North Korean bomb test benefitting Bush?

North Korea’s announcement of its first nuclear test on October 9, 2006 has been expected for some time.

Seismic evidence at this point does not rule out that the “test” was a massive conventional explosion (in the manner of the planned US “Divine Strake” test). However satellite imagery and signals intelligence should provide a greater level of confidence, that the explosion was, in fact, nuclear.

In a February 28, 2006 global threat assessment before the Senate Armed Services Committee, John Negroponte, US Director of National Intelligence said unlike Iran, North Korea claims already to have nuclear weapons, “a claim that we assess is probably true”.

Assuming North Korea’s nuclear capability is as North Korean leader Kim Jung-il claims, Kim Jung-il had a choice of when to hold the test and when to announce it.

One limitation was that the test should be held at a time when the probability of a successful detonation was sufficiently high.

A test sooner or later was inevitable given Kim Jung-il tendency towards grandiose gestures. Furthermore (unlike Israel) North Korea is probably too backward (in some areas) to run a reliable computer simulation of a nuclear test, so a real test was necessary.

Testing of a nuclear weapon should not have greatly changed the strategic picture if the whole world knew North Korea had nuclear weapons, but public fears and politics have changed the picture.

The major reasons for the test and its timing are likely to remain unclear until a comprehensive statement from the North Koreans and (declassified) intelligence assessments clarify them.

Why test on October 9?

It was the ninth anniversary (and one day) since Kim Jung-il came to power. The extra day may have been due to technical delays.

On October 10, 2006, South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon faced a vote on his bid to become the next Secretary General of the United Nations. He has just been nominated for that post.

It provides the Republicans with the necessary foreign policy crisis to have some hope of “winning” the mid-term elections on November 7, 2006, as in times of crisis Americans rally to the president, including his (Republican) Party.

Most Americans would have been unaware of North Korea’s previous ownership of nuclear weapons. An actual test provides a headline to allow the truth (and fear) to sink in. North Korea’s action provides Bush with a sound reason to make bold statesman-like speeches against North Korea. He may also launch some military action such as a stop and search “quarantine” of North Korean shipping and he will be seen to support UN sanctions.

In the end Bush will be grateful to North Korea and its leader for detonating the bomb at a most fortuitous time for the Republicans. North Korea may be gambling that Bush’s bluster will dampen down after this election. By then North Korea, now officially in the nuclear club, will start to enjoy some subtle recognition from the US. This latter theory is, of course, speculative and unkind. But as the West discovered with Mao and Stalin, communist dictators (and some Western leaders) can be decidedly cynical and opportunistic.

Effect of sanctions and a quarantine

If there has been a successful nuclear test it means it is too late to tell North Korea not to build nuclear weapons: in terms of standard non-proliferation policies the “horse has bolted”. The chances of North Korea destroying or handing over any or all of its nuclear weapons are remote.

International pressure on North Korea to cease or slow down development of miniturised nuclear weapons (more deadly because they can be placed on missiles or fast jets) is highly unlikely to be effective. North Korea may play at extended negotiations but its track record of bowing to such pressure is poor.

Given most trade and aid to North Korea is from China and South Korea (via land borders), a naval stop and search program is likely to have little effect, however decisive the sight of US naval vessels (for example, aircraft carriers) looks.

Chinese actions are likely to be the key. China is North Korea’s largest trading partner and probably the largest aid donor. North Korea relies on Chinese fuel, oil and food in particular. If China chooses, it could compensate for any reduction in aid from South Korea and other countries brought on by UN sanctions. No doubt China wants a stable North Korea first, not one that is an even more starving and unstable. Hence UN sanctions may be effectively foiled by China’s assessment of the situation and actions.

Russia may perceive political gain from being seen as “conciliatory” towards North Korea, its old Korean War ally. Much has changed since then but an unstable North Korea does not make a good immediate neighbour. And there are opportunities for Russia to score points against the “forever aggressive West”.

South Korea may be highly responsive to a UN sanction call as it needs all the international support it can get. South Korea and Japan are the most vulnerable targets for North Korea’s nuclear weapons and so have the most to fear. They would prefer a stable North Korea and may only hope to dampen the mixed expressions of jubilation and antagonism emanating from North Korea.

The US fears a regional arms race partly because this may mean a nuclear armed (and otherwise militarily self-sufficient) Japan, in as little as five years. The US's nuclear protection and arms sales have been of great assistance to the US in reducing its balance of trade difficulties with Japan. The nuclear arming of Japan would remove that dynamic.

Looking more broadly, the US is concerned that North Korea may ignite World War III by playing with nuclear fire. Hence America and the other nuclear powers are concerned if not alarmed.

All in all, October 9, 2006 was a sad day for all if the test is authentic. Countries like Japan, Taiwan and Australia are, no doubt, already considering their own nuclear weapons options. A new regional arms race looks set to start.