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Burmese daze

By Chris Winslow - posted Friday, 9 June 2006


It was one of those rare occasions when the media reported that something hadn’t happened. Recently, there was growing optimism that the world’s most famous political prisoner, Aung San Suu Kyi, would be released from house arrest. Such hopes were dashed when the military announced that her detention order had been renewed, yet again.

Ever since she was first detained in July 1989, the world has been fascinated by the stand-off between a determined, articulate Nobel laureate and the ruthless generals running Myanmar (formerly Burma).

It appears that a rare alignment of events had aroused foreign media interest and fuelled Rangoon’s fast-breeder rumour mill. There was the expiry of her detention order, increased diplomatic pressure from ASEAN, a direct appeal by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan for Suu Kyi’s release, and most surprisingly, permission for UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari to meet with her.

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Cynical foreign observers, not to mention most Burmese people, will caution against casual optimism that Senior General Than Shwe will have a “change of heart” and release Suu Kyi. In the past, the junta has skillfully deflected diplomatic pressure on the regime by releasing political prisoners, only to imprison them again at a later date. On this occasion gestures of goodwill have more to do with assuaging the UN and occupying media attention at a critical time, just as the army launches fresh offensives against ethnic Karen guerillas on the border with Thailand.

Of course, if the State Peace and Development Council (the ruling junta) did release “The Lady” from detention, the news would be greeted with approval and relief by many. This may even be so among the ASEAN nations, where some members are growing increasingly embarrassed by the international pariah in their ranks.

Unfortunately, any decision to eventually release Suu Kyi should not be mistaken as a sign of weakness or compassion on the part of the junta. Nor would it necessarily signal preparedness on their part to enter meaningful dialogue with the main civilian opposition party, the National League for Democracy.

Instead, it would indicate that the SPDC was confident enough to proceed with the next step in its self-proclaimed “Seven Point Roadmap” for the creation of a pseudo-democratic system with the armed forces as the core institution.

It is important to remember that Myanmar has the distinction of being ruled by the world’s most enduring military regime. Throughout 1980s and 1990s, the armed forces in neighbouring Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, as well as Argentina and the rest of Latin America, have withdrawn from the complex and difficult business of directly managing a modern economy and returned to barracks.

In contrast, the Burmese military, known as the Tatmadaw, have ruled the country in various incarnations since 1962. They remain firmly entrenched in office, despite decades of ethnic and communist insurgencies, diplomatic isolation, international sanctions, their disastrous mismanagement of a once-productive economy and alarming increases in narcotics trafficking, HIV infection and other social problems.

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How can this be? There are many factors contributing to the persistence of military rule. Most of them are not unique to Myanmar, although their combination in a single country is quite rare.

In common with many other military regimes, the SPDC has used brutal repression of any sign of dissent. But this alone does not explain how Tatmadaw Government has outlasted others using the same methods.

One explanation is that, relative to the civil society it aims to control, the Tatmadaw is larger, more battle-hardened and its members are more imbued with a sense of national purpose than their counterparts in, say, Thailand or Argentina. This is partly a result of decades of fighting multiple, simultaneous insurgencies by communist and ethnic guerrilla armies in the mountainous border regions. The ruling junta has fashioned its own ideology, which portrays the armed forces as the nation’s indispensable institution, responsible for restoring and upholding the unity of the state and Myanmar’s independence.

Another reason is that the Tatmadaw has made concerted efforts to institutionalise military rule. It is now a state within a state, with privileges such as separate hospitals, schools and businesses. Added to these avenues for dispensing patronage, the SPDC has, in recent years, poured money into its front organisation, the Union Solidarity Development Association, under the guidance of the Prime Minister, General Soe Win.

It is no secret that the Tatmadaw would like the USDA to evolve into a political party, capable of mobilising support and competing with the NLD. Their role model is Indonesia’s Golkar Party, which was formed by the military during President Soeharto’s New Order Regime.

Similarly, the Tatmadaw aspires to the “dwifungsi” or dual political and defence roles of the Indonesian armed forces. Under such a system, the military would be guaranteed seats in parliament and control over key ministerial portfolios, such as defence. This kind of political system, which the military calls “disciplined democracy”, would be minimally acceptable to ASEAN and possibly to other Asian nations such as Japan and China. Military rule is likely to have one more incarnation.

In recent months the military government has escalated its persecution of the National League for Democracy. State controlled television and newspapers, like the New Light of Myanmar, have published feature articles on mass resignations from the NLD and members renouncing the party’s policies. It is now far from certain that the democratic opposition, weakened by so many years of intimidation, can disentangle and solve Myanmar’s many woes.

Foremost among these is separatism. The need for a federal system allowing a degree of self-governance for the Karen, Kachin, Mon and the rest of the nation’s minorities is obvious to most foreign observers. Yet federalism remains anathema to the military. “Non-disintegration of the Union” is the regime’s mantra for the preservation of a Burmese-dominated, multi-ethnic state - through sheer brute force, if necessary. Even a civilian-led government would have to attend to the ethnic separatist issue, but under constant threat of a coup.

There is little or no prospect that General Than Shwe or any other officers in the ruling junta will release Aung San Suu Kyi on humanitarian grounds. Nor is there any hope that the SPDC will simply capitulate in the face of economic sanctions. Myanmar’s predominantly agrarian economy is not as susceptible to international pressure as, say South Africa’s under the Apartheid regime.

The international community is unable to gain leverage over the regime by exerting pressure on a globally oriented-business class and their export industries. Most corporations in Myanmar owe their existence to patronage dispensed by the military. The junta is further insulated by the considerable support it enjoys from Beijing and a number of ASEAN neighbours, such as Thailand and Singapore.

As difficult or unpleasant as it may be for us to accept, there is no incentive for the military to release Aung San Suu Kyi before they have implemented their plans for a “disciplined democracy”. There is little prospect that international pressure will succeed in bringing forward that day. Indeed speculation by the western media, linking her possible release to international appeals and diplomatic initiatives, will in all likelihood have the opposite effect.

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About the Author

Chris Winslow has a Master of International Studies degree (with Merit) from the University of Sydney. He is a public affairs officer from Sydney who has visited Singapore on a number of occasions, most recently in April 2007.

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