Moral values and religious doctrines

Some philosophers, faced with this relationship between values and moral sentiments, argue for a concept of moral truth which aims for a 'reflective equilibrium' in which judgments are justified by values and values tested by the judgments they entail. This is not an esoteric idea but a feature of reflective thought; our opinion of someone is influenced by the impression he makes on us, but this impression is read in light of our previous knowledge of him and our understanding of human nature.

However that may be, the distinction between interests and values is part of the logic of moral argument; it rules out self-interest as a justification for harming others and - as the central idea of international law - rules out national self-interest as a reason for war. It explains the categorical nature of Kant's Imperative because his criterion of universalizability is the clearest statement of this distinction we are likely to find. Interests and preferences, which differ between individuals, cannot be Kantian reasons, hence cannot justify harming others. The only reasons which satisfy the test are those based on values, such as the doctrines of international law; so perhaps Kant was right to suppose his Moral Law included but went further than the 'golden rule' of Christianity - he sensed the conceptual logic underlying an intuitive sense of fairness.

What does all this mean? It means that those who believe their moral world is governed by religious doctrines as interpreted by church authorities must - like Jehovah Witnesses - reconcile these doctrines with the ordinary, everyday values discussed above; at least they must do so if they believe these values are important. For Christians this should be easier than it seems because important values, such as compassion and love for strangers, are exemplified in the life of Christ. This is, however, an ideal no political community is likely to attain and illustrates the difference, mentioned earlier, between private ethics and public morality - We may be inspired by Mother Teresa, but do not expect this selflessness from ordinary citizens.

In the realm of public values - values which govern social relations and political arrangements - the standard is a lesser but more realistic one of respect. In political theory this translates into a duty of equal respect, that is to say, equal concern for the interests of all citizens, and equal respect for each citizen as such. If we had to choose one political principle this ideal of fairness would be a prime candidate; if, for example, we believe in the priority of freedom, then fairness argues for conferring its benefits on all citizens - one cannot disentangle these commitments.

In contrast with these 'natural' values are the rules and doctrines which obligate members by virtue of their institutional authority. The difference is accentuated when the latter come under the scrutiny of the former and are rejected, qualified, or ignored; religious examples include rules to attend mass on Sundays and against eating meat on Fridays, working on the Sabbath, divorce, re-marriage, sexual intimacy outside wedlock and contraception, abortion and same-sex unions - in times past these were mortal sins, which meant eternal suffering in the flames of Hell.

When it comes to reconciling these doctrines with the morality of values there are two further matters to consider. The first is exemplified by the recurring debates within the Catholic Church over the relative importance of pastoral concerns, with a new Pope calling for a greater focus on poverty and social justice. It illustrates a point easy to miss: that when doctrinal issues become the subject of criticism within the church, the reasons are likely to appeal to the same ideals of justice, humanity, and respect for others shared by all members of the community. Denmark's recent ban on religious slaughter for halal and kosher meat has outraged Muslims and Jews, who see it as a violation of human rights; their argument, however, is not that the Minister is ignoring God's law, but that cutting the throats of animals is not cruel.

The second is a theological question which follows from the first. It is another version of the question raised by Galileo Galilei in his response to a charge of heresy for asserting that the earth orbited the sun. There were, he reasoned, conflicting sources of evidence; the first was Sacred Scripture and the second the Laws of Physics as deduced by man's Reason. Because these are also Divine gifts one must, he believed, read the former in light of the latter.

The analogy is clear enough: it is perfectly rational for anyone who believes in God to suppose that the values in point are as much His creation as mankind, the laws of physics and the world itself, a conclusion which also answers two perennial questions which, while they continue to attract philosophers and theologians, are ignored in most social and political debates - where do our values come from and why are they important?

I hope it is clear from this last comment that nothing in the paper is intended to question a religious view of the world or the role of faith in supporting it. I trust no one will find support for a Humean view that reason alone can explain the miracle and mystery of life.Cicero said 'the question of the nature of the gods is the darkest and most difficult of all…. So various and so contradictory are the opinions of the most learned men on this matter as to persuade one of the truth of the saying that philosophy is the child of ignorance…'