Ideals and interests coalesce in Libya

On declaring the passing of UN Security Council Resolution 1973, an eager French President Nicolas Sarkozy complained that the process had taken too long.

Within hours of receiving UN approval, French jets were in the skies above Libya, pounding Colonel Gaddafi's menacing tanks near Benghazi.

If one were to judge previous UN responses to global crises and conflicts, the international community's reaction to Gaddafi's massacres could not have been done with greater haste.

The West feared a most probable bloodbath in Benghazi had Gaddafi's forces entered the rebel stronghold, and reacted in time to spare the city.

The atrocities in Libya are certainly not the first to have surfaced in recent years. Not too far away, the autocratic rulers of Yemen and Bahrain are showing similar contempt for pro-democracy protesters.

The West's swift reaction to only Gaddafi's crackdown has aroused scepticism among many in the Arab world, as well as Western critics. Indeed, what the coalition is out to achieve in Libya remains unclear. Since Gaddafi's rapprochement with the West in recent years, Europe has significantly benefited from Libyan oil supplies and co-operation on illegal immigration.

No soon after Western fighter jets began bombing Libyan military targets had the charges of hypocrisy and imperialism erupted.

The West makes no secret of its inconsistent and hypocritical policies concerning human rights. It sat idly by as Uzbekistan's US-backed dictator Islam Karimov slaughtered hundreds of opponents protesting his rule in 2005. Nor is it intervening now as Saudi tanks station themselves in Bahrain in a bid to quash pro-democracy protests.

Selective intervention is not simply based on whether a state is a friend or foe, however. The West have also baulked when its opponents have equally used excessive force to repress dissidents. Condemnation was all the Burmese junta received in 2007, and Iran in 2009.

This suggests that Western intervention is contingent on several factors that are inclusive of all of the above: a state's relationship with the West, a cost-benefit analysis, and strategic interests.

Libya appears to tick all the right boxes to enable a military strike. Despite a rapprochement with the West, Gaddafi certainly does not qualify as an ally, or at least not of the same ilk as the Saudi royal family – given the history of violence between Tripoli and the West.

The costs of a No Fly Zone and air strikes are relatively little due to Libya's conventional inferiority. This would obviously change should ground forces be deployed, raising the costs of intervention as the threat to foreign troops increases.

Western strategic interests in Libya is perhaps the only ambiguous aspect to the intervention. The West is already a recipient of Libyan oil, and little is known of Libya's opposition, or what form a Libyan democracy would take. Arab public opinion is highly critical and cynical of Western involvement in the region. As is becoming apparent in neighbouring Egypt, the emergence of popular rule does not necessarily equate to warmer relations.

Legitimacy

Whilst the current debate is centred on whether the West should have intervened, few have questioned the world policeman's role Western nations have proclaimed as their own.

Despite seeking approval from the United Nations for military intervention, one cannot possibly assume the five permanent seat holders at the Security Council – formed in the aftermath of World War II – still reflect the dynamics of international relations today. That Britain and France, long past their eras of colonial glory, still hold considerable weight over newcomers Brazil and India, or even Japan, in world affairs is evident of a Security Council out of touch with global realities.

Even those that accuse the West of hypocrisy in Libya do so on the grounds that the West should be consistent in all cases where human rights abuses and genocide are committed.

Thus, among many in both the supportive and opposing camps of military intervention lies a shared belief that the West still has a duty to police world affairs in the 21^st century, as it has done the past four centuries.

Underlying such a belief is a lingering 19^th century, colonialist view distinguishing the world between the civilised, barbarian and primitive states, although perhaps not in such direct terms. The West still retains a self-perception of being the most civilised, and therefore believes it carries an obligation to civilise those still in need, in this case the 'barbarian' Arab world.

Former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami stated in a speech at the Australian National University in 2009 that the West needed to recognise other civilisations on an equal footing, and not as inferior to its own.

However, current arguments in the West appear to only reinforce a colonial perception of the world, and indeed a self-image of the West as a global policeman. The point of contention appears to be on how to apply that role, as opposed to questioning whether that role is still suitable for the West in a post-colonial world where its power is in decline.

New reality in the Arab world

Nothing is more evident of a decline in Western global power than the current revolutions ongoing in the Arab world.

Under Western domination since the end of World War I, the masses of the Arab world are seeking to reclaim sovereignty over their affairs, and indeed, their destiny. The status quo of the Arab world is a product of a colonial project, where European powers drew artificial boundaries and empowered large families and clans to the thrones of a number of Arab states. The US simply inherited such a policy post-World War II, and has maintained dominance over the region ever since.

That Washington has been unable to stem popular uprisings (not the first in recent history) threatening a region of US-backed despots signals that the end of American hegemony in the region is drawing near.

It is with this understanding, thus, that we must distinguish Libya from the Iraq invasion. The conflict in Libya arose from a local push for reform and democracy. Much credit must be given to the domestic agents in the Arab world that have risen against their tyrants en masse out of frustration at a lack of freedom and economic opportunity.

Western intervention has been aimed at reinforcing such a drive in Libya that was extremely close to total annihilation at the hands of Gaddafi.

This differs significantly from Iraq, where the project was initiated, drafted and implemented completely by external forces. Little engagement of domestic agents was sought, as the Bush administration pushed to impose his New Middle East agenda on Iraq.

There is no such imposition in Libya, but instead a unique union of ideals and interests that have enabled military intervention to take place.

The Libyan conflict is a rare occasion where Arab popular demands and Western idealism and interests are on the same side, thus highlighting the need to contextualise each case. One does not and should not expect the West to apply a similar policy in the Persian Gulf as it does in Libya, as each conflict presents its own opportunities and consequences, which need to be weighed individually.

Regardless of what interests are at stake for the West in Libya, it appears an old perception of its role as the world policeman is part of the driving force in its decision to intervene. It is also a signal to other emerging powers that the West is determined to ensure its liberal democratic values continue to underpin international norms and expectations in the 21^st century.

Although the notion of a Western global policeman might be dismissed as outdated international political logic in Moscow and Beijing, it appears to be doing its job in Libya – albeit a rare occasion of commendable action by the West.