The passage to democracy in Iraq

With the exception of the KDP, PUK and some other major Shia parties, the lists consist of too many small parties and delegates and a range of loose alliances. It is not the same as Western democracy when two or three parties with established manifestos and popular support fight for the polls. This is simply, an indicator of the largely fragmented Iraqi society and lack of coherent voices from each major group. Even when the elections are over and the first democratic steps have been taken, no government will be truly representative of Iraq and cater for the needs of the greater nation. This will naturally only lead to disharmony and further bloodshed in Iraq, most probably in the form of sectarianism and civil war.

Post-election inevitability

There is one key problem in Iraq: Iraq itself is a British fabricated country that is loosely based on three former Ottoman provinces. There are three distinct groups in Iraq, which have never lived in harmony since its formation - the Kurds, Shia and Sunni. Each separate group is weary of conceding too much, and being oppressed by the others. With no concensus between each group, and a lack of common understanding and appreciation of the desires of one another, true democracy and co-existence is difficult if not impossible, no matter how much democratic progress is made in the country.

If the principles of democracy were applied to the area represented by each group then there could be a chance of achieving a successful outcome. When applied to Iraq as a whole, they will lead to inevitable post-ballot implications.

In any future Iraqi parliament, there will be too much pressure on the politicians of each respective ethnic group to work for their own group rather than the whole.

This is particularly true of the Kurdish region. In the Kurdish controlled area the cries and calling of the politicians are certainly in Kurdish, however, in the Iraqi government these same politicians will have to converse in the name of the greater Iraq and the majority. An example of these divided loyalties is Hoshyar Zebari who has been a senior Kurdish politician for many years, and is also the Iraqi Foreign Minister, and therefore a representative of greater Iraq.

In this situation, political disharmony will have already begun before the politicians have opened the doors to the parliament. Most likely, politicians will decide to enter parliament with a degree of compromise and perhaps resentment. Democracy in Iraq would work best with a very loose federation, bordering on independence, for each federative area representing each of the three major groups.

The Shia population

What is most likely is a Shia victory in the forthcoming Iraqi elections as the Shias form about 60 per cent of the population and therefore a clear majority. This likelihood has been hesitantly confirmed by the US, which has always tried to avoid, and to an extent deny, that an Islamic government will be formed. Colin Powell, in Middle East Online, claimed the future government is likely to be in a form “that may be majority Shia, but respects the rights of others”.

Furthermore, Powell stated swiftly but without a lack of conviction that the Shia bloc will not be influenced by the regional Shia powerhouse of Iran. A Shia grip on power and domination of the parliament would clearly lead to dissatisfaction among the rest of the Iraqi community. Shias would choose to implement an Islamic state and thus many of their own policies, eradicating century old repression and seizing the chance to cement power. The Kurds would tolerate this as long as they maintained their federal unit of Kurdistan with Kirkuk as its capital and with a due proportion of the federative budget and natural resources.

For the Sunni community, who will clearly be under-represented in the elections in the current climate, democracy represents only uncertainty and a confirmation of their now inferior status in Iraq. This is in complete contrast to their 80-years of domination and rule in Iraq. With so much lost  and so much more to lose, and a lack of clarity on their future status, the violence, boycotting of elections and discomfort they feel is inevitable. Anything but a democratic election would serve their purpose.

The Shia coalition, spearheaded by al-Hakim, as the likely winners of the vote, have tried their best to reassure their Sunni brethren and have emphasised that the “participation of all” is essential for the new government.

In addition Iraq's predominantly Arab-Sunni neighbours are concerned that the Sunni community will be sidelined in any new undertakings and are slowly beginning to exert diplomatic influence on the electoral process, aware that for many of these aforementioned regional Sunni countries with Kurdish minorities, a great Kurdish representation in a future Iraq would spell danger and potential instability. And in addition an overall Shia majority will undoubtedly side with Iran and in turn shift the regional balance of power in the habitually volatile Middle East.

Conclusion

The arrangement, logistics and staging of the elections will prove to be much easier to manage than the actual result, even in the current context of violence and trepidation in Iraq.