Mohammed El Baradei is no shoo-in as Egyptian leader

To overcome this problem, El Baradei has promised that if he does become President, he will adopt a pro-Arab rather than a pro-Western approach that will align Egyptian interests with the rest of the Arab world. He has also sought to cultivate ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in a possible effort to seek their endorsement for the presidency.

This collaboration is highly advantageous for both parties: (a) Brotherhood support provides El Baradei with an immediate constituency and eliminates the need to develop one; (b) Brotherhood’s endorsement of El Baradei would expedite its re-entry into the political arena and reduce their risk of being marginalized by the West. While El Baradei is Muslim, he does not subscribe to Islamist doctrine. Hence, this collaboration with the Brotherhood would be at best, a temporary marriage of convenience.

The second candidate is the current Vice-President and former Director of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate (GID) - Omar Suleiman. Suleiman is best known internationally for his role as mediator between Egypt, Israel and HAMAS, as well as mediator between Fatah and HAMAS. He possesses impressive military credentials, commands the respect of the Army and is a close ally of Mubarak.

Suleiman is said to have a deep distrust of Iran, favours maintaining close ties with the US, supports the current peace agreement with Israel, and is strongly against the Muslim Brotherhood. In fact as Director of the GID, one of his main tasks was to clamp down on the Brotherhood, which often entailed arbitrary arrests, indefinite detention and torture of members/supporters.

He is also credited with assisting in the US’ controversial rendition program. His worldview and former responsibilities, make him an ideal candidate for those that wish to maintain the status quo in Egypt (particularly the US and Israel), however, it does not make him popular among Egyptians.

It is highly unlikely that he will ascend to the presidency unaided, and for now, will continue to play the role of maintaining stability until a new President is elected.

A recent entry into the presidential race is Amr Moussa. Moussa was formerly Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1991 to 2001 and is currently the Secretary-General of the Arab League. He has expressed his desire to contest the Presidency when his term as Secretary-General expires in two months stating that “Every citizen who is ready for any post has the right to aspire for it...I am ready to serve Egypt as long as I believe it is necessary for me to serve it.”

Moussa is popular among many Egyptians despite his career in the Mubarak administration due in part to his willingness to challenge government positions on various sensitive issues such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the US invasion of Iraq. While his criticisms incensed US and Israeli officials, they seemed to have endeared him to local Egyptians. Moussa is said to be highly respected even among supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.

While Moussa commands a high degree of domestic legitimacy, his administration style may be a cause of concern for those wishing to see an end to corruption in the Egyptian political system. Accusations of cronyism have been levelled at Moussa by former and current Arab League staff. In addition, it is unclear if Moussa has or can get the endorsement of the Army since he is not a military man.

The dynamics affecting the presidential race suggest that coalitions between the contenders might have to be formed since no candidate seems strong enough to assume the reins of government unassisted. It is for this reason that the formation of an interim government until September when elections take place is strategically beneficial to all contenders. This would allow them to be better prepared as they can formulate election strategies, establish coalitions and canvass support.

The question at the heart of the matter is whether Egypt is likely to replace the current regime with an Islamist one. The answer is a resounding ‘NO’.

The reasons for this include: (a) An Islamic state with the enforcement of Sharia law would change the whole fabric of Egyptian life and not necessarily for the better; (b) the advantages of having a purely Islamic regime have yet to be proven. What Egyptians do want is a state that is guided by Islamic principles that protects fundamental human rights and facilitates social and economic progress to all.

This implies that candidates campaigning on a purely Islamist platform are not particularly appealing - a fact recognised by the Muslim Brotherhood, which accounts for its willingness to enter into dialogue with El Baradei.

Although it remains unclear as to whom the next president will be, 2011 will definitely be a year of political change in Egypt, especially as Mubarak’s international supporters prepare to abandon ship.