plutonium-239 is the isotope of plutonium generally used in nuclear weapons.

Nuclear fission that is unleashed by fast or high energy neutrons produces more new neutrons than that by way of thermal neutrons. Pu-239 with fast neutrons produces 2.9 neutrons per fission, the highest for the various fissile isotopes. If one were to surround the core of a fast reactor with a blanket of ordinary uranium the neutrons produced from the core could turn this material into more plutonium-239 by way of the above reaction again. By placing a very tight fit between the blanket and the core of a fast reactor comparatively few neutrons would be lost and over time thereby the amount of plutonium produced would exceed the amount consumed.

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A similar process occurs in nuclear weapons where a tamper reflects neutrons back into the plutonium pit to increase the efficiency of fission or in boosted fission weapons where neutrons produced in the fusion of deuterium-tritium gas produces extra neutrons, although weapons do not of course breed plutonium.

The plutonium 239 used in a fast breeder reactor usually comes in the form of a Mixed Oxide Fuel, that is a mixture of plutonium oxide and uranium oxide typically with a 20:80 ratio between the two respectively. The most important point to consider from our perspective however is that any plutonium 239 present in a fast neutron reactor must be very highly concentrated, that is highly pure plutonium 239, in order to prevent the loss of neutrons.

Nuclear fuel cycles based on the fast breeder reactor concept have been the holy grail of the nuclear industry but have been dismal failures. But a few countries still are pursuing the dream such as Japan, France, China and India. It is revealing that in each case energy security is an important motivating factor, a fact of no small moment given the looming peak in oil production and the expansion of nuclear power.

The latter case is especially interesting for the fast breeder reactor is an integral part of India’s three-stage nuclear fuel cycle strategy. The three stages consist first, of utilising heavy water moderated reactors; second, fast breeder reactors; and third, thorium-based breeder reactors.

The idea with such thorium reactors is to use thorium to breed uranium-233, a fissionable isotope of uranium. The reason why India wants to achieve this penultimate stage in its fuel cycle strategy is of great import. It is recognised that India has small reserves of uranium but large reserves of thorium.

Implicit in the very concept of India’s three-stage nuclear fuel cycle strategy is recognition that India does not have enough reserves of uranium to both maintain fissile material production for nuclear weapons, if not expand such production, and significantly increase the amount of electricity generated by nuclear power stations to help fuel economic growth.

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The emphasis on breeding fissile material by way of fast neutron reactors is also an acknowledgement that India’s uranium reserves imposes a strict upper bound on its civil and military nuclear programs.

It is often stated by supporters of government policy on uranium exports, for instance by Rory Medcalf writing in The Sydney Morning Herald that even exporting coal to India would free up Indian uranium reserves. Medcalf’s point is only of relevance as an example of how a pathetic and superficial understanding of the issues can enter public discourse even in so august a publication as the Herald.

As often stated elsewhere the US-India nuclear transfer accord will set the framework for Australian uranium exports to India. Under the 123 agreement that implements the accord India’s fast breeder reactor program will not be safeguarded. During negotiations this was a sticking point with Washington keen to subject India’s current fast breeders to safeguards. India held firm on its position and the United States has clearly relented. It is worth looking at some likely implications of this.

India currently has two fast breeder reactors, the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR) and the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR). The FBTR actually uses fuel in the form of a plutonium-uranium carbide mixture with a ratio of 70 per cent plutonium and 30 per cent uranium. It initially used a core composed of weapons grade plutonium. The Prototype reactor is the follow on reactor to the FBTR and shall use a mixed fuel of plutonium-uranium oxide. It is envisaged that the FBTR will be up and running by 2010.

To produce the plutonium for fast breeder reactors India will re-process spent reactor fuel from the operation of thermal reactors. The United States has agreed, again another concession to India, to give Delhi advanced consent for the re-processing of spent reactor fuel to separate plutonium.

Alexander Downer has stated that Australia will sign a safeguards agreement with India to allow for the export of uranium and that it will incorporate all the safeguards features typical of hitherto agreements. It has been standard policy, although not from the beginning of uranium exports, to provide advanced consent for chemical re-processing of spent reactor fuel arising from the use of Australian designated nuclear material.

It is clear that under India’s three-stage nuclear fuel cycle strategy that Delhi seeks to use separated plutonium in its fast breeder reactor program. Recall from the above discussion that plutonium used in fast breeder reactors is highly concentrated plutonium-239 that is weapons grade plutonium. It is possible then that Australian uranium could very well be used in short burn-up campaigns in designated civil reactors to produce spent reactor fuel high in the concentration of plutonium 239.

Indeed India in the first stage of its nuclear fuel cycle relies heavily upon heavy water moderated reactors that are efficient producers of plutonium-239. Australian safeguards policy requires the consent of Australia before any country can enrich uranium to concentrations of uranium-235 greater than 20 per cent (20-90 per cent is weapons useable and greater than 90 per cent is weapons grade) but does not actually make any such stipulation with regard to plutonium. This is because Australian safeguards policy assumes, so it would seem, nuclear fuel cycles associated with light water reactors predominantly but with India’s three-stage nuclear fuel cycle this is not the case.

But actually India need not produce plutonium high in plutonium-239 in civil reactors in its fast breeder reactors. This is because it is possible to use reactor grade plutonium, high in the isotope of plutonium-240, to produce plutonium-239. This is known as using a reactor as a “laundry” to breed plutonium-239.

The Indian case may well pose some interesting dilemmas for the Australian Safeguards Office. For instance the office has acknowledged in a research paper that the blanket of fast breeder reactors will be a source of plutonium-239, as is clear, and that in fact the blankets of fast breeders will contain plutonium at the super-grade level, that is, 97 per cent plutonium-239.

The key point for us is that, as noted, the US in the 123 accord has agreed that these two fast breeder reactors will not be safeguarded. Because of this a reasonable thesis to draw is that these fast breeders will play a role in India’s nuclear weapons program. Given the enormous leverage of the United States it hardly seems likely that Australia will wrest this concession from India. Delhi will not let such a concession to its negotiating stance with Washington slip behind the back door via a safeguards agreement with Australia.

That being the case it thereby follows that the Australian government, given advanced consent to spent fuel re-processing and the absence of safeguards on India’s fast breeder reactor program, will not be in a position to claim that it can safeguard Australian nuclear material from ending up in India’s nuclear weapons program.

In its negotiations with India the government must state quite categorically that no Australian designated nuclear material may end up at these two fast breeder reactors. In the absence of such provision safeguards is a moot point.

It is disturbing, then, that it seems that under some aspects of the 123 accord the export of uranium to India almost follows as a consequence. For instance in one article the US agrees to provide India assurance of supply in the case of exogenous supply side shocks by convening friendly countries to re-supply India.

Australia would fit into this provision.

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About the Author

Mark Beljac teaches at Swinburne University of Technology, is a board member of the New International Bookshop, and is involved with the Industrial Workers of the World, National Tertiary Education Union, National Union of Workers (community) and Friends of the Earth.

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