A very difficult relationship: living with Indonesia

Our military expenditure is more than ten times that of Indonesia, and the clear superiority of our defence equipment and systems understandably troubles some Indonesian strategists. Some senior generals still speak of Australia as a threat from the south.

The fourth marker is the need to acknowledge important policy differences remain, notwithstanding improved personal relations at the head of government level. The stationery printed for the Australia-Indonesia Ministerial Forum 2005 carried under the two crests the words “Close Neighbours; Strong Partners”. The first is a fact. But the partnership is a work in progress.

President Yudhoyono’s election, followed by Australia’s very generous and prompt response to the tsunami tragedy and the subsequent earthquakes in Nias, Sumatra and, most recently, South Java, as well as growing co-operation in combating terrorism, have created the opportunity to improve bilateral relations further.

Although important policy differences remain, this does not mean avoiding policies that might cause concern to our regional neighbours, especially ones clearly based on Australia’s interests. But, clearly, relationships are closer if we find ourselves pursuing similar approaches to major international and regional issues.

We need to realise many Indonesians see us as more closely aligned with the US - or with the Bush Administration - than ever before. This, and some prime ministerial and ministerial comments, have nourished the perception of the “deputy sheriff role”.

There are still concerns in Indonesia that Australia is now a less independent voice than before, and that we do not use our position to try to influence American decisions that may impact adversely on our region.

Indonesia is also concerned by Australian plans to acquire and deploy missiles, which will put Indonesia within range. The Prime Minister’s support for a right to launch pre-emptive strikes in South-East Asia - although since qualified - and the original decision to create a 1,000 nautical mile surveillance zone, which would encroach on Indonesian territorial sovereignty, have also caused anxiety in Indonesia.

More importantly, we need to recognise that Indonesians, including the President, the Foreign Minister and the Defence Minister, were all opposed to the invasion of Iraq. This cannot be reversed, and the situation it has created must be addressed.

Nevertheless, Indonesians remain concerned that the occupation has led to increased, not reduced, terrorism in the Middle East, and offered enhanced recruiting opportunities to Islamic extremists.

Unfavourable perceptions of our method of conducting our diplomacy still linger. Our style is often seen as assertive, moralising and intrusive - what Foreign Minister Wirajuda has called “megaphone diplomacy”, often invoked for domestic political reasons.

There has also been a distaste for what is perceived to be jingoism - an excessive emphasis on military heroics and triumphalism - in relation, for example, to our intervention in East Timor in 1999.

The fifth guideline is that, although the Indonesian economy remains fragile and foreign investment is still sluggish, we should expect - in the longer term and with stable government - Indonesia, with its population expected to reach 300 million by 2050, to offer Australia considerable commercial and selective investment opportunities.